

Accounting for Nature in Economic Models and Decisionmaking

Nicoletta Batini (Sveriges Riksbank) and Luigi Durand (CBoC)

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The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Sveriges Riksbank or its Board, nor those of the Central Bank of Chile or its Board.

- Introduction (policy relevance, questions, our contributions)
- A two-bloc model with Nature
- The Social Planner Problem
- Calibration
- Model Dynamics
- Green Policies
- Conclusion

Policy Relevance

- ▶ The decline or disappearance of biological diversity, also known as “biodiversity loss”, has accelerated dramatically over the past half century
- ▶ Biodiversity loss is a risk for the environment and for humanity because biodiversity is key to producing what we need to live
- ▶ At the same time, the major drivers of biodiversity loss – are all “by-products” of economic growth and production (IPBES (2016))

Policy Questions


- ▶ How should capital from Nature (*aka* “Natural Capital” or K_N) be accounted for in economic models and decisionmaking?
- ▶ What are the implications of accounting for Nature in economic models used to inform policy?
- ▶ Is there a role for green policies that can help conserve more Nature?

- ▶ Traditional growth models, like the Solow-Swan 1956 neoclassical growth model (Solow (1956)), are silent about the natural foundation of production
- ▶ Following large oil shocks and rising pollution, in the 70s, attempts made to embed non-renewable natural resources; see Solow (1974), Stiglitz (1974); Dasgupta and Heal (1974), and Hartwick (1977)
- ▶ In the 1990s, limits to growth analysis begun (see Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), Howitt and Aghion (1998), Brock and Taylor (2010))
- ▶ Then came attempts to model K_N as a renewable resource (Mourmouras (1991); Hinterberger et al. (1997); Bringezu et al. (2003); Copeland and Taylor (2009))
- ▶ A growing literature focuses on the political economy aspects of renewable resources management (Karp and Rezai (2014a), Karp and Rezai (2014b))
- ▶ Dasgupta (2021) proposes to add K_N in production function as, both (1) a flow of “services” yield by natural assets (e.g. timber, catches of fishery products, produce, etc.), and as (2) a given stock of the biosphere necessary to ensure the continuation of key ecosystem services as well as life on Earth and human productive activities (see also Kornafel and Telega (2020))

- ▶ Model K_N as a *bounded factor input* in the supply side of a fully specified two-bloc growth model to proxy biophysical limits to economic production and allow for tipping points in its evolution
- ▶ Link value of K_N to its 'exploited' value (e.g. a killed whale, fallen tree) *but also* to its economic value when conserved
- ▶ Derive optimal green policies to foster sustainable production
- ▶ **Show that:**
 - (1) when natural assets are abundant, it is optimal to deplete some and conserve some, but less depletion should occur if there is a critical threshold beyond which Nature is irreversibly altered;
 - (2) if production can push Nature to a level beyond which it can no longer regenerate itself, lower initial output and consumption levels make growth sustainable and stronger long run;
 - (3) when Nature is a driver of TFP, subsidizing the conservation of Nature can improve economic welfare for all countries.

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A two-bloc model with Nature



Macro ingredients of the two-bloc model

- ▶ Households [▶ Details](#)
- ▶ Intermediate brown/green firms [▶ Details](#)
- ▶ Intermediate input and final consumption good firms [▶ Details](#)
- ▶ **Natural capital**
- ▶ Aggregation and market clearing [▶ Details](#)

Brown production:

- ▶ It includes any type of technical process that uses the stock of Nature as an input in an unsustainable way (meaning that it has an impact on the accumulation of K_N between two periods)
 - ▶ forest logging, industrial crop and animal farming, " K_N -consuming" manufacturing, etc.

Green production has two interpretations:

- ▶ It can include any type of technical process that relies on the stock of Nature as an input, in a sustainable way
 - ▶ poly-culture and regenerative land and ocean farming, conservation activities, sustainable forest management
 - ▶ other economic activities such as textiles, manufacturing, real estate, etc. where the amount of virgin materials used is reduced (for example through renewable energy production, recycling of material inputs etc.)
- ▶ It can be interpreted as environmental offsets

⇒ Importantly, green production can exploit the stock of Nature, the only restriction being that from one period to the next the exploitation must be such there is no perturbation in the natural accumulation of K_N

Modeling Natural Capital

- ▶ The stock of natural capital ($K_{N,t}$) is assumed to evolve as a function of the amount that is exploited for production ($K_{N,t}^b$), the amount that is preserved ($K_{N,t}^g$), and parameters such as the intrinsic regeneration rate (r_N), the carrying capacity level (CC), and its critical threshold (CT)

$$K_{N,t+1} = K_{N,t+1}(K_{N,t}^b, K_{N,t}^g, r_N, CC, CT)$$

$$K_{N,t} = K_{N,t}^b + K_{N,t}^g$$

- ▶ The values of r_N , CC , CT are going to be assumed exogenous, constant, known, and common across all firms
- ▶ r_N contributes to the rate at which natural capital is regenerated when left untouched
- ▶ CC indicates the upper ecological limit of natural capital (fauna and flora)
⇒ The max amount of K_N that can be sustained given the resources available in the ecosystem
- ▶ CT refers to the critical threshold for natural capital, or its 'tipping point'
- ▶ To capture these dynamics we focus on two main alternative specifications for natural capital

