Speaker: Stefan Lamp
Co-authors: Mario Samano, Silvana Tiedemann
Affiliation: PUC
Date and time: Wednesday, September 24, 2025 14:30 (Santiago, GMT-03:00)
Location:

• Auditorio at the Central Bank of Chile, Morandé 115, second floor.
• Online meeting

Registration: seminarios@bcentral.cl

Abstract: Auctions are increasingly used by governments to select suppliers and determine levels of policy support. In the context of renewable energy (RE) investment, they have become dominant in the ongoing energy transition. Using unique bid-level data from German RE auctions (2015-2019), this paper documents bidding behavior and recovers bidders’ costs under uniform and pay-as-bid pricing rules by estimating a structural model of multi-unit auctions that accounts for future cash flows from subsidies. By conducting counterfactual analyses on the impact of switching to a non-discriminatory auction, we find that such a change may have reduced subsidy expenditures and mitigated market power.