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## THE CHANGING ROLES OF EDUCATION AND ABILITY IN WAGE DETERMINATION\*

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#### Abstract

This study examines changes in returns to formal education and cognitive skills over the last 20 years using the 1979 and 1997 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. We show that cognitive skills had a 30%-60% larger effect on wages in the 1980s than in the 2000s. Returns to education were higher in the 2000s. These developments are not explained by changing distributions of workers' observable characteristics or by changing labor market structure. We show that the decline in returns to ability can be attributed to differences in the growth rate of technology between the 1980s and 2000s.

#### Resumen

Nuestro estudio examina los cambios en retorno a la educación formal y a las habilidades cognitivas en los últimos 20 años utilizando datos de las encuestas National Longitudinal Survey of Youth de 1979 y 1997. Mostramos que el retorno a las habilidades cognitivas tienen entre un 30 y 60% mayor impacto en la década de 1980 con respecto a la década de 2000. Los retornos a la educación son mayores en 2000. Los cambios en retorno no se explican por cambios en características demográficas de los trabajadores ni por cambios en características y estructura del mercado laboral. Mostramos que la caída en retornos a la habilidad cognitiva puede ser atribuida a diferencias en las tasas de crecimiento en tecnología entre 1980 y 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>\*</sup> We would like to thank Philippe Belley, Prashant Bharadwaj, Rachana Bhatt, Mark Bils, Denise Doiron, Zvi Eckstein, Jamie Hall, John Haisken-DeNew, Thomas Lemieux, Ronni Pavan and seminar participants at University of New South Wales, University of Santiago, University of Chile, Bank of Israel, Central Bank of Chile and 2010 Stockman Conference (University of Rochester) for valuable comments. Castex: Central Bank of Chile; email: <u>gcastex@bcentral.cl</u>. Dechter: School of Economics, University of New South Wales; email: <u>e.dechter@unsw.edu.au</u>.

#### **1** Introduction

Families and policy makers implement various strategies to enhance an individual's capacity to succeed in the labor market. Investment in an individual's human capital is one of the most important channels to achieve this goal. A large literature documents that workers with higher educational attainment have higher earnings and that this wage differential has been increasing over time. The standard estimates show that between the 1980s and 2000s there was an increase in returns to education in the range of 20% - 50% (see, for example, Goldin and Katz 2007). Many studies argue that this growth was more rapid in the first half of the 1980s. There is also a debate about the interpretation of the rising return to schooling: whether it is due to an increase in the return to formal education or a rising return to cognitive ability. This debate focuses on developments in the 1980s and concludes that the increase in return to cognitive ability explains much of the increase in return to education in the 1980s (see, for example, Cawley et al. 1998). In this study, we examine changes in wage structure between the 1980s and 2000s, and show that the return to cognitive skills has declined substantially over this period while the return to schooling has increased.

Using data from the 1979 and 1997 National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY79 and NLSY97, respectively) we evaluate to what extent schooling and cognitive skills, as captured by performance on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tests, affect the wages of 18 - 28 year old men and women, and how this relationship has changed between the 1980s and 2000s.<sup>1,2</sup> We show that during these two decades the return to cognitive ability declined by 30% - 60% for men and women. We also show that the slowdown in the growth rate of return to education after the 1990s is less pronounced when controlling for ability. These changes in returns are persistent across various demographic groups, and are robust to use of alternative ability measures and econometric specifications.

We consider various channels that could lead to such large declines in the ability premium in the 2000s. First, we examine changes in the distributions of demographic characteristics and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>ASVAB scores are extensively used in the literature as a measure of cognitive achievement, aptitude and intelligence. See for example Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Belley and Lochner (2007).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>The data are from 1980 - 1991 waves in NLSY79 and the 1999 - 2008 waves in NLSY97.

assess how the returns to education and ability would have changed if observable characteristics remained constant between the 1980s and 2000s. We reweight the samples to match NLSY79 and NLSY97 age and family background distributions, and find that changing demographics cannot explain the decrease in return to cognitive ability. Second, we match distributions of occupations and industries across surveys, and show that changes in the labor market structure do not explain the results. Third, we examine the role of measurement error in test scores and show that it cannot explain our findings.

