The Heterogeneous Effects of Monetary Policy Theory and an application to the Chilean economy

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- Monetary policy mandate: aggregate inflation and employment
 - Iots of work studiying aggregate effects
 - only recently theory and evidence of cross-sectional effects
- This paper: new theoretical framework
 - heterogeneous workers, produce and consume different goods
 - \blacktriangleright monetary policy \rightarrow cross-sectional income, via production side
- Complementary to HANK
 - focus on consumption/saving decision
 - cross-sectional real income independent of policy



Basic mechanism

- ► Monetary expansion: prices ↑, output ↑
- Relative response governed by Phillips curve:

$$\pi_t = \kappa y_t + \rho \mathbb{E} \pi_{t+1}$$

Flatter if elastic labor supply, sticky prices

$$\kappa = (\gamma + arphi) \, rac{\delta}{1 - \delta}$$

• Prices \uparrow less \iff output \uparrow more

- aggregate: $\pi_t + y_t = \text{nominal demand}$
- cross-section: expenditure switching

Heterogeneous agents



► Expenditure switching → cross-sectional non-neutrality

- ▶ sticky-wage worker: rel wage \downarrow , rel employment \uparrow
- ► Expenditure switching → more aggregate non-neutrality
 - substitution towards sticky worker "flattens" aggregate PC

Quantitative takeaways

Heterogeneous monetary non-neutality in the cross-section

- cumulative employment and income response
- $\blacktriangleright\,$ ranges from $\sim 0.5\%$ to $\sim 3\%$ across demographic groups
- Industry heterogeneity \rightarrow worker heterogeneity
 - input-output linkages amplify cross-sectional non-neutrality
- Agent heterogeneity: small effect on aggregate non-neutrality
 - input-output structure remains crucial

Literature

Framework: Baqaee and Farhi (2018)

$\text{HANK} \rightarrow \text{uniform MPCs},$ heterogeneity from interaction with supply side

Werning (2015), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), Kaplan, Moll, Violante (2018),

Auclert (2019), Auclert, Ronglie, Straub (2019);

Monetary policy with I-O \rightarrow abandon rep agent

Basu (1995), Erceg et al (1999), Aoki (2001), Woodford (2003), Blanchard and Gali (2007), La'O and Tahbaz-Salehi (2021), Rubbo (2021); Carvalho (2006), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008, 2013), Carvalho and Nechio (2011), Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2014), Pasten, Schoenle and Weber (2016, 2017), Castro Cienfuegos (2019), Höynk (2019)

Models with HA-IO \rightarrow derive analytical results, many instruments Benigno (2004), Gali and Monacelli (2008), Engel (2011), Huang and Liu (2005), Bouakez, Rachedi, Santoro (2020), Cox, Muller, Pasten, Schoenle, Weber (2020), Flynn, Patterson, Surm (2021), Huber, Straub, et al. (2021)

Roadmap

- Theory (Monetary Non-Neutrality in the Cross-Section)
 - model setup
 - local and aggregate monetary non-neutrality
 - examples
- Calibration to Chilean economy
 - with Ernesto, Emiliano, and Matias

Outline

Setup

Monetary Non-Neutrality

Calibration

Conclusion

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Environment

- H worker types, N production sectors, F capital assets
- Agents
 - consume different bundles of goods
 - have different labor supply elasticity
 - own different shares of sectors and capital assets
- Sectors
 - hire different bundles of workers and intermediate inputs
 - face different price and wage rigidity
 - face different demand elasticity
- Log-linearized model
 - parameters measured in national accounts

Consumers

Type-h preferences:

$$rac{{{\mathcal{L}}_{h}}\left({{x_{1}},...,{x_{N}}}
ight)^{1-{\gamma _{h}}}}}{{1-{\gamma _{h}}}}-rac{{{\mathcal{L}}_{h}^{1+{arphi _{h}}}}}{{1+{arphi _{h}}}}$$

Budget constraint:



Maximize PDV of utility

Good producers

CRS sectoral production functions:

$$Y_{i} = F_{i}(\{\underline{L_{ih}}\}, \{\underbrace{K_{if}}\}_{\text{labor}}, \underbrace{\{K_{if}\}}_{\text{captial assets intermediate inputs}})$$