Specification 1: Natural capital with no critical threshold

- ▶ The stock of natural capital can always recover to its original, carrying capacity level, no matter what amount of depletion occurs between periods
- ▶ The stock of natural capital depends non-linearly on its “background” or “natural” regeneration rate, r_N , and its CC level

$$K_{N,t+1} = \underbrace{K_{N,t} \left(1 + r_N \left(1 - \frac{K_{N,t}}{CC} \right) \right)}_{\text{Natural Accumulation}} - \underbrace{K_{N,t}^b}_{\text{Economic Activity}} \quad (1)$$

- ▶ We define the accumulation rate of natural capital as:

$$A_{N,t} \equiv r_N K_{N,t} \left(1 - \frac{K_{N,t}}{CC} \right)$$

⇒ This is the traditional specification used in the literature (see Copeland and Taylor (2009))

Specification 2: Natural capital with critical threshold

- ▶ The stock of natural capital is also dependent on CT
- ▶ The equation for natural capital under this specification becomes

$$K_{N,t+1} = K_{N,t} \left(1 + r_N \left(1 - \frac{K_{N,t}}{CC} \right) \left(\frac{K_{N,t}}{CT} - 1 \right) \right) - K_{N,t}^b \quad (2)$$

- ▶ In this case, once $K_{N,t} < CT$, the existing stock of natural capital converges progressively to zero. The accumulation rate is then given by:

$$A_{N,t} \equiv r_N K_{N,t} \left(1 - \frac{K_{N,t}}{CC} \right) \left(\frac{K_{N,t}}{CT} - 1 \right)$$


- ▶ In the presence of a critical threshold, the rate at which natural capital accumulates/decumulates depends not only on CC but also on CT

⇒ Less common specification (emphasized in Dasgupta (2021))

Natural capital accumulation rates: A graphical representation

- ▶ Figure 1 plots the rate at which natural capital evolves (that is, its accumulation rate A_N) with or without CT , normalizing the value of CC to 1 and assuming $CT = 0.7$ and setting $r_N = \{0.41, 1.41\}$


Figure 1: Nature Accumulation Rates (A_N)



Natural capital accumulation rates: A graphical representation

- ▶ A higher CT ($CT = 0.75$) compresses the region where there is positive accumulation of K_N and impairs the regeneration rate when K_N is close to the CT


Figure 2: Nature Accumulation Rates (A_N)



Natural capital accumulation rates: A graphical representation

- ▶ A higher r_N (by 10%) increases the accumulation rate of K_N

Figure 3: Nature Accumulation Rates (A_N)



Accounting for uncertainty in accumulation rates

- ▶ In practice, under both specifications, the accumulation rate of K_N remains uncertain because shocks to each specification may affect the evolution of natural capital
- ▶ To capture this we go one step further in modeling K_N and postulate that there are shocks that affect multiplicatively the accumulation rate

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(z_{t+1}) &= \rho^N \ln(z_t) + \sigma \epsilon_{t+1} \\ \epsilon_t &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ We thus re-write the law of motion of natural capital (in the absence of critical threshold) as:

$$K_{N,t+1} = K_{N,t} \left(1 + z_t r_N \left(1 - \frac{K_{N,t}}{CC} \right) \right) - K_{N,t}^b$$

- ▶ and similarly for the case when there is a CT
- ▶ The multiplicative assumption implies that the greater A_N , the larger the uncertainty that the agents or Social Planner face when making optimal decisions

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The Social Planner Problem

- ▶ To study the role of policy in the optimal management of natural assets, we introduce in the model an unconstrained global Social Planner (SP)
- ▶ Her role is to maximize global welfare subject to world resources constraints and the dynamics of natural capital
- ▶ Global welfare depends on domestic and foreign consumption (C_t, C_t^*) through the utility functions $U(\bullet)$ of the households living in the H and F blocs, and does not have a specific preference nor target for a certain level of the natural capital stock

$$U(C_t) \equiv \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma}$$
$$U(C_t^*) \equiv \frac{C_t^{*1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma}$$

The Social Planner Problem: $\max_{\psi} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (\chi U(C_t) + (1 - \chi)U(C_t^*))$ s.t.

$$Y_{F,t} = C_{F,t}^* + C_{F,t} + K_{t+1}^* - (1 - \delta^*)K_t^* \quad (3)$$

$$Y_{H,t} = C_{H,t} + C_{H,t}^* + K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)K_t \quad (4)$$

$$Y_{b,t}(1 - \kappa(K_{N,t}, K_{N,t}^b)) = I_{b,t}^* + I_{b,t} \quad (5)$$

$$Y_{g,t} = I_{g,t}^* + I_{g,t} \quad (6)$$

$$K_{N,t} = K_{N,t}^g + K_{N,t}^b \quad (7)$$

$$K_{N,t+1} = K_{N,t+1}(K_{N,t}^b, K_{N,t}^g, r_N, CT, CC) \quad (8)$$

together with a list of definitions and clearing conditions.