To further study skill prices in the 1980s and 2000s, we examine changes in wage dynamics. In the 1980s estimations, returns to education decline with experience and returns to ability increase with experience. These relationships are weaker in the 2000s for men and women. In the dynamic model, the returns to cognitive skills for entry wages are similar across cohorts, which suggests that changing wage dynamics explain the overall decline in returns to cognitive skills. We address these outcomes within two frameworks, human capital accumulation theory, as in Ben-Porath (1967), and employer-learning model, (see, for example, Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001). Within the Ben-Porath framework, changing coefficients of the dynamic wage equation reflect how changing technology and structural changes in labor market affect human capital accumulation. Using this framework, we examine the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis, which posits that skills are most valuable when workers are adapting to a changing environment but as the rate of technological change slows down, formal education becomes relatively more important for labor market outcomes. Within the employer-learning framework, changing wage dynamics reflect changes in signaling, screening and learning mechanisms that are associated with reforms in the education system following technological innovations. Both explanations are consistent with a changing state of workplace technology. We construct technology growth indexes employing Cummins and Violante (2002) methodology and show that there was a slowdown in growth starting in the late 1990s, (Greenwood and Yorokoglu, 1997 and Katz, 2000 show similar trends). We also argue that changing technology has led to reforms in the schooling system which has resulted in a more relevant and merit-oriented education.

Previous studies that examine changes in returns to cognitive skills focus on developments in the 1980s and find an increasing or weakly increasing trend. For example, Blackburn and Neumark (1993) use 1979 - 1987 waves of the NLSY79 and report that the rise in return to education during that period was concentrated among those with both high education and high ability.<sup>3</sup> Grogger and Eide (1995) using 1970s - 1980s data, find that controlling for ability reduces the rising return to schooling.<sup>4</sup> Bishop (1991), using the 1981 - 1986 waves of NLSY79 finds that the return to cognitive skills rose in cross-sectional data but finds mixed results using panel data. All the above studies decompose the increasing return to schooling using panel data or repeated cross-sections data and therefore cannot simultaneously identify age, cohort and time effects. These studies require further parametric assumptions to conclude whether the estimated increase in return to ability is due to changes in the value of cognitive skills or because ability becomes more valuable with work experience. Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) provide an extensive study using a large number of specifications and demonstrate the sensitivity of the results to such assumptions.

Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995) solve the identification problem by examining two different cohorts. They draw from the NLS72 and HSB surveys to compare wages of 24 year old males in 1978 and 1986. They conclude that 38% of the rise in the return to education during this period can be attributed to a rise in the return to ability (measured by scores on a math test). There is still a question of whether their results are unique to the age they choose and the two years they analyze.

An alternative to estimating the trend in the return to cognitive ability (as measured by scores on standardized tests) is to examine patterns of wage dispersion. For example, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) attribute the increasing variance of wage residuals in the 1980s to an increase in the demand for unobserved skill. Chay and Lee (2000) examine the changing distributional patterns and show that the return to unobserved skills were increasing in the 1980s, but argue that it cannot be large enough to account for the full increase in the return to schooling. Taber (2001) finds that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Blackburn and Neumark (1993) measure cognitive ability using an average score of three subtests in the ASVAB.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Grogger and Eide (1995) use the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS72) survey and the High School and Beyond (HSB) survey. Cognitive skills are measured by standardized test scores and high school grades. They use a math test, a vocabulary test, and a "mosaic" test that measures perceptual speed and accuracy.

an increase in the demand for unobserved ability could play a major role in the growing college premium.

Our study extends the previous work by using cross-decade comparisons of the returns to schooling and cognitive ability. Using two NLSY cohorts allows us to identify age, cohort and time effects. Whereas previous studies have focused on developments in the 1980s and early 1990s, we examine the 1980s - 2000s period and document a large decline in the return to cognitive skills and an increase in the return to schooling.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the datasets in detail. Our main empirical results are reported in Section 3. In this section we examine the changing roles of cognitive skills and formal education in wage determination. We also perform sensitivity analysis to evaluate whether differences in demographics and test-taking conditions can explain the outcomes. Section 4 explores the dynamics of wages and evaluates findings within the human capital and employer-learning theories. Here we also document the developments in the state of technology over the 20 years. Section 5 concludes the paper.

#### 2 Data

The data are from the 1979 and 1997 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). NLSY79 provides a nationally representative sample of 12686 young men and women who were 14 - 22 years old in 1979, and NLSY97 samples 8984 individuals who were 12-16 years old in 1997. We employ both cross-sectional and supplemental samples (excluding the military supplement) and use the base year weights provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to achieve representativeness of the population.<sup>5</sup> We pool observations for 1980 - 1991 for NLSY79 and for 1999 - 2008 for NLSY97.

