# Short-Term Interest Rates and Bank Lending Terms: Evidence from a Survey of U.S. Loans

by

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<sup>\*</sup> Our views not necessarily reflect those of the IMF, IMF Board, ECB, Federal Reserve System, or its Board of Governors

#### Motivation

 Renewed debate: are low interest rates setting the stage for future crises? (e.g., Rajan (2010))

 Interest rate policy affects the quality and not just the quantity of credit

Risk-taking channel of monetary policy

#### **Existing literature**

- Theoretical work:
  - Adrian and Shin (2010), Acharya, and Naqvi (2012),
     Diamond and Rajan (2012), Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, and
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 Diamond and Rajan (2012), Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, and
 Marquez (2013)

#### Empirical work:

- Non-U.S. data: Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydró (2009),
   Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibañez (2010),
   Maddaloni and Peydró (2011), Jimenez et al. (2011)
- U.S. data: Paligorova and Santos (2012), Delis et al.
   (2012), Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2014)

#### Preview of results

 We use confidential loan-level data from the Fed's Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL) to measure how US bank lending terms change controlling for the riskiness of their loans

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- 2. We find that, controlling the ex-ante riskiness of the loans, lending terms tend to be easier when interest rates are lower
- 3. These results are stronger for banks that are likely to be more sensitive to short-term interest rates

#### Outline

1. Data: Survey of Terms of Business Lending

2. Empirical strategy

3. Results

4. Conclusions

## Data: Survey of Terms of Business Lending

 Loan-level data from the Fed's Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL) supplemented with Call Report data for individual banks.

 STBL: Banks report data on all individual new loans extended on the first business week of the middle month of the quarter since 1977.

 Since 1997, the STBL has asked banks to report the internal risk rating of each new loan

## Data: Survey of Terms of Business Lending

The internal risk rating for the loan is an increasing, discrete index of loan riskiness:

- 1 = Minimal risk
- 2 = Low risk
- 3 = Moderate risk
- 4 = Acceptable risk
- 5 = Special mention or classified asset

$$y_{kit} = \alpha_i + \lambda_j + \beta r_t + \theta X_{kit} + \mu W_{it} + \rho Z_{jt} + \gamma M_t + \varepsilon_{kit}$$

Baseline regression 1:

$$y_{kit} = \alpha_i + \lambda_j + \beta r_t + \theta X_{kit} + \mu W_{it} + \rho Z_{jt} + \gamma M_t + \varepsilon_{kit}$$

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- $X_{kit}$  includes the ex-ante loan risk rating

Example of baseline regression 1:

Spread<sub>kit</sub> = 
$$\alpha_i + \lambda_j + \beta r_t + \theta X_{kit} + \mu W_{it} + \rho Z_{jt} + \gamma M_t + \varepsilon_{kit}$$

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If  $\beta > 0$ , terms are tighter (easier) when short-term interest rates are higher (lower)

 $\beta$  > 0 provides evidence for the risk-taking channel of monetary policy

$$\sigma_{kit} = \alpha_i + \lambda_j + \tau_t + \delta r_t * v_{it} + \theta X_{kit} + \mu W_{it} + \rho Z_{jt} + \varepsilon_{kit}$$

- $v_{it}$  is a bank characteristic (included in the vector  $X_{kit}$ ).
- $\tau_t$  are time-fixed effects.

Dependent variable							
	Loan spread	Dummy for secured loan	Loan maturity				
Target federal funds rate	0.037*** (0.012)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.013 (0.010)				
Bank and region fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Region and macro controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Bank controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Loan controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes				
$R^2$	0.331	0.183	0.130				
Obs	1,121,510	1,121,510	773,814				

De	Dependent variable							
	Loan spread	Dummy for secured loan	Loan spread	Dummy for secured loan				
Short-term deposits/Deposits	-1.677*** (0.416)	0.681* (0.375))						
Short-term deposits/Deposits × target federal funds	0.201*** (0.063)	0.175** (0.086)						
Loan risk rating			0.319*** (0.014)	0.028*** (0.003)				
Loan risk rating × target federal funds			0.022*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.001				
$R^2$	0.338	0.132	0.338	0.186				
Obs	1,121,510	1,121,510	1,121,510	1,121,510				