- ▶ $\kappa(K_{N,t}, K_{N,t}^b)$ is a cost function that is increasing in the amount of exploited natural capital for a given stock
- ▶ Y_H (Y_F) is domestic (foreign) final consumption goods output, C_F (C_F^*) domestic (foreign) consumption of foreign goods, C_H (C_H^*) domestic (foreign) consumption of home goods, K (K^*) domestic (foreign) physical capital, Y_b (Y_g) brown (green) output and I_b (I_g) brown (green) intermediate inputs
- ▶ FOCS [▶ Here](#)

The Social Planner Problem: Shadow Price of Nature

- ▶ A special FOC pertains to the shadow price of natural capital, μ_t . Based on the SP problem's FOC with respect to $K_{N,t}^g$, this is given by:

$$\mu_t = \underbrace{-\lambda_{3,t} \left(\frac{\partial Y_{b,t}}{\partial K_{N,t}^g} \left(1 - \kappa(K_{N,t}, K_{N,t}^g) \right) - Y_{b,t} \frac{\partial \kappa(K_{N,t}, K_{N,t}^g)}{\partial K_{N,t}^g} \right)}_{\text{Marginal Costs from conservation}} - \underbrace{\lambda_{4,t} \frac{\partial Y_{g,t}}{\partial K_{N,t}^g}}_{\text{Marginal Benefits from conservation}}$$

where

$$\frac{\partial Y_{b,t}}{\partial K_{N,t}^g} < 0; \quad \frac{\partial \kappa(K_{N,t}, K_{N,t}^g)}{\partial K_{N,t}^g} < 0$$

- ▶ The shadow price of natural capital can be interpreted as the difference between two magnitudes: the marginal cost from foregoing an additional unit of K_N in the production of brown intermediate goods; and the marginal benefit associated with preserving one additional unit of K_N for the production of green intermediate goods
- ▶ This means that in our set up, the shadow price of K_N is positive when there exists a trade-off between exploitation and conservation of the stock of natural capital

The Social Planner Problem: Hotelling Condition

- ▶ K_N 's shadow price must satisfy an intertemporal condition. This relates the current shadow price with expected future benefits from changes in the amount of available K_N
- ▶ Following from the FOC with respect to $K_{N,t+1}$, this Hotelling condition is given by:

$$\mu_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\mu_{t+1} \frac{\partial A_{N,t+1}}{\partial K_{N,t+1}} + \lambda_{3,t+1} \left(\frac{\partial Y_{b,t+1}}{\partial K_{N,t+1}} (1 - \kappa(K_{N,t+1}, K_{N,t+1}^g)) - Y_{b,t+1} \frac{\partial \kappa(K_{N,t+1}, K_{N,t+1}^g)}{\partial K_{N,t+1}} \right) \right]$$

- ▶ Assuming $\mu_t > 0$, the pace of natural capital accumulation/decumulation rate thus depends on two forces: first, the change in K_N accumulation rate, which in turn depends on the level of the natural capital stock relative to CC (and CT if this is assumed); second, the marginal value of changes to next period's natural capital stock on brown production

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- ▶ We assume that one period corresponds to 5 years, in line with the literature that focuses on modeling long-run climate economics phenomena
- ▶ We align common macroeconomic parameters with prior existing empirical literature
- ▶ We assume no Home bias in consumption
- ▶ We experiment with parameters governing natural capital basing our priors on environmental research in connection to each parameter, since the economic literature on this is scarce or non-existent
- ▶ Our analysis should be taken as a numerical exploration rather than a quantitative one

Calibration: Macro Parameters

- ▶ For the intratemporal rate of substitution between intermediate inputs, g, b , previous literature has found a vast range of estimates highlighting the difficulty in pinning down a value for our parsimonious model \Rightarrow we use a value equal to 1.5, so as to emphasize imperfect substitution
 - ▶ this value is below 2.4, which is the value reported for domestic and imported intermediates by Blaum et al. (2018) but above the value of 0.9 proposed by Peter and Ruane (2023) to characterize the elasticity between energy, material and services inputs
- ▶ For the share of green inputs in the intermediate goods production function we chose 10%. This allows to incorporate well the trade-off that a SP is likely to face, conditional on the current economic structure

$$I_t = \left(\underbrace{\omega_g}_{10\%} I_{g,t}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} + \underbrace{\omega_b}_{90\%} I_{b,t}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}$$

and similarly for I_t^*

- ▶ Other details [▶ Here](#); full Table with values [▶ Here](#)

- ▶ To set the CT level, we rely on current estimates of what is considered a safe decline in biodiversity levels, and ecosystems more generally
 - ▶ We use the Atlantic rainforest as a reference; the forest itself when in a self-sustainable state can recycle much of the rain that falls on it, generating a self-preserving cycle. Removing as little as 30% of the forest cover *could* impede this self-perpetuating stabilizing cycle (see Nepstad et al. (2007), Salati (1987), Farley (2008)). A similar threshold applied for fish populations ((Bousquet et al. (2008) and Thorpe et al. (2015)))

⇒ Normalizing the level of CC to 1 we set $CT = 0.7$

- ▶ To calibrate the regeneration rate r_N , we follow Poorter et al. (2021), who analyzed 2,200 patches of forest in West Africa and Central and South America, including areas of the Atlantic and Amazon rainforests
 - ▶ The main results of the study suggest after deforestation the forests' structure and function had fully returned after 60 years

⇒ We set $r_N = 1.4$ for the model without CT and 0.4 for the model with CT

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- ▶ We study how decisions by the Social Planner in the model are affected by different initial levels of natural capital and by natural capital's own dynamics
- ▶ We start by assuming that there is no TFP growth. We look at four natural capital scenarios:
 - ▶ (1) initially abundant K_n , no CT ;
 - ▶ (2) initially abundant K_n , CT ;
 - ▶ (3) critically depleted K_n , no CT ;
 - ▶ (4) critically depleted K_n , CT .
- ▶ In all cases we trace the behavior of both natural capital and key macro-variables as the economy evolves starting from the given levels of the state variables toward the model long-run stationary equilibrium
- ▶ We then move to a world with positive (exogenous) TFP growth and perform a similar analysis