The data contain detailed information on individuals, including measures of cognitive ability, education, labor market activity, and other family and personal characteristics. Many of these

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>For some estimations we construct alternative sets of weights to evaluate effects of changing distributions of demographic characteristics on labor market outcomes.

variables are compatible across the 1979 and 1997 cohorts, but some require further adjustments to facilitate comparison across samples. Altonji, Bharadwaj and Lange (2012) provide a detailed analysis of each dataset and suggest methods to achieve compatibility. We follow their methodology where applicable.<sup>6</sup>

Individuals enrolled in school and in military service are excluded from the analysis. We consider individuals who have achieved their highest degree, work at least 20 hours per week and earn real hourly wages within the range of 3 to 100 dollars (in 2007 prices, deflated using the CPI). We exclude individuals with missing information on key variables. Since the oldest individual in the NLSY97 turned 28 in the 2008 wave of data, we limit our analysis to the 18 - 28 age group.<sup>7</sup> The final samples of men contain 25491 observations in the 1979 cohort and 12458 in the 1997 cohort. The number of individuals in each cohort is 5021 and 3009, respectively. Women samples contain 21603 observations in the NLSY79 and 10887 observations in NLSY97, pooling information on 4863 and 2892 respondents, respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Some studies have raised a concern regarding the representativeness of the NLSY97. These issues are discussed in detail by Altonji et al. (2012), and we adopt their assumption that when using the survey weights, the available data are representative of the 1997 and 1979 populations. Altonji et al. (2012) also argue that attrition patterns do not constrain the analysis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>A very small number of respondents were age 29 at the time of the 2008 wave of the NLSY97.

	N	9779		NLSY97	797		Z	NLSY79		NLSY97	797	
	standard	lard weights	standard	standard weights	age-rew	eighted	standarc	standard weights	standard	standard weights	age-rew	eighted
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean SD	SD	Mean	SD	Mean		Mean SD	SD
			men	'n					women			
real wage rate	14.7	7.3	13.8	8.1	15.2	9.3	11.9	5.6	11.9	6.2	12.9	7.4
AFQT	160.2	31.2	161.7	32.2	158.6	33.3	165.6	27.3	164.9	28.9	160.6	31.0
math score	47.8	8.2	48.5	8.8	48.0	9.0	46.5	6.7	49.3	8.1	48.6	8.4
varbal score	44.9	9.9	45.2	10.2	44.1	10.7	47.4	8.7	46.6	9.3	45.1	10.1
hs	0.66	0.47	0.70	0.46	0.66	0.47	0.69	0.46	0.63	0.48	0.60	0.49
аа	0.04	0.18	0.04	0.20	0.04	0.20	0.06	0.24	0.05	0.23	0.06	0.24
ba	0.12	0.32	0.13	0.33	0.16	0.36	0.14	0.35	0.20	0.40	0.21	0.41
ma	0.01	0.10	0.01	0.09	0.02	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.13	0.03	0.18
years of school	12.3	2.0	12.6	2.2	12.7	2.4	12.7	1.9	13.1	2.3	13.3	2.5
age	24.8	2.4	22.7	2.3	24.8	2.4	24.7	2.4	22.8	2.3	24.7	2.4
experience	6.5	2.6	4.1	2.8	6.1	3.2	6.0	2.6	3.7	2.7	5.4	3.2
black	0.13	0.33	0.15	0.36	0.25	0.43	0.13	0.34	0.17	0.37	0.30	0.46
unemployment	0.08	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.00
Z	25	491		124	58		21	603		108	87	
family intact	0.80	0.40	0.68	0.47	09.0	0.49	0.80	0.40	0.63	0.48	0.61	0.49
mom educ	11.6	2.4	12.8	2.6	12.7	2.7	11.6	2.4	12.8	2.6	12.6	2.8
dad educ	11.6	3.2	12.6	2.8	12.4	3.0	11.7	3.2	12.7	2.9	12.5	3.0
Z	20	449		103	59		17	802		8958	58	
In(real family inc)	10.7	0.7	10.8	1.1	10.8	1.1	10.8	0.7	10.6	1.2	10.5	1.2
Z	11	1791		100	62		94	137		8948	18	

Table 1: Summary statistics

Education variables: hs=1 for high school graduates and 0 otherwise, aa=1 for individuals with an associate degree, ba=1 for a bachelor's degree holders and ma=1 for individuals with a master's degree or higher. The unemployment rate is measured by a 3-year moving Real family income is measured at ages 16 or 17. Family intact indicates family composition at 14 years old in the NLSY79, and in average and is calculated using the Current Population Survey. Family background variables are observed only for a subset of individuals. Note: Hourly wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. AFQT score is adjusted using the Altonji et al. (2008) methodology. 1997 (i.e., ages 13-17) in the NLSY97. Parental education is measured in years of schooling. Table 1 summarizes the key variables. The statistics are calculated using the standard BLS weights and also using constructed weights to match the age distribution of NLSY97 to that of NLSY79.<sup>8</sup> Comparison of the age statistics in the NLSY79 and NLSY97 samples shows the main effect of the age-reweighting procedure. The mean age is lower in NLSY97 when using the standard weights, due to a higher concentration of young workers. The age statistics are practically identical when adjusting the NLSY97 sample to have the age distribution of NLSY79. Other variables that are sensitive to the choice of weights are hourly wage, work experience and education. The means of these variables increase when the age-reweighted NLSY97 sample is used.

