
# **Disappearing Dollar Convenience?**

Monetary Policy, Financial Markets, and Challenges Ahead: Celebrating the Centennial of the Central Bank of Chile

November 2025


Miguel Chumbo (Stanford GSB) and Arvind Krishnamurthy (Stanford GSB and NBER)



Risk

L

## **Convenience Yields, Across Currencies**



**US Payoffs** 

Foreign Payoffs, converted

## Within Dollar Measurement, Short-maturity bonds

Consider a one-period bond that provides liquidity/convenience services of  $v_t$ . Then,


$$i_t^{(1)} = y_t^{(1)} - v_t \tag{1}$$

offers  $\beta_t < 1$  fraction of convenience (i.e.,  $\beta_t v_t$ ) and has yield,


$$y_t^{(1,\beta)} = y_t^{(1)} - \beta_t v_t, \tag{2}$$

so that,

$$S_t^{(1,\beta)} = y_t^{(1,\beta)} - i_t^{(1)} = (1 - \beta_t)v_t.$$
(3)



Either  $v_t$  declined, or  $\beta^{Tbills}$  fell to  $\beta^{CP}$  by 2023



Treasury Bills - Repo

 $\beta^{\mathit{Tbills}}$  fell relative  $\beta^{\mathit{repo}}$  in 2023

## Long-term Spread, Treasury

- Long-term Treasury bond is used by banks as collateral to create short-term repo securities
- Repo carries a convenience yield  $v_t$
- Long-term Treasury bond prices in  $v_t$  ("collateral premium")

au-period Treasury, including dealer balance sheet costs  $\gamma_t$  and  $\beta_t^{\textit{Treas}} < 1$  of collateral:

$$y_{t}^{(\tau, Treas)} = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ \underbrace{y_{t+j}^{(1)}}_{Exp. \, Hypothesis} - \underbrace{\beta_{t+j}^{Treas} v_{t+j}}_{Conv. \, Yield} + \underbrace{\gamma_{t+j}}_{Costs} \right] + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ \mu_{t+j}^{(\tau-j)} - y_{t+j}^{(1)} \right]}_{Term \, Premium}$$
(4)

## Long-term Spread, Treasury

au-period Treasury:

$$y_{t}^{(\tau, Treas)} = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} \mathbb{E}_{t} [y_{t+j}^{(1)} - \beta_{t+j}^{Treas} v_{t+j} + \gamma_{t+j}] + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} \mathbb{E}_{t} [\mu_{t+j}^{(\tau-j)} - y_{t+j}^{(1)}]}_{\text{Term Premium}}$$
(5)

au-period non-convenience bond:

- BBB corporate bonds are not collateral
- BBB bond + credit default swap to strip out default risk component of pricing

$$y_{t}^{(\tau)} = \underbrace{\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} E_{t}[y_{t+j}^{(1)}]}_{\text{Expectations Hypothesis}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} E_{t}[\mu_{t+j}^{(\tau-j)} - y_{t+j}^{(1)}]}_{\text{Term Premium}}$$
(6)

$$S_t^{\tau,CorpTreas} = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} E_t \left[ \beta_{t+j}^{Treas} v_{t+j} - \gamma_{t+j} \right] \tag{7}$$

#### Long-term Spread, Repo Swap

au-period non-convenience bond:


$$y_{t}^{(\tau)} = \underbrace{\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} E_{t}[y_{t+j}^{(1)}]}_{\text{Expectations Hypothesis}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} E_{t}[\mu_{t+j}^{(\tau-j)} - y_{t+j}^{(1)}]}_{\text{Term Premium}}$$
(8)

Fixed rate on  $\tau$ -period dollar repo (SOFR) interest rate swap:

$$i_t^{(\tau)} = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} E_t[i_{t+j}^{(1)}] + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j=0}^{\tau-1} E_t[\mu_{t+j}^{(\tau-j)} - y_{t+j}^{(1)}]}_{\text{Term Premium}}.$$
 (9)

Note: swaps have no balance sheet costs and setting  $\beta=1$ :

$$S_t^{\tau,CorpSOFR} = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{i=0}^{\tau-1} E_t[v_{t+j}]. \tag{10}$$



#### **Taking Stock**


- 1. The  $\beta$  (convenience fraction) of Treasurys, both long and short, has fallen
- 2. Short-term spread moves tell us clearly that dollar repo is the new dollar safe asset
- 3. Long-term SOFR spread moves tells us that the convenience attached to repo, ( $\sim 90bps$ ) is stable over last 5 years and expected to persist at current levels

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Point (3) is somewhat surprising given the deficits and the large increase in the stock of Treasurys. It has declined since 2015.

# **International Liquidity**



**US Payoffs** 


Foreign Payoffs, converted

#### Measurement

- $i_t^{(1)}$  is dollar safe rate (repo),  $\beta^{1,\$}=1$
- $i_t^{(1)*}$  is foreign safe rate (Euro STR),  $eta^{1,*}=1$
- Forward premium:  $\rho_t^{(1)} = log F_t^{(1)} log X_t^{(1)}$

Swap foreign into dollars and construct spread relative to dollars:


$$S_t^{ extit{xccy}, extit{safe}} = \left(i_t^{(1)*} + 
ho_t^{(1)}
ight) - i_t^{(1)}$$




G10 (average) vs Treasury, from Jiang, Krishnamurthy, Lustig (2021)



Euro STR (safe interbank rate) versus Treasury, and repo





Foreign safe versus US repo




Euro safe versus US repo, by maturity  $\dots$  [expectations hypothesis logic]

# Flight to dollar? Liberation day







#### Conclusions

- 1 U.S. liquidity demand have reorganized around repo as the dollar safe asset, and valuations at "normal" levels
- 2 The richness of dollar short-term safe assets relative to Euro safe assets has fallen over the last 5 years to near zero over the last 6 months.
- 3 Also fallen relative to other currency safe assets, but less so
- 4 Pricing from the term-structure of basis swaps (downward slope) indicates that the markets had anticipated some of this occurrence, although the realized fall has been larger than the term-structure-based expectation.
- 5 Dollar depreciated after April 2 not appreciated; flight from dollar and Treasurys

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Asset price metrics indicate erosion of international role of dollar safe assets. Quantities move slower.