- ▶ To be able to compare the model dynamics we start by computing initial (time t_0) values of the key macroeconomic variables between the case with CT and the case with no CT
- ▶ This allows subsequently to put relative growth rates into context across the two scenarios
- ▶ The Table reports such values showing that in the presence of a CT there is lower economic activity than in a world in which there is no CT ...
- ▶ with the exception of green production and green labor

Table 1: Percentage (%) in levels at t_0
(CT versus no-CT)

Var.	$\Delta(\%)$
C	-21.8
Y_b	-40.5
Y_g	20.9
N_b	-2.0
N_g	22.6
Inv	-29.2
Inv^*	-28.9
Y_H	-22.2
Y_F	-23.6

- ▶ In our set up it is not optimal to maintain K_N close to its CC level because this requires setting aside a large portion of natural capital for conservation, which in turn implies reducing substantially the production of brown goods
- ▶ The output trade-off when K_N is close to CC is particularly stark because—both and without a CT —the rate at which natural capital accumulates is low, as in the proximity of CC this rate declines as natural capital increases (Figure ▶ Accumulation Rates)
- ▶ It follows that when the economy finds itself with a high level of K_N close to CC , the SP , efficiently chooses to lower the natural capital stock gradually over time


Figure 4: Natural Capital Dynamics



Model Dynamics: Cases (1) (2) -Abundant Initial K_N (Continued)

- ▶ There is a smooth decline of brown production
- ▶ Physical investment also declines
- ▶ Since the speed of physical disinvestment is higher than the speed at which output declines, in equilibrium consumption can temporarily increase, before falling
- ▶ When there is no CT green output falls; this outcome is efficient due to the relatively small share that green production plays in generating the final consumption goods
- ▶ When there is a CT , green output increases; this is possible because of a sufficiently strong re-allocation of labor from the brown sector towards the green sector

Figure 5: Growth Rates of Macroeconomic Variables



Model Dynamics: Cases (3) (4) -Critically Depleted Initial K_N

- ▶ To be able to compare the model dynamics in this case relative to the previous case we compute initial (time t_0) values of the key macroeconomic variables in this case versus the abundant K_N case
- ▶ This allows to put relative growth rates into context across the two scenarios.
- ▶ The Table reports such values for both the no- CT and the CT assumptions, showing that in both cases, there is lower economic activity than in a world in which natural capital is initially abundant
- ▶ The discrepancy in activity is visibly larger in the presence of a CT than in the absence of it, with the exception of green production and green labor


Table 2: Percentage (%) in levels at t_0
(Critical vs. Abundant)

Var.	Exo CT	No CT
C	-32.3	-4.9
Y_b	-61.9	-10.7
Y_g	8.0	-10.7
N_b	-4.1	0.0
N_g	35.5	0.0
Inv	-90.5	-17.2
Inv^*	-85.6	-16.6
Y_H	-39.0	-6.5
Y_F	-41.6	-7.0

Model Dynamics: Cases (3) (4) -Critically Depleted Initial K_N (Continued)

- ▶ Like in the abundant case, natural capital adjusts to its economically efficient long-run levels
- ▶ The *rate* at which natural capital accumulates in this scenario is much lower, however, when a *CT* is present
- ▶ When the economy starts with a low stock of natural assets, and there exists a *CT*, it is obviously optimal to conserve more natural assets than when the economy starts in an abundant K_N state
- ▶ Moving away from *CT* also raises the rate at which Nature can regenerate itself, which in turn allows the social planner to count on more natural capital in the future while still allowing for more K_N^b accumulation in the near term—a virtuous cycle


Figure 6: Natural Capital Dynamics



Model Dynamics: Cases (3) (4) -Critically Depleted Initial K_N (Continued)

- ▶ Brown output can expand *while* green output declines due to labor reallocation; overall consumption increase through time
- ▶ This happens because while, with K_N initially close to CT , it is optimal for the social planner at first to reduce brown output and divert resources to green production—in order to raise the level of K_N from its critically-depleted state...
- ▶ as the economy moves away from its tipping point it becomes increasingly inefficient to sacrifice brown production to favor green production
- ▶ When there is no critical threshold, there are no large qualitative differences from an abundant natural capital state

Figure 7: Growth Rates of Macroeconomic Variables



Adding Technological Growth


- ▶ In this case the policy functions are time-inhomogenous
- ▶ The growth processes are formalized following Barrage and Nordhaus (2023):

$$A_{j,t} = A_{j,t-1} / (1 - g_{0,j} \exp(-g_{1,j} N(t-1)))$$

for $j \in \{H, F, c, h\}$

- ▶ We calibrate the initial exogenous productivity levels of H, F by matching the relative average TFP in 2019 between the two groups
- ▶ To calibrate $A_{H,t}, A_{F,t}$ we follow Christensen et al. (2018)
- ▶ We use the same growth rates between the two groups
- ▶ We make the simplifying assumption that $A_{h,t} = A_{c,t} = A_{H,t}$
- ▶ we assume that after 15 periods the economy reaches a steady growth rate
- ▶ From period 20 (i.e. after 100 years), we assume a stationary solution, in which we revert to the naive-approach where the agents policy functions do not incorporate the future path of productivity growth