Both data sources contain comparable measures of ability, captured by the ASVAB, which is a sequence of tests that cover basic math, verbal, and manual skills. Math skills are measured by scores on the Arithmetic Reasoning, Numerical Operations and Mathematics Knowledge sections of the ASVAB. Verbal skills are measured by the scores on the Word Knowledge and Paragraph Comprehension sections of the ASVAB. We construct the Armed Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT) score using the definition from NLSY79, which is based on scores from Arithmetic Reasoning, Numerical Operations, Word Knowledge and Paragraph Comprehension tests. We also define Math and Verbal measures using the relevant tests in ASVAB. "Math" is defined as an average of the Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics Knowledge and Numerical Operations sections. "Verbal" ability is measured by averaging the scores on the Word Knowledge and Paragraph Comprehension sections of the ASVAB.

We address two important compatibility issues which arise due to differences in survey and test methodologies between the NLSY79 and NLSY97. First, participants in the NLSY79 took the ASVAB exam in the summer of 1980 when they between 15 and 23 years old. For the NLSY97 cohort, the test was administered when individuals were between 12 and 17 years old. Second, the NLSY79 cohort was administered a pencil and paper (P&P) version of the ASVAB while the NLSY97 participants took a computer assisted test (CAT) format. For NLSY97 we use ASVAB scores provided by Daniel Segall, who develops a mapping that assigns scores to equalize per-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>The reweighting procedure is discussed in detail in subsection 3.1.




Figure 1: Ability Densities for men and women

Note: AFQT, Math and Verbal scores densities from the NLSY79 and re-weighted NLSY97.

centiles on the various subtests of the P&P and the CAT. The mapping procedure is described in detail in Segall (1997). To adjust the scores by age we follow a procedure described in Altonji et al. (2012).<sup>9</sup> For the NLSY79 and NLSY97 we apply an equipercentile mapping to age 16 of the scores of respondents who took the test at other ages, exploiting the overlap in the test-taking age across cohorts.

Figure 1 shows the distributions of ability measures for each cohort. Table 1 provides means and standard deviations of the measures. The AFQT score can take values between 70 and 280 but actual scores fall within the 80 - 220 range. Math and Verbal test scores can range within 20 and 80, with actual scores falling within the 20 - 70 interval. We use normalized test scores in estimations, such that the relevant sample mean is zero and the standard deviation is one.

The ASVAB scores are widely used in the literature as a measure of cognitive achievement,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>We thank Joseph Altonji, Prashant Bharadwaj and Fabian Lange for help with the ASVAB data.

aptitude and intelligence. Some studies argue that human capital investments affect AFQT scores which may constrain the identification of education and ability effects on earnings; see for example Neal and Johnson (1996) or Cascio and Lewis (2006). To address this issue we perform robustness tests using a subgroup of individuals who took the AFQT when they were 16 years old (the overlap age in the two samples) and attended the 9th grade. Another concern is that individuals with higher AFQT scores are more likely to be more educated and that such selection into schooling could change over time. We find that the correlation between the AFQT scores and years of schooling is fairly stable, 0.56 in NLSY79 and 0.53 in NLSY97 for males and 0.52 vs. 0.56 for females, (using the age reweighted sample), which allows us to compare returns to cognitive skills and education across cohorts.

Table 1 documents an increase in the schooling level which is more pronounced when using the age-reweighted NLSY97 sample. The average of years of schooling in the NLSY79 sample is 12.3 for men and 12.7 for women. In the NLSY97 sample the averages are 12.6 for men and 13.1 for women. In the age-reweighted NLSY97 sample the averages are 12.7 and 13.3 for men and women, respectively. On the other hand, it takes longer for the 1997 cohort to complete their degrees. For example, an average 25 year old college graduate has 15.9 years of schooling in NLSY79, but 16.5 years in NLSY97. Therefore, in our main estimations we use indicators of schooling levels which show similar patterns as the continuous schooling variable.

Work experience is defined as age minus schooling minus six; the average experience is slightly lower for the NLSY97 cohort (age-reweighted sample). Hourly wage rates (in 2007 dollars) increase over time if using the age-reweighted samples. To control for changing macroeconomic conditions we use the unemployment rate. Finally, the proportion of black workers is higher in the NLSY97 sample. This is partially due to sampling methodology and partially because of a higher attrition of black workers in the earlier waves of the survey. This issue is discussed in more detail in Altonji et al. (2012).

Table 1 also summarizes information on the family background of respondents: parental education, family structure and family income. The NLSY79 and NLSY97 record family income in early survey years; we use average family income (in 2007 dollars) when participants were 16-17 years old, excluding those not living with their parents at that time.<sup>10</sup> Mean family income is fairly constant over time but its dispersion has risen. Family structure information is provided by an indicator variable for whether both parents were living with the child when he/she was 14 years old in the NLSY79 and in 1997 (i.e., ages 13-17) in the NLSY97. There are more single-parent households in the later cohort. Finally, Table 1 shows statistics on parental years of schooling, which are higher in the 2000s.