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# Robustness

	Dependent variable							
	Loan spreads	Dummy for secured loan	Loan spread	Dummy for secured loan				
Taylor rule residual (traditional rule)	0.034*** (0.013)	0.005*** (0.002)						
Taylor rule residual (expanded rule)			0.019* (0.011)	0.003* (0.009)				
$R^2$	0.330	0.183	0.212	0.147				
Obs	1,121,510	1,121,510	941,063	941,063				

#### Conclusions

 Evidence that banks lending terms vary with shortterm interest rates, controlling for the riskiness of loans

 The evidence suggest that lending spreads and the probability of loan collateralization increase are lower when interest rates are lower

 This negative relationship is stronger for banks that appear to be ex-ante more sensitive to interest rates

# **END**

# Additional slides

# Table 1: Summary statistics

	Observations	Average	25 <sup>th</sup> percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> percentile	Standard deviation
Loan-level variables					
Loan spread (in percentage points)	1,121,510	0.754	0.074	1.425	1.444
Dummy for loans secured by collateral	1,121,508	0.807	1	1	0.395
Loan maturity (years)	773,814	1.427	0.315	1.567	2.130
Risk rating	1,112,510	3.306	3	4	0.837
Loan size (dollars)	1,121,510	520,529	14,800	142,285	4,703,035
Bank-level variables					
Bank total assets (\$ millions)	11,854	21,072	318	5,884	104,353
Tier 1 capital ratio	11,854	0.122	0.095	0.135	0.049
Net income / assets	11,854	0.006	0.003	0.010	0.009
Liquid assets / assets	11,854	0.027	0.014	0.035	0.019
Deposits / assets	11,854	0.779	0.724	0.858	0.103
Short-term deposits / deposits	11,854	0.018	0	0	0.071
Non-retail deposits / deposits	11,854	0.362	0.190	0.461	0.267
Loans / assets	11,854	0.641	0.566	0.737	0.141
C&I loans / loans	11,854	0.219	0.131	0.277	0.127
Regional variables					
State personal income growth (%)	2,604	2.114	-0.549	4.794	4.824
Change in region CPI (%)	236	2.386	1.112	3.985	2.908
State unemployment rate (%)	2,604	5.434	4.000	6.233	2.079
Change in state housing prices (%)	2,604	3.104	-0.523	7.739	8.356
Nationwide variables					
Target federal funds rate (%)	59	3.012	1.000	5.250	2.203
Real GDP growth (%)	59	2.257	1.318	3.600	2.837
NBER recession	59	0.186	0	0	0.393

## Table 2: Terms of lending and the fed funds rate

	Loan spread	Dummy for secured loan	Loan maturity
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Target federal funds rate	0.037***	0.008***	0.013
	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.010]
Loan risk rating	0.346***	0.056***	-0.026**
	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.011]
Loan size	-0.275***	-0.006***	0.109***
	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.010]
Bank size	-0.088***	-0.030***	0.179***
	[0.032]	[0.006]	[0.016]
Bank tier 1 capital ratio	3.754***	-0.106	2.677***
	[0.571]	[0.152]	[0.807]
Bank net income / assets	-6.641***	0.277	-0.942
	[1.495]	[0.248]	[1.828]
Bank liquid assets / assets	-2.158**	-0.126	-4.556***
	[0.975]	[0.286]	[0.839]
Bank deposits / assets	1.104***	0.068	0.659**
	[0.224]	[0.052]	[0.286]
Short-term deposits / deposits	-0.548***	-0.102*	1.762***
	[0.193]	[0.053]	[0.183]
Non-retail deposits / deposits	-0.08	-0.014	0.041
	[0.073]	[0.015]	[0.079]
Bank loans / assets	0.799***	0.107**	0.171
	[0.115]	[0.046]	[0.173]
Bank C&I loans / loans	0.476**	0.197***	0.361
	[0.184]	[0.039]	[0.267]
State personal income growth	-0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Change in region CPI	-0.002	0	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.005]
State unemployment rate	0.099***	0.019***	-0.035***
Characteristics	[0.011]	[0.002] 0	[0.010]
Change in state housing prices	-0.002		-0.001
GDP growth	[0.001] 0.008	[0.000] 0.001	[0.002] 0.009*
GDF growth	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.005]
NBER recession dummy	0.012	-0.003	-0.007
NDER recession duminy	[0.039]	[0.005]	[0.041]
Constant	2.043***	0.809***	-3.438***
Constant	[0.690]	[0.113]	-3.438**** [0.401]
Bank fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,121,510	1,121,508	773,814
Number of banks	455	590	585
Number of banks  R <sup>2</sup>	0.331	0.183	0.13
Λ	0.331	U.103	0.13