Figure 8: Growth Rate of Technology



Model Dynamics with Technological Growth

- ▶ The stock of natural capital declines faster and more (accumulates slower and less) than in the absence of technological growth, when we assume the absence (presence) of a *CT*
- ▶ This is because SP internalizes that, for a given level of natural capital conserved today, the marginal benefit that arise from producing brown goods tomorrow—i.e. goods which entail depleting natural capital—are relatively higher compared to a scenario without technological growth
- ▶ This in turn generates an equilibrium where it is optimal to deplete relatively more natural capital (or equivalently, in the *CT* scenario, to conserve relatively less natural capital)


Figure 9: Natural Capital Dynamics



Model Dynamics with Technological Growth (Continued)

- ▶ The dynamics remain coherent with the scenario without technological growth
- ▶ The simulation highlights that in the presence of a CT it is optimal to contain the accumulation of physical capital (that is, to invest less), compared to a scenario without a CT
- ▶ Given the current calibration and assumptions, the exercise suggests a slower accumulation of domestic (foreign) capital in the range of -4.0% (-4.5%) per year on average over the course of the next 10 years

Figure 10: Growth Rates in Macro Variables



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Introducing the TFP externality of Nature


- ▶ We assume the following externalities:

$$y_{g,t} \equiv \underbrace{A_{g,t}^0 (K_{N,t}^g)^{\phi_g}}_{\equiv A_{g,t}} (k_{N,t}^g)^{\alpha_g} n_{g,t}^{1-\alpha_g}$$

$$y_{b,t} \equiv \underbrace{A_{b,t}^0 (K_{N,t}^g)^{\phi_b}}_{\equiv A_{b,t}} (k_{N,t}^b)^{\alpha_b} n_{b,t}^{1-\alpha_b}$$

- ▶ As expected, natural capital accumulation is stronger when there is a CT and the SP internalizes the TFP externality
- ▶ The same virtuous cycle allows eventually for more exploitation and more conservation
- ▶ In both cases there is *front-loading* and the speed of accumulation (decumulation) of natural capital is stronger (milder) during the first periods, as demonstrated by the non-monotonic evolution of the percentage differences in accumulation rates

Figure 11: Natural Capital (% Differences SP and CE)



Note: $\phi_g = 0.05$, $\phi_b = 0.05$, $K_{N,t_0} = 0.75$.

- ▶ A tax authority in the Home country could establish a (lump-sum financed) subsidy offered to the intermediate goods firms on the stock of conserved nature ($k_{N,t}^g$)
- ▶ This subsidy can be expressed in nominal units (that is in the country "currency"), as similarly done in the case of carbon taxes, which are usually expressed in terms of \$ per ton of CO_2
- ▶ In our case, the relevant measure is the "unit of nature"; this unit could be made to correspond to the stock of forests, the stock of fishing population, or the stock of freshwater available net of withdraws

Proposition

A nominal, lump-sum financed, subsidy to the intermediate goods firms equal to $P_t \tau_t k_{N,t}^g$ where τ_t

$$\tau_t = p_{b,t} \phi_b \frac{y_{b,t}}{K_{N,t}^g} (1 - \kappa(k_{N,t}, k_{N,t}^g)) + p_{g,t} \phi_g \frac{y_{g,t}}{K_{N,t}^g}$$

offsets the TFP-related externality associated with the stock of nature.


Green Policies: The case of a Domestic Subsidy Scheme on Intermediate Goods Firms (Continued)

- ▶ The subsidy (as a % of H bloc output)

$$\frac{\tau_t K_{N,t}^g}{p_{H,t} Y_{H,t} - p_{I,t} I_t}$$

- ▶ The numerical illustration shows that the subsidy rate (as a percentage of home GDP) is decreasing through time as the economy adjusts (LHS: $\phi_g = \phi_b = 0.02$; RHS $\phi_g = \phi_b = 0.05$)
- ▶ The dynamics of the subsidy are similar, independently of the assumed elasticity

Figure 12: Optimal Green Subsidy (% Home GDP)




Note: Left y axis corresponds to the case $\phi_g = \phi_b = 0.02$; right y axis corresponds to the case $\phi_g = \phi_b = 0.05$.

- ▶ A subsidy initially determines a drop in consumption compared to the CE; however, higher Nature eventually allow for higher levels of consumption
- ▶ We quantify the proportional increase in consumption that would make the households indifferent between the economy with and without green policies; formally, we define the welfare gains of the households as the value Ω that would make the following equality hold:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{\left((1 + \Omega) C_t \right)^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma} \right] = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{\left(C_t^I \right)^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma} \right]$$

where C_t denotes consumption in the CE and C_t^I denotes the consumption when the intervention is introduced

Figure 13: Consumption (% Diff. CE+subsidy vs. CE)




Note: $\phi_g = \phi_b = 0.05$

Green Policies: Welfare Gains ($\phi_g = \phi_b$)