#### **3** Estimation

We estimate wage functions for men and women using the NLSY79 and NLSY97. The tables summarize selected results; full tables are provided in Appendix A, available in the online version of this article.<sup>11</sup> To evaluate the changes in effects of schooling and cognitive skills on earnings, we estimate

$$\ln wage_{it} = EDUC_i\beta_1^T + \beta_2^T ABILITY_i + \beta_3^T EXP_{it} + \beta_4^T EXP_{it}^2 + X_{it}\beta_5^T + \varepsilon_{it}, \qquad (1)$$

where  $wage_{it}$  is the real hourly wage rate paid to an individual *i* at time *t*,  $EDUC_i$  is a vector of education dummy variables,  $ABILITY_i$  measures cognitive skills using the AFQT score, the average Math score or the average Verbal score,  $EXP_{it}$  corresponds to labor market experience,  $X_{it}$  is a vector of personal characteristics and family background variables. Upper scripts on the coefficients denote the cohort,  $T \in \{NLSY79, NLSY97\}$ . The term  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is a vector of unobserved factors that affect wages, (for example, ambition or luck). We assume that correlations between  $\varepsilon_{it}$ and control variables do not change over time, (allowing for zero correlation). This assumption allows to compare the coefficients of equation (1) across cohorts. The plausibility of this assumption is to some extent explored in our estimations that include ability measures and detailed vectors of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>The family income measure is available for the younger cohorts of NLSY79, those born between 1961 and 1964. When income is available only for age 16 or age 17 and not both, we use the available measure.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>For more details see the notes attached to each table.

controls.

The datasets pool information for individuals over time. Therefore, the coefficients of education and ability may reflect not only prices of these skills, but also the effects of human capital depreciation and on-the-job training or learning-by-doing. We discuss the interpretation of the coefficients in the next section, where we estimate the returns to formal schooling and test scores in a dynamic wage model.

The results are reported in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimated effects of education on wages without controlling for test scores. Returns to education in this specification display modest increases over time for men and women. Columns (3) - (8) display estimation results that include the ability measures. We document a significant decline in return to ability,  $\beta_2$ , over the 20 years. The differences between the coefficients on ability measures are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level in all specifications. For men, an increase in the AFQT score by one standard deviation is associated with a 9.6% increase in hourly wage for the 1979 cohort, but only with a 3.3% increase for the 1997 cohort. For women, the effect of one standard deviation increase in AFQT score on the real wage rate drops from 10.8% to 6.2%. Similar large declines in the returns to cognitive skills are documented when using alternative measures; the coefficient of Math (Verbal) score has declined by 59% (72%) for men and by 38% (39%) for women.

The increase in the return to education is more pronounced when controlling for test scores. For instance, if not controlling for ability, the return to bachelor's degree (compared to high school dropouts) for men is 14% higher in the 2000s than in the 1980s, this difference increases to 43% if controlling for AFQT, (for women these changes are 8% and 27%, respectively). These outcomes also imply that the ability bias is larger when estimating the wage equation for the 1980s.<sup>12</sup>

Table 3 reports estimation results of the wage equation controlling for additional characteristics, as well as by education level and by race. Including family background controls (Model 1, Panel A) such as family income, parental education and intact family indicator reduces the coefficient of the AFQT score. Adding occupation and industry indicators (Model 2, Panel A) reduces

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Returns to experience for both cohorts do not change significantly when controlling for the AFQT scores. See Table A.1 in the online Appendix A.

			AFC	QT80	М	ath	Ver	rbal
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
					en			
test score			.0956	.0328	.1109	.0460	.0672	.0190
			(.0088)	(.0079)	(.0084)	(.0080)	(.0084)	(.0079)
hs	.2012	.1901	.1239	.1679	.1144	.1620	.1495	.1772
	(.0161)	(.0193)	(.0176)	(.0197)	(.0172)	(.0199)	(.0175)	(.0197)
aa	.3836	.4415	.2727	.4143	.2645	.4068	.3065	.4255
	(.0335)	(.0445)	(.0357)	(.0446)	(.0352)	(.0448)	(.0353)	(.0446)
ba	.5248	.5972	.3845	.5481	.3743	.5272	.4323	.5706
	(.0233)	(.0279)	(.0264)	(.0300)	(.0252)	(.0303)	(.0262)	(.0297)
ma	.8308	.9112	.6520	.8552	.6282	.8333	.7188	.8807
	(.0510)	(.0824)	(.0531)	(.0819)	(.0527)	(.0816)	(.0528)	(.0824)
R2 adj	.1405	.1498	.1661	.1535	.1758	.1570	.1544	.1511
N	25491	12458	25491	12458	25491	12458	25491	12458
				WO	men			
test score			.1078	.0624	.1059	.0654	.0824	.0506
			(.0077)	(.0079)	(.0076)	(.0081)	(.0074)	(.0073)
hs	.2167	.1979	.1334	.1563	.1473	.1587	.1518	.1643
	(.0157)	(.0175)	(.0164)	(.0179)	(.0160)	(.0180)	(.0166)	(.0177)
aa	.4773	.4723	.3500	.4042	.3649	.4032	.3854	.4197
	(.0293)	(.0380)	(.0297)	(.0391)	(.0292)	(.0384)	(.0301)	(.0392)
ba	.6194	.6695	.4581	.5815	.4741	.5766	.5039	.6029
	(.0237)	(.0246)	(.0263)	(.0266)	(.0253)	(.0266)	(.0263)	(.0262)
ma	.7919	1.0034	.6168	.9038	.6328	.9025	.6697	.9274
	(.0764)	(.0556)	(.0750)	(.0560)	(.0734)	(.0551)	(.0757)	(.0565)
R2 adj	.1910	.2579	.2257	.2713	.2270	.2729	.2130	.2673
N	21603	10887	21603	10887	21603	10887	21603	10887