- All producers minimize costs, given factor and input prices
- Fraction δ_i of producers adjust price to max profit (Calvo)
 - continuum of firms within sectors, CES bundle
 - optimal input subsidies $(\tau_i) \rightarrow$ efficient steady-state
- Sticky wages: add labor unions with sticky price

Capital assets

- Capital endowment \bar{K} , does not depreciate
 - augmented with "investment", fully depreciates

$$K_f = \left[\left(1 + \varphi_f \right) I_f \right]^{\frac{1}{1 + \varphi_f}} \bar{K}_f$$

- CRS investment production, marginal cost P^I_f
- Choose I to max profits:

$$\Pi_f = \frac{\varphi_f}{1 + \varphi_f} R_f K_f$$

Utilization:

$$U_{f}^{\varphi_{f}} \equiv \left[\left(1 + \varphi_{f} \right) I_{f} \right]^{\frac{\varphi_{f}}{1 + \varphi_{f}}} = \frac{R_{f}}{P_{f}^{l}}$$





Input-output notation

Total input requirements:

$$(I - \Omega)^{-1} = I + \Omega + \Omega^2 + \dots$$

▶ Total content of good *i* in *h*'s final use:

$$\lambda_{hi}^{T} = \left[\beta^{T} \left(I - \Omega\right)^{-1}\right]_{hi}$$

Total content of factor h in l's final use:

$$\left[\alpha^{T}\lambda\right]_{hl}$$

Supply and demand elasticities

Factor supply:

• wealth effects: $\Gamma \equiv diag(\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_H)$

- ► Frish: $\Phi_L \equiv diag(\varphi_1, ..., \varphi_H)$, $\Phi_K \equiv diag(\varphi_1, ..., \varphi_F)$
- ▶ Demand: for each sector *i*, ES between inputs *j* and *k* is θ_{ik}^{i}

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• Price adjustment probabilities: $\Delta = diag(\delta_1, ..., \delta_N)$

Aggregation

► (Endogenous) income shares s = (s^C; s^I):

$$s_{h}^{C} \equiv \frac{P_{h}^{*}C_{h}^{*}}{\sum_{k} P_{k}^{*}C_{k}^{*} + \sum_{f} P_{f}^{*}I_{f}^{*}}, \quad s_{f}^{I} \equiv \frac{P_{f}^{*}I_{f}^{*}}{\sum_{k} P_{k}^{*}C_{k}^{*} + \sum_{f} P_{f}^{*}I_{f}^{*}}$$

Aggregate real GDP

$$d \log Y_t \equiv \sum_h s_h^C d \log C_{ht} + \sum_f s_f^I d \log I_{ft}$$

GDP deflator

$$d \log P_t^Y \equiv \sum_h s_h^C d \log P_{ht}^C + \sum_f s_f^I d \log P_{ft}^I$$

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Variables and policy instruments

Variables:

- sector-level inflation π
- ▶ factor-level employment gaps ℓ
- aggregate output gap $\bar{y} \equiv \sum_h s_h \ell_h$
- Monetary policy pins down \bar{y}
 - today: cash-in-advance constraint and financial autarchy

$$\pi_t^Y + y_t = m_t - p_{t-1}^Y$$

nominal rate: similar, keep track of income transfers



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Equilibrium

► Supply block → Phillips curves:

$$\pi_{it} = \sum_{h} \kappa_{ih} \ell_{ht} - \mathcal{V} \mathbf{p}_{t-1} + (I - \mathcal{V}) \mathbb{E} \pi_{t+1}$$

Cross-sectional demand:

$$\ell_t = (I - \mathcal{X})^{-1} \mathbf{1} \bar{y}_t + \mathcal{F} (\mathbb{E} \pi_{t+1}, \mathbf{p}_{t-1})$$

Aggregate demand:

$$\pi_t^Y + \bar{y}_t = m_t - p_{t-1}^Y$$

Slope $(\Gamma = \mathbb{O})$

▶
$$I, u \uparrow \rightarrow w, r \uparrow \rightarrow \pi \uparrow$$
:

$$\kappa = \Delta \left(I - \Omega \Delta \right)^{-1} \alpha \left(I - \delta_{\beta} \left(\alpha \right) \right)^{-1} \Phi$$

$$\Delta \left(I - \Omega \Delta \right)^{-1} \alpha$$

Price rigidity in consumption:

$$\delta_{\beta}\left(\alpha\right) \equiv \beta^{T} \Delta \left(I - \Omega \Delta\right)^{-1} \alpha$$