- ▶ Assuming, as done before, that all realizations of shocks are set to 0, we compute welfare gains as a function of ϕ_g, ϕ_b in both the *CT* and no-*CT* case. Welfare gains are increasing in the size of the externality
- ▶ Welfare gains when having a *CT* are close to zero due to the fact that the policymaker has a very limited margin of action when trying to boost conservation, since the accumulation rate is low
- ▶ Moreover, rational agents in the CE are already allocating a relatively large amount of resources to the green sector, so as to converge away from the *CT*
- ▶ Forgoing additional amounts of the exploited natural resources has very large costs in terms of produced output, since it requires a significant shift of labor from the brown to the green sector to compensate for the decline in the intermediate input

- ▶ Green Policies: Impact on ▶ Relative Prices

Figure 14: Welfare Gains (%)
Low K_{N,τ_0}



Green Policies: Global Tax on Intermediate Inputs

- ▶ Even though direct subsidy on Nature represents a first best policy intervention it might be less practical than policies that affect economic quantities for which a market already exists
- ▶ We analyzed the case of global taxes applied on purchases of intermediate brown goods
- ▶ In the *CE* there is (at least initially) an excess of brown production – the tax is set such that in equilibrium the relative demand of brown inputs (to green inputs) reflects the allocation that arises under a *SP* ([▶ Details](#))
- ▶ We found that only a small share of the original externality is resolved and that welfare gains are contained in both the *CT* and *no – CT* scenarios ([▶ Details](#))
- ▶ Intuitively, the brown tax affects the amount of conservation indirectly through the Hotelling equation:
i) via a decline in the future marginal value of brown goods, ii) via labor markets readjustments following the decline in the demand of brown inputs

- Introduction (policy relevance, questions, our contributions)
- A two-bloc model with Nature
- The Social Planner Problem
- Calibration
- Model Dynamics
- Green Policies
- Conclusion

- ▶ We enriched a standard stochastic two bloc growth model with natural capital alongside man-made capital. Natural capital is an input to production in both blocs, but only one bloc is endowed with it
- ▶ Depletion of natural capital for production reduces its ability to regenerate itself, like in the real natural world
- ▶ We traced the efficient dynamics for natural capital and economic variables by comparing a world still rich in natural assets and a world in which these assets have been critically depleted.
- ▶ We then incorporated an externality in the model (linking the level of natural capital and TFP) and derived optimal policies
- ▶ Our analysis opens the doors to further policy relevant applications, such as the study of the economic impact of greening the production structure of an economy and the welfare costs from delaying the green transition.

Thank You!

Annex

Calibration: Macro Parameters Summary Table

Parameters	Value	Explanation
σ	2	HHs Intra-temporal Elast. of Subst.
β	0.985	HHs Discount Factor
ζ_N	0.30	Labor Share in H Production
ζ_{N^*}	0.25	Labor Share in F production
ζ_K	0.11	Capital Share in H production
ζ_{K^*}	0.11	Capital Share in F production
ω_g	0.10	share of c intermediate inputs in H production
ω_g^*	0.10	Share of c intermediate inputs in F production
ρ	1.50	Intra-temporal Elast. of H intermediate inputs
ρ^*	1.50	Intra-temporal Elast. of F intermediate inputs
α_b	0.48	Share of Natural Capital in h production
α_g	0.48	Share of Natural Capital in c production
ϕ_g, ϕ_b	**	Elasticity of intermed. output to stock of K_N
b_1	10	Parameters in Cost Function of h firms
γ	0.50	Share F consumption goods

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Calibration of Macro Parameters: Details

- ▶ We include in the H bloc countries where the share of total natural resources rents in the data is equal to, or above, the 70th percentile of the full sample item To calibrate the F bloc we include all the remaining countries, with the exclusion of "low income" and "lower middle income" countries
- ▶ We use World Bank data on total resources rents as a share of GDP to distinguish between the two blocs
- ▶ We calibrate the size of each bloc (population) and depreciation rates of physical capital from the Penn World Tables (PWT) as of 2019
- ▶ We calibrate the size of each bloc using population data from the Penn World Tables (PWT) as of 2019
- ▶ The households intratemporal elasticity of substitution of intermediate goods and the discount factor are set within standard ranges (see for example Golosov et al. (2014)).
- ▶ For the shares of intermediate inputs, labor and capital in the production of final consumption goods, we follow results from regressions in Baptist and Hepburn (2013) which, while fit to U.S. data, can be used as a rough starting point sufficient for our numerical illustrations.
- ▶ We calculate the depreciation rates of physical capital using the PWT

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The Global Social Planner Problem: Consumption FOCs

The first order conditions associated with consumption (C_F, C_F^*, C_H, C_H^*) are given by:

$$FOC(C_{F,t}) : \chi \frac{\partial U'(C_t)}{\partial C_{F,t}} = \lambda_{1,t}$$

$$FOC(C_{F,t}^*) : (1 - \chi) \frac{\partial U'(C_t^*)}{\partial C_{F,t}^*} = \lambda_{1,t}$$

$$FOC(C_{H,t}) : \chi \frac{\partial U'(C_t)}{\partial C_{H,t}} = \lambda_{2,t}$$

$$FOC(C_{H,t}^*) : (1 - \chi) \frac{\partial U'(C_t^*)}{\partial C_{H,t}^*} = \lambda_{2,t}$$