Table 2: Returns to schooling and cognitive skills, standard weights OLS

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Education variables: hs=1 for high school graduates and 0 otherwise, aa=1 for individuals with an associate degree, ba=1 for a bachelor's degree holders and ma=1 for individuals with a master's degree or higher. Other included controls: exp, exp2, black, unemployment, metro status. For full results see Tables A.1 and A.2 in the online appendix A. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

the coefficients of AFQT further. However, the proportional decline in the AFQT coefficient does not change much when including additional controls, and the differences in the returns to cognitive skills between the 1980s and 2000s are statistically significant for men and women.

Returns to ability by education level are reported in Panel B of Table 3. These results show that the decrease in the returns to ability occurred within and between different education levels for men and women. The differences in the ability coefficients across cohorts are statistically significant at the 1% - 5% level in all specifications. The same pattern is observed in Panel C, Table 3, which records estimation results by race. The returns to ability decrease for white and black men and women, although the magnitude of the decline is higher for white workers. The differences are significant at the 1% level for men and at the 5% - 10% for women.

Equation (1) is also estimated using the alternative definition of the schooling variable. Columns (1), (2) and (5), (6) in Table 7 report estimation results using years of schooling (highest grade completed) for men and women. In these specifications, the AFQT coefficient drops from 0.077 to 0.030 for men and from 0.091 to 0.070 for women.

#### 3.1 Robustness/ Sensitivity Analysis

This section provides additional robustness tests. First, we check whether measurement error in test scores can explain the outcomes. Second, we estimate equation (1) using weights to adjust the age and other characteristics distributions that vary across samples. Third, we estimate returns to skills while reweighting the NLSY97 sample to match labor market structure in the 1980s.

**Measurement errors** Section 2 describes the procedure to adjust the scores for the test format and for differences in the test taking age. To eliminate measurement errors associated with the age adjustments we estimate equation (1) for respondents who took the ASVAB test when they were 16 years old. Results in Table 4 show a significant decline in returns to ability over the 20 years for men and women. The differences are statistically significant at the 5% level for men and at the

			men			women	
		AFQT	R2 adj	Ν	AFQT	R2 adj	Ν
				Panel A			
model 1	NLSY79	.0683	.2396	9396	.0952	.2783	7788
		(.0121)			(.0132)		
	NLSY97	.0248	.1593	8432	.0682	.2856	7480
		(.0101)			(.0108)		
model 2	NLSY79	.0608	.3113	9387	.0742	.3659	7775
		(.0110)			(.0121)		
	NLSY97	.0224	.3054	8408	.0479	.4139	7467
		(.0089)			(.0093)		
			Panel	B: by educ	cation		
high school dropouts	NLSY79	.1134	.0940	5875	.0665	.0410	2826
		(.0196)			(.0190)		
	NLSY97	.0199	.0474	1846	.0528	.0237	1284
		(.0173)			(.0194)		
high school diploma	NLSY79	.0836	.0816	16297	.1017	.0755	14993
		(.0108)			(.0088)		
	NLSY97	.0316	.0658	8496	.0661	.0463	6835
		(.0094)			(.0092)		
ba	NLSY79	.1594	.1044	2346	.1639	.1360	2476
		(.0249)			(.0275)		
	NLSY97	.0404	.0404	1066	.0648	.0203	1377
		(.0386)			(.0282)		
			Pan	el C: by ra	ace		
white	NLSY79	.0901	.1464	15956	.1038	.2236	1381
		(.0106)			(.0092)		
	NLSY97	.0276	.1380	6762	.0567	.2753	5507
		(.0105)			(.0109)		
black	NLSY79	.1213	.1356	6439	.1401	.1777	5250
		(.0143)			(.0144)		
	NLSY97	.0700	.1356	3137	.0985	.2896	3146
		(.0136)			(.0120)		