# Table 3: Relationship by loan risk rating

	Dependent variable			
	Loan spread	Dummy for secured loan	Loan maturity	
			(2)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Target federal funds rate × Loan risk rating	0.022***	0.008***	0.018***	
	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.004]	
Loan risk rating	0.319***	0.028***	-0.094***	
	[0.014]	[0.003]	[0.014]	
Loan size	-0.265***	-0.005***	0.106***	
	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.010]	
Bank size	-0.142***	0.006	0.097***	
	[0.030]	[0.009]	[0.018]	
Bank tier 1 capital ratio	1.888**	-0.008	3.074***	
	[0.712]	[0.156]	[0.854]	
Bank net income / assets	-8.708***	0.465	-4.038**	
	[1.586]	[0.367]	[1.975]	
Bank liquid assets / assets	0.635	-0.683**	-3.072***	
	[0.932]	[0.266]	[1.034]	
Bank deposits / assets	1.140***	0.117*	0.203	
	[0.263]	[0.058]	[0.313]	
Short-term deposits / deposits	-1.063***	-0.088	1.542***	
	[0.188]	[0.055]	[0.174]	
Non-retail deposits / deposits	0.166*	-0.005	0.031	
	[0.091]	[0.017]	[0.069]	
Bank loans / assets	0.609***	0.075	0.243	
	[0.151]	[0.048]	[0.170]	
Bank C&I loans / loans	-0.059	0.191***	0.572**	
	[0.180]	[0.042]	[0.277]	
State personal income growth	-0.000**	0.000***	0	
	[000.0]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
Change in region CPI	0.006	-0.002	0.006	
	[0.015]	[0.003]	[0.017]	
State unemployment rate	-0.028**	0.028***	-0.044***	
State unemproyment rate	[0.012]	[0.003]	[0.012]	
Change in state housing prices	0.002	-0.001	0.001	
Change in state housing prices	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.002]	
GDP growth	0	0.007***	0.046**	
ob. govu	[0.006]	[0.002]	[0.018]	
NBER recession dummy	-0.068	0.0021	0.062	
TABLE recession duminy	-0.068 [0.047]	[0.010]	[0.038]	
Constant	4.176***	0.053	-1.478***	
Constant	[0.607]	[0.184]	[0.372]	
Bank fixed effects	Yes	[0.184] Yes	[0.372] Yes	
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	1121510	1121508	773814	
Number of banks	590	590	585	
<u>R</u> <sup>2</sup>	0.338	0.186	0.132	