Factor price Phillips curves:

$$(I - \delta_{\beta}(\alpha))^{-1} = I + \delta_{\beta}(\alpha) + \delta_{\beta}(\alpha)^{2} + \dots$$

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Cross-sectional employment

$$rac{m\ell}{ar y} = \left[I - m{\mathcal{X}}
ight]^{-1} \left[m{1} + ...
ight]$$

- ► Impact effect: expenditure ↑ proportionately for all goods
- Propagation:
 - factor demand $\uparrow \rightarrow$ real wages (or rental rates) \uparrow
 - larger price increase for goods produced by steep-PC factors
 - demand for their labor falls
 - real wages and prices adjust
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Cross-sectional employment

 $\mathcal{X} = \mathsf{expenditure} \ \mathsf{switching} + \mathsf{income} \ \mathsf{reallocation}$

- Expenditure switching:
 - *h*'s employment \downarrow if *h*, co-workers,... have steep PC

$$-\frac{1}{s_h}\sum_i \lambda_i \theta_i \operatorname{Cov}_{\Omega_{(i,:)}}\left(\left((I-\Omega)^{-1}\alpha\right)_{(:,h)}, \sum_n \kappa_{(:,n)}\ell_n\right) + \dots\right)$$

- Income reallocation: real income
 - *h*'s employment \uparrow if *h* sells to final users whose real income \uparrow

$$\dots + Cov_{s}\left(\left(\alpha^{T}\lambda\right)_{h,n}, \text{real income}_{n}\right)$$

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Price rigidity



Phillips curves:

$$\kappa_{\textit{sticky}}^{\textit{Y}} = \frac{\varphi}{2} \frac{\delta_{\textit{sticky}}}{1 - \bar{\delta}}, \ \kappa_{\textit{flex}}^{\textit{Y}} = \frac{\varphi}{2} \frac{\delta_{\textit{flex}}}{1 - \bar{\delta}}$$

► Cross-section: employment ↑ for sticky workers

$$\ell_{sticky} - \ell_{flex} = rac{arphi heta ar{\delta}}{1 + arphi heta ar{\delta}} (\delta_{flex} - \delta_{sticky}) ar{y}$$

Consumption:

$$c_{sticky} - c_{flex} = \frac{\varphi(\theta - 1)\bar{\delta}}{1 + \varphi\theta\bar{\delta}} (\delta_{flex} - \delta_{sticky})\bar{y}$$

Input-output linkages



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Chain-weighted ES



Labor supply elasticity



• Expansion benefits elastic workers ($\varphi_E < \varphi_I$):

$$\ell_{E} - \ell_{I} = (\varphi_{I} - \varphi_{E}) \frac{\theta \delta}{1 + \bar{\varphi} \theta \delta} \bar{y}$$
$$c_{E} - c_{I} = (\varphi_{I} - \varphi_{E}) \frac{(\theta - 1) \delta}{1 + \bar{\varphi} \theta \delta} \bar{y}$$

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NYC vs Boise, ID



- Geographic mobility:
 - $\sigma\delta < \theta$: improve own apt \rightarrow NYC more cyclical
 - $\sigma \delta > \theta$: buy big home in ID \rightarrow Boise more cyclical

$$\ell_B - \ell_{NY} \propto heta(\sigma\delta - heta)(lpha_B - lpha_{NY})ar{y}$$

Aggregate non-neutrality

Representative agent, static

$$\begin{cases} \pi_t^Y + \bar{y}_t = m_t - p_{t-1}^Y & \text{cash in advance} \\ \pi_t^Y = \kappa \bar{y}_t & \text{Phillips curve} \end{cases}$$

• Non-neutrality = $%L \uparrow$ if $M \uparrow$ by 1%

$$\bar{y} = \frac{m - p_{-1}^Y}{1 + \kappa}$$

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Heterogeneous agents

Aggregate non-neutrality:

$$\bar{y} = \frac{m - p_{-1}}{1 + \bar{\kappa}^{\mathbf{Y}} + Cov_{s}\left(\frac{\kappa_{h}^{\mathbf{Y}}}{s_{h}}, \frac{\ell_{h}}{\bar{y}}\right)}$$