Table 3: Returns to AFQT, standard weigths, OLS, with additional controls, by education and by race

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Other controls: education dummies (see Table 2 note), exp, exp2, black, unemployment, metro status. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Model 1 specification includes family background variables. Model 2 specifications includes family background variables, industry and occupation dummies. For full results, see Tables A.3, A.4, A.5 and A.6 in the online appendix A Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

		m	en			WOI	men	
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
AFQT			.0894	.0317			.1299	.0451
			(.0203)	(.0191)			(.0236)	(.0171)
hs	.1387	.1916	.0834	.1705	.2538	.2332	.1604	.1975
	(.0433)	(.0442)	(.0453)	(.0465)	(.0464)	(.0282)	(.0474)	(.0301)
aa	.4076	.5662	.3237	.5374	.5097	.4728	.3855	.4131
	(.0890)	(.0866)	(.0852)	(.0882)	(.0768)	(.0611)	(.0799)	(.0671)
ba	.5341	.6986	.4119	.6508	.7476	.6979	.5726	.6310
	(.0649)	(.0580)	(.0701)	(.0629)	(.0698)	(.0447)	(.0739)	(.0515)
ma	.6844	1.0505	.5227	1.0008	.5882	.9684	.4131	.8958
	(.1470)	(.1726)	(.1515)	(.1706)	(.2369)	(.1017)	(.2413)	(.1034)
R2 adj	.2105	.2137	.2355	.2166	.2699	.2500	.3077	.2569
N	3086	2906	3086	2906	2572	2679	2572	2679

Table 4: Returns to schooling and AFQT, standard weights, 16yo at time of test

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation onw. Education variables: hs=1 for high school graduates and 0 otherwise, aa=1 for individuals with an associate degree, ba=1 for a bachelor's degree holders and ma=1 for individuals with a master's degree or higher. Other included controls: exp, exp2, black, unemployment, metro status. For full results see Table A.7 in online appendix A. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

1% level for women.<sup>13</sup>

To further examine the role of potential measurement errors, we perform TSLS estimations using SAT score to instrument for the AFQT score.<sup>14</sup> The TSLS results, along with the OLS results for the subsample of respondents with valid SAT scores, are reported in Table 5. The first stage results show a strong correlation between the SAT and AFQT scores which did not change much over time. The second stage results show larger effects of AFQT on earnings than the OLS results, suggesting that the measurement error might be important. On the other hand, the proportional decline between the coefficients for NLSY79 and NLSY97 cohorts remains above 50% and is statistically significant.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Further constraining the sample to include only respondents who were 16 years old and completed the 9th grade at the time of the test delivers very similar estimates, these results are reported in Table A.8 in the online Appendix A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>The SAT is a standardized test for college admissions in the United States. In the NLSY79, SAT score is collected in 1980, 1981 and 1983 in the high school transcript survey, and available for 950 respondents. The majority of these individuals were expected to graduate high school in the survey year. In the NLSY97, SAT scores are also available in the transcript surveys of 1999-2000 and 2004 waves for 1407 respondents who graduated high school or had reached

	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
	m	en	WOI	men
OLS	.1588	.0611	.0760	.0436
	(.0448)	(.0285)	(.0308)	(.0282)
TSLS	.2158	.0992	.1926	.0547
	(.0557)	(.0433)	(.0445)	(.0448)
First stage results:				
SAT	.4588	.5097	.5182	.5104
	(.0155)	(.0133)	(.0132)	(.0128)
N	1221	1456	1729	1606

Table 5: TSLS using SAT scores, workers with 12 or more years of schooling

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Sampe includes individuals with 12 or more years of schooling and valid SAT scores. Other controls: education dummies (see Table 2 note), exp, exp2, black, unemployment, metro status. For full results, see Tables A.9 and A.10 in the online appendix A. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

The amount of financial compensation to participate in ASVAB was lower for the later cohort and could affect test performance through incentives and motivation.<sup>15</sup> We address these motivation effects on test performance using information on reason to take the ASVAB which is recorded in the NLSY97. Respondents chose one of the following options: (1) Because it's an important study; (2) To see what it's like to take a test on a computer; (3) To see how well I could do on the test; (4) To learn more about my interests; (5) Family member wanted me to take it; (6) To get the money; (7) I had nothing else to do today. We split the NLSY97 sample into two groups, those who chose (1) to (4) are the "motivated" group and those with (5) to (7) are the "non-motivated" group.<sup>16</sup>

Table 6 reports estimation results for each subgroup. The estimated test score coefficient is higher for the "motivated" group. We partly attribute this difference to measurement error in test

<sup>15</sup>Respondents in NLSY79 were paid \$50 (equivalent to \$97 in 1997) and respondents in NLSY97 were paid \$75.