# Table 4: By sensitivity to interest rates

	Dependent variable			
	Loan spread	Dummy for secured loan	Loan maturity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Target federal funds rate × Short term deposits / deposits	0.201***	0.034*	0.175**	
	[0.063]	[0.020]	[0.086]	
Loan risk rating	0.353***	0.056***	-0.028**	
	[0.009]	[0.004]	[0.012]	
Loan size	-0.279***	-0.006***	0.105***	
	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.010]	
Bank size	-0.074**	0.005	0.101***	
	[0.028]	[0.009]	[0.018]	
Bank tier 1 capital ratio	2.984***	-0.053	3.051***	
	[0.504]	[0.157]	[0.838]	
Bank net income / assets	-6.054***	0.652*	-3.878*	
	[1.539]	[0.356]	[1.962]	
Bank liquid assets / assets	-0.009	-0.719***	-3.095***	
	[0.798]	[0.265]	[1.017]	
Bank deposits / assets	1.090***	0.099*	0.131	
	[0.228]	[0.057]	[0.325]	
Short-term deposits / deposits	-1.677***	-0.263**	0.681*	
	[0.416]	[0.113]	[0.375]	
Non-retail deposits / deposits	0.096	-0.014	0.018	
	[0.079]	[0.016]	[0.070]	
Bank loans / assets	0.581***	0.085*	0.246	
	[0.102]	[0.047]	[0.166]	
Bank C&I loans / loans	-0.114	0.168***	0.42	
	[0.147]	[0.045]	[0.290]	
State personal income growth	-0.000***	0.000***	0	
	[0.000]	[000.0]	[0.000]	
Change in region CPI	0.012	-0.002	0.006	
Change in region Cr	[0.012]	[0.003]	[0.017]	
State unemployment rate	-0.01	0.028***	-0.046***	
State diemproyment rate	[0.011]	[0.003]	[0.012]	
Change in state housing prices	0.002	-0.001	0.001	
Change in state nousing prices	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	
GDP growth	-0.009	0.006***	0.044**	
GDF growth	[0.007]	[0.002]	[0.018]	
NIDED'. I		0.031***		
NBER recession dummy	-0.023		0.064*	
Constant	[0.039] 2.719***	[0.009]	[0.037] -1.407***	
Constant		0.002		
Park Coult Court	[0.673]	[0.181]	[0.413]	
Bank fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	1121510	1121508	773814	
Number of banks	590	590	585	
<u>R</u> <sup>2</sup>	0.338	0.185	0.132	

# Table 5: Taylor rule

		Dependent variable				
	Loan spread	Dummy for secured loan	Loan maturity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
Taylor rule residual	0.034***	0.005***	0.020*			
	[0.013]	[0.002]	[0.010]			
Loan risk rating	0.346***	0.056***	-0.025**			
	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.011]			
Loan size	-0.275***	-0.006***	0.108***			
	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.010]			
Bank size	-0.098***	-0.033***	0.179***			
	[0.031]	[0.006]	[0.016]			
Bank tier 1 capital ratio	3.818***	-0.095	2.735***			
	[0.552]	[0.153]	[0.798]			
Bank net income / assets	-7.305***	0.152	-1.148			
	[1.513]	[0.232]	[1.793]			
Bank liquid assets / assets	-2.214**	-0.136	-4.578***			
	[0.970]	[0.285]	[0.813]			
Bank deposits / assets	1.060***	0.069	0.607**			
	[0.227]	[0.052]	[0.283]			
Short-term deposits / deposits	-0.549***	-0.101*	1.758***			
	[0.194]	[0.053]	[0.181]			
Non-retail deposits / deposits	-0.086	-0.013	0.035			
	[0.073]	[0.015]	[0.077]			
Bank loans / assets	0.815***	0.114**	0.174			
	[0.115]	[0.046]	[0.170]			
Bank C&I loans / loans	0.508***	0.207***	0.343			
	[0.183]	[0.039]	[0.257]			
State personal income growth	-0.000***	0.000***	0.000***			
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]			
Change in region CPI	0.013*	0.002**	0.004			
	[800.0]	[0.001]	[0.006]			
State unemployment rate	0.093***	0.015***	-0.029***			
	[0.010]	[0.002]	[0.009]			
Change in state housing prices	-0.002	0	0			
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.002]			
GDP growth	0.012*	0.002**	0.011**			
	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.005]			
NBER recession dummy	0.015	-0.003	-0.006			
	[0.041]	[0.005]	[0.040]			
Constant	2.719***	-1.407***	0.002			
	[0.673]	[0.413]	[0.181]			
Bank fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes			
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Observations	1121510	1121508	773814			
Number of banks	590	590	585			
$R^2$	0.330	0.183	0.130			