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The first order conditions associated with I_{b^*} , I_b give:

$$FOC(I_{b^*,t}) : \lambda_{1,t} \frac{\partial Y_{F,t}}{\partial I_{b^*,t}} = \lambda_{3,t}$$

$$FOC(I_{b,t}) : \lambda_{2,t} \frac{\partial Y_{H,t}}{\partial I_{b,t}} = \lambda_{3,t}$$

$$FOC(I_{j,g^*,t}) : \lambda_{1,t} \frac{\partial Y_{F,t}}{\partial I_{j,g^*,t}} = \lambda_{4,t}$$

$$FOC(I_{g,t}) : \lambda_{2,t} \frac{\partial Y_{H,t}}{\partial I_{g,t}} = \lambda_{4,t}$$

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The first order conditions with respect to N_t^b and N_t^g are given by:

$$FOC(N_t^b) : -\lambda_{2,t} \frac{\partial Y_{H,t}}{\partial N_t^b} = \lambda_{3,t} \frac{\partial Y_{b,t}}{\partial N_t^b} (1 - \kappa(K_{N,t}, K_{N,t}^g))$$

$$FOC(N_t^g) : -\lambda_{2,t} \frac{\partial Y_{H,t}}{\partial N_t^g} = \lambda_{4,t} \frac{\partial Y_{g,t}}{\partial N_t^g}$$

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The first order conditions with respect to K_{t+1}, K_{t+1}^* produce standard Euler conditions:

$$FOC(K_{t+1}^*) : \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\lambda_{1,t+1} \left(\frac{\partial Y_{F,t+1}}{\partial K_{t+1}^*} + (1 - \delta^*) \right) \right] = \lambda_{1,t}$$

$$FOC(K_{t+1}) : \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\lambda_{2,t+1} \left(\frac{\partial Y_{H,t+1}}{\partial K_{t+1}} + (1 - \delta) \right) \right] = \lambda_{2,t}$$

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The Global Social Planner Problem: Specifications and Identities

Consumption Good:

$$C_t \equiv C_{H,t}^{1-\gamma} C_{F,t}^\gamma, \quad C_t^* \equiv C_{H,t}^{*1-\gamma} C_{F,t}^{*\gamma} \quad (9)$$

Foreign Firm: The intermediate input F country firm uses the following CES technology:

$$I_t^* \equiv \left(\omega_g^* I_{g,t}^{*\frac{\rho^*-1}{\rho^*}} + \omega_b^* I_{b,t}^{*\frac{\rho^*-1}{\rho^*}} \right)^{\frac{\rho^*}{\rho^*-1}} \quad (10)$$

The second type of firms' technology uses a Cobb-Douglas CRS Aggregator:

$$Y_{F,t} \equiv A_{F,t} K_t^{*\zeta_K} N_t^{*\zeta_N} I_t^{*1-\zeta_N-\zeta_K} \quad (11)$$

Home Firm: The intermediate good firm is analogously specified as:

$$I_t \equiv \left(\omega_g I_{g,t}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} + \omega_b I_{b,t}^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \quad (12)$$

and the final good firm as:

$$Y_{H,t} \equiv A_{H,t} K_t^{\zeta_K} N_t^{\zeta_N} I_t^{1-\zeta_N-\zeta_K} \quad (13)$$

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The Global Social Planner Problem: Specifications and Identities (Continued)

The Home intermediate production technologies are given by:

$$Y_{g,t} \equiv \underbrace{A_{g,t}^0 (K_{N,t}^g)^{\phi_g}}_{\equiv A_{g,t}} (K_{N,t}^g)^{\alpha_g} N_{g,t}^{1-\alpha_g} \quad (14)$$

$$Y_{b,t} \equiv \underbrace{A_{b,t}^0 (K_{N,t}^g)^{\phi_b}}_{\equiv A_{b,t}} (K_{N,t}^b)^{\alpha_b} N_{b,t}^{1-\alpha_b} \quad (15)$$

The cost function is given:

$$\kappa(K_{N,t}, K_{N,t}^b) = e^{-\frac{b_1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{K_{N,t}^b}{K_{N,t}}\right)^2}$$

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Other Ingredients of the two-bloc model: Households

- ▶ We assume a mass N_t of H households and a mass N_t^* of F households
- ▶ Households in both bloc maximize their utility ($U(c_t), U(c_t^*)$) subject to their respective budget constraints

The budget constraints read as:

$$c_t + p_{H,t}k_{t+1} + \tilde{a}_{t+1} \leq W_t + (R_t^K - \delta)p_{H,t}k_t + R_t\tilde{a}_t + t_t + o_t \quad (16)$$

$$c_t^* + p_{F,t}^*k_{t+1}^* + \tilde{a}_{t+1}^* \leq W_t^* + (R_t^{K*} - \delta^*)p_{F,t}^*k_t^* + R_t^*\tilde{a}_t^* + t_t^* + o_t^* \quad (17)$$

- ▶ In both countries households have access to a risk free internationally traded financial asset, can save through physical capital and supply one unit of labor. We assume complete markets.