► Employment ↑ for agents with flat Phillips curve → more non-neutrality

With dynamics

Impact response of employment:

$$\bar{y}_{0} = \frac{m_{0} - p_{-1}}{1 + \sum_{t} \rho^{t} \left(\bar{\kappa}_{t}^{Y} + Cov_{s}\left(\frac{\kappa_{ht}^{CPI}}{s_{h}}, \frac{\ell_{ht}}{\bar{y}_{t}}\right)\right) \frac{\bar{y}_{t}}{\bar{l}_{0}}}$$

- Depends on
 - elasticity of current inflation to employment t periods ahead
 - rate of decay of employment response
- Representative agent, one sector:

$$y_0 = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho \eta}}$$





Aggregate non-neutrality:

$$\bar{y} = \frac{m}{1 + \varphi \frac{\bar{\delta}}{1 - \bar{\delta}} \left[1 - \frac{\varphi \theta \bar{\delta}}{1 + \varphi \theta \bar{\delta}} \left(\frac{\delta_{\text{flex}} - \delta_{\text{sticky}}}{\bar{\delta}} \right)^2 \right]}$$

Labor supply elasticity:

$$\bar{y} = \frac{m}{1 + \bar{\varphi} \frac{\delta}{1 - \bar{\delta}} \left[1 - \frac{\bar{\varphi} \theta \delta}{1 + \bar{\varphi} \theta \delta} \left(\frac{\varphi_l - \varphi_E}{\bar{\varphi}} \right)^2 \right]}$$

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Eliminating cross-sectional effects

Easy if heterogeneity only driven by nominal rigidities (same γ, φ)

subsidize inputs proportional to wage exposure

$$\tau_{i} - \tau_{j} \propto \left(\Delta \left(I - \Omega \Delta \right)^{-1} \bar{\alpha} \right)_{i} - \left(\Delta \left(I - \Omega \Delta \right)^{-1} \bar{\alpha} \right)_{j}$$

- tax consumption to equalize incomes
- set levels so that lump-sum taxes sum to 0 and budget is balanced
- Aggregate non-neutrality same as RA economy, no cross-sectional effects
- ► Heterogeneous Frish → cannot compensate different disutility of labor
- Capital assets \rightarrow equity-efficiency tradeoff

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- Input-output: National Accounts
- Employment: Administrator of Severance Payments Funds
 - by gender, age quintile, income quintile
- Consumption shares: Family Budget Survey
- Price adjustment:
 - producer prices: electronic invoices
 - consumer prices: National Institute of Statistics

Still collecting

- Wage adjustment frequencies by demographic group
- Expenditure shares on capital assets
- Investment network
- Labor supply elasticities?
- Income group definition?
 - labor market boundaries

Women



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Price stickiness by sector



Price adjustment probabilities by industry

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Employer's price stickiness



Consumer price stickiness



Cumulative employment response



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Outline

Setup

Monetary Non-Neutrality

Calibration

Conclusion

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Conclusion

- Monetary expansion:
 - cross-section: $I \uparrow$ for flat-PC workers
 - aggregate: substitution \rightarrow more non-neutrality
- Quantitative results:
 - sizable cross-sectional effects on employment and income
 - input-output structure important driver of heterogeneity
- Widely applicable framework:
 - other shocks (spending, transfers...)
 - interpreting cross-sectional estimates
 - exchange rates in open economy

Thank you!

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Real income

Real income: employment + profits - final use prices

real income_n =
$$l_n + \sum_i \frac{\xi_{in}}{s_n} \bar{\lambda}_i \left[(I - \Omega) \kappa \mathbf{I} \right]_i - \sum_k \left(\beta^T \kappa \right)_{nk} l_k$$

Function of employment via Phillips curves

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Timing

One-period model

- Period 0: prices are pre-set
- Period 1: money supply and spending shock
 - only a fraction of producers can adjust prices
 - production and consumption take place
 - the world ends

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Seignorage

Consumers need to purchase new money issuances

- agent *h* buys share v_h
- Revenues are fully rebated through lump-sum transfers
- Budget constraint:

$$P_hC_h + \underbrace{v_hdM}_{\text{money purchase}} = \text{income}_h - T_h + \underbrace{v_hdM}_{\text{seignorage rebate}}$$

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