# Table 6: Modified Taylor rule

	Dependent variable			
	Loan spread	Dummy for secured loan	Loan maturity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Modified Taylor rule residual	0.019*	0.003**	0.021**	
	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.009]	
Loan risk rating	0.333***	0.050***	-0.030**	
	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.013]	
Loan size	-0.261***	-0.004***	0.114***	
	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.012]	
Bank size	-0.105***	-0.040***	0.190***	
	[0.035]	[0.008]	[0.019]	
Bank tier 1 capital ratio	4.241***	-0.196	2.754***	
	[0.643]	[0.164]	[0.998]	
Bank net income / assets	-7.458***	0.222	-1.585	
	[1.696]	[0.250]	[1.880]	
Bank liquid assets / assets	-1.181	-0.286	-5.186***	
	[1.115]	[0.358]	[1.092]	
Bank deposits / assets	1.391***	0.114**	0.712**	
	[0.264]	[0.056]	[0.349]	
Short-term deposits / deposits	-0.767***	-0.116*	1.693***	
	[0.200]	[0.060]	[0.214]	
Non-retail deposits / deposits	0.019	-0.011	0.089	
	[0.081]	[0.017]	[0.090]	
Bank loans / assets	0.940***	0.052	0.18	
	[0.131]	[0.045]	[0.168]	
Bank C&I loans / loans	0.790***	0.244***	0.352	
	[0.209]	[0.040]	[0.318]	
State personal income growth	-0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
Change in region CPI	0.002	0.001	-0.004	
	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.005]	
State unemployment rate	0.087***	0.013***	-0.035***	
	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.008]	
Change in state housing prices	-0.003**	0	0	
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.002]	
GDP growth	0.006	0	0.008	
	[0.008]	[0.001]	[0.006]	
NBER recession dummy	0.012	-0.005	-0.001	
	[0.048]	[0.004]	[0.035]	
Constant	1.815**	1.116***	-3.735***	
,	[0.690]	[0.126]	[0.442]	
Bank fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	941063	941062	645018	
Number of banks	543	543	537	
_R <sup>2</sup>	0.318	0.185	0.142	

#### Frequency of keywords in FOMC minutes

Keyword	# of times the was used in meetings 1997Q2—2	FOMC from	# of times the keyword was used in FOMC meetings from 1997Q2—2006Q4		# of times the keyword was used in FOMC meetings from 2007Q1—2011Q4		Frequency of times the keyword was used in FOMC meetings from 1997Q2—2006Q4		Frequency of times the keyword was used in FOMC meetings from 2007Q1—2011Q4	
	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal
Bank risk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Banking risk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Banking sector	10	14	1	1	9	13	0.026	0.026	0.450	0.650
Banking system	15	19	3	3	12	16	0.077	0.077	0.600	0.800
Condition of the banking system	2	2	2	2	0	0	0.051	0.051	0.000	0.000
Financial conditions	112	351	74	187	39	167	1.897	4.795	1.950	8.350
Financial stability	14	17	0	0	14	17	0.000	0.000	0.700	0.850
Financial system	11	19	1	2	10	17	0.026	0.051	0.500	0.850
Health of the banking system	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Risks to the financial system	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.050
Stability of the financial system	2	3	0	0	2	3	0.000	0.000	0.100	0.150
Systemic	2	4	0	0	2	4	0.000	0.000	0.100	0.200
Systemic risk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Troubles of the banking system	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.050

Notes: Frequency is determined as the number of times a word has been used within a time period divided by the number of quarters in that time period. Conservative = the number of reports the word appears in (if a word appears several times in a report, that's not counted). Liberal = the total number of times the word appears in the reports.

Source: FOMC Minutes