The final consumption good is an aggregate of H and F consumption goods

$$C_t = C_t(C_{H,t}, C_{F,t}) \quad (18)$$

$$C_t^* = C_t^*(C_{H,t}^*, C_{F,t}^*) \quad (19)$$

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Other Ingredients of the two-bloc model: Intermediate Goods Green/Brown Firms

- ▶ We assume a continuum of production units
- ▶ The mass of these continua is fixed and normalized to 1.
- ▶ Atomistic firms own a stock of natural capital ($k_{N,t}$) and have available two technologies
- ▶ Each firm can choose how much labor to hire for the production of both green and brown intermediate goods
- ▶ in the case of the brown good, labor is combined with an exploited amount of natural capital ($k_{N,t}^b$)
- ▶ in the case of the green good, labor is combined with the stock of existing natural capital that is not being exploited for the production of the brown good ($k_{N,t}^g$)

The production technologies are given by:

$$y_{g,t} = y_{g,t}(A_{g,t}, k_{N,t}^g, n_{g,t}) \quad (20)$$

$$y_{b,t} = y_{b,t}(A_{b,t}, k_{N,t}^b, n_{b,t}) \quad (21)$$

We assume Cobb-Douglas (C-D) specification (with CRS)

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Other Ingredients of the two-bloc model: Green/Brown Intermediate Goods Firms (Continued)

- ▶ We assume that $A_{i,t} = A_{i,t}^0 (K_{N,t}^g)^{\phi_i}$, for $i \in \{b, g\}$, to capture the fact that productivity also depends on the aggregate stock of natural capital, where $\phi_i > 0$ is a parameter. $A_{i,t}^0$ is an exogenous productivity process, which we assume common across firms of the same sector (e.g., brown or green)
- ▶ We assume variable costs associated with producing the brown good
- ▶ The cost function is assumed to be quadratic and dependent on the remaining stock of natural capital:

$$\kappa(k_{N,t}, k_{N,t}^b) = e^{-\frac{b_1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{k_{N,t}^b}{k_{N,t}}\right)^2}$$

costs are a function of b output and are given by:

$$\kappa(k_{N,t}, k_{N,t}^b) y_{b,t}$$

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Other Ingredients of the two-bloc model: Intermediate Inputs and Final Consumption Goods Firms

In both blocs:

- ▶ There is a representative firm that aggregates the intermediate imported goods into the intermediate composite good
- ▶ There is a representative firm that uses labor, capital, and an intermediate composite good to produce final output

$$I_t^* = I_t^* \left(I_{b,t}^*, I_{g,t}^* \right) \quad (22)$$

$$I_t = I_t \left(I_{b,t}, I_{g,t} \right) \quad (23)$$

$$Y_{F,t} = Y_{F,t} (A_{F,t}, K_t^*, N_t, I_t^*) \quad (24)$$

$$Y_{H,t} = Y_{H,t} (A_{H,t}, K_t, N_t, I_t) \quad (25)$$

K denotes physical capital, N denotes labor, I denotes the intermediate input.

We assume CES specification for the intermediate input firms and CD specification for the final good firm, both with CRS assumption.

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Other Ingredients of the two-bloc model: Aggregation and Market Clearing


$$\begin{aligned} Y_{g,t} &= \int_0^1 y_{g,t}(i) di, & Y_{b,t} &= \int_0^1 y_{b,t}(i) di, & K_{N,t} &= \int_0^1 k_{N,t}(i) di, \\ K_{N,t}^g &= \int_0^1 k_{N,t}^g(i) di, & K_{N,t}^b &= \int_0^1 k_{N,t}^b(i) di, & N_{b,t} &= \int_0^1 n_{b,t}(i) di, \\ N_{g,t} &= \int_0^1 n_{g,t}(i) di, & C_t &= \int_0^{N_t} c_t(i) di, & C_t^* &= \int_0^{N_t^*} c_t^*(i) di, \\ \tilde{A}_t^* &= \int_0^{N_t^*} \tilde{a}_t^*(i) di, & \tilde{A}_t &= \int_0^{N_t} \tilde{a}_t(i) di, & K_t &= \int_0^{N_t} k_t(i) di, & K_t^* &= \int_0^{N_t^*} k_t^*(i) di \end{aligned}$$

$$\tilde{A}_t + \tilde{A}_t^* = 0 \tag{26}$$

$$N_t = N_{H,t} + N_{b,t} + N_{g,t} \tag{27}$$

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Figure 15: Nature Accumulation Rates (A_N)



Theorem

An "inputs-efficient", lump sum financed, global tax scheme can be expressed as a function of the relative marginal value of labor across sectors in the H bloc:

$$\tau_{b,t} = \frac{\frac{\partial Y_{g,t}^{SP}}{\partial N_{g,t}^{SP}}}{\frac{\partial Y_{b,t}^{SP}}{\partial N_{b,t}^{SP}} (1 - \kappa(\bullet)^{SP})} / \frac{\frac{\partial Y_{g,t}^{CE}}{\partial N_{g,t}^{CE}}}{\frac{\partial Y_{b,t}^{CE}}{\partial N_{b,t}^{CE}} (1 - \kappa(\bullet)^{CE})} - 1 \quad (28)$$

where the superscript SP, CE refer to the allocations arising in the social planning and competitive equilibrium, respectively. This tax allows to align the relative purchase of brown intermediate inputs with the allocation that arise in a SP outcome.

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- ▶ Brown goods prices increases in the medium term but eventually settle at a relatively lower level
- ▶ Green goods prices decrease
- ▶ Terms of trade worsens in the short-medium-run but eventually improves

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Figure 16: Rel. Prices - Low $K_{N,t0}$
(% Diff. CE+subs. vs. CE)






Figure 17: Natural Capital
(% Diff. CE+tax and CE)



$$\phi_g = \phi_b = 0.05$$

Figure 18: Welfare Gains (%)
Low $K_{N,t0}$



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