<sup>18</sup> and were no longer enrolled.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>The results are not very sensitive to the division of individuals into subgroups. For example, estimating equation (1) using only individuals who chose answer (4) vs. those who chose (7) provides very similar estimates.

	NLSY79		NLSY	97
	all	all	motivated	non-motivated
			Men	
AFQT	.0956	.0328	.0464	.0162
	(.0088)	(.0079)	(.0105)	(.0125)
R2 adj	.1661	.1535	.1753	.1351
Ν	25491	12458	6445	5743
		V	Vomen	
AFQT	.1078	.0624	.0645	.0571
	(.0077)	(.0079)	(.0095)	(.0140)
R2 adj	.2257	.2713	.2865	.2488
N	21603	10887	6506	4202

Table 6: Returns to AFQT, standard weights, OLS, by reason to take the test

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Other controls: education dummies (see Table 2 note), exp, exp2, black, unemployment, metro status. See Section 3.1 for definitions of "motivated" and "non-motivated" test-takers. For full results, see Table A.11 in the online appendix A. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

scores. Test scores are likely to be less informative about the true cognitive ability of a respondent who puts lower effort into the test. This result may also suggest that there is a correlation between unobservable personal characteristics that affect both wages and the reason to take the test. However, including the motivation indicator as a control in equation (1) does not affect the estimated returns to schooling and cognitive skills (see Table A.12 in the online Appendix A). In Table 6 the estimated return to cognitive ability is two to six times larger in the 1980s than in the 2000s for any subgroup. The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. There is no statistically significant difference in the returns to schooling between the "motivated" and "non-motivated" samples (see Table A.11 in the online Appendix A).

**Estimation of Propensity Scores and Reweighting** We reweight the NLSY97 sample to match NLSY79 distributions of observable characteristics. To construct the weights, we follow the methodology developed in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). We pool data from both surveys and use Probit models to estimate the probability that an observation is in the NLSY79, condi-

tional on the variables of interest.<sup>17</sup> The estimated probabilities are used to construct the weights:  $\psi(Z) = \frac{P(d_{1979}|Z)}{1-P(d_{1979}|Z)}$ , where Z is the vector of variables of interest,  $d_{1979} \in \{0, 1\}$  equals 1 when an observation is taken from the NLSY79, and  $P(d_{1979}|Z)$  is the conditional probability of appearing in the NLSY79 conditional on observable characteristics Z. The weight function,  $\psi(Z)$ , is used to reweight the observations in the NLSY97 to obtain nearly equal distributions of the variables of interest across the two surveys. Estimation results of equation (1) using the reweighted data are reported in Tables A.13 and A.14 in the online Appendix A.

To reweight the NLSY97 by age we generate weights using  $Z = (age, age^2, age^3)$ . Table 1 reports summary statistics before and after the reweighting. Age-reweighting has a small effect on the estimated returns to skills, return to ability declines substantially and return to education increases between the 1980s and 2000s. We also construct a set of weights using a model that includes age variables, mother's and father's education, family income, intact family indicator, number of siblings, and an indicator for Hispanic origin. The results suggest that changing distributions of family characteristics do not explain the decline in returns to cognitive skills.

Finally, we test how the returns to cognitive ability and schooling would have changed if there was no shift in the distributions of industries and occupations over time.<sup>18</sup> We find that the effect of structural change on the estimates is relatively small for men and women.

#### 4 Wage Dynamics and Returns to Cognitive Skills

We estimate equation (1) and document a substantial decline in the return to cognitive skills and an increase in the return to formal education between the 1980s and 2000s. Here we estimate a dynamic wage specification, allowing for differential effects of education and ability by work

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>These probability estimations use sampling weights provided by the BLS to achieve population representative samples.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Many studies argue that structural changes in the labor market played an important role in the changing wage structure (see, for example, Acemoglu 2002).

		m	en			WOI	nen	
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8
AFQT	.0768	.0300	.0248	.0254	.0913	.0701	.0721	.060
	(.0090)	(.0113)	(.0147)	(.0224)	(.0078)	(.0105)	(.0135)	(.0160
education	.0715	.0931	.1023	.0905	.0814	.1000	.1117	.1388
	(.0038)	(.0067)	(.0074)	(.0134)	(.0037)	(.0058)	(.0077)	(.0091
AFQT*exp			.0081	.0007			.0034	.0019
			(.0019)	(.0040)			(.0019)	(.0026
educ*exp			0054	.0006			0060	0090
			(.0012)	(.0024)			(.0012)	(.0018
experience	.0521	.0597	.1392	.0473	.0496	.0273	.1530	.196
-	(.0065)	(.0118)	(.0187)	(.0417)	(.0064)	(.0083)	(.0189)	(.0308
experience2	0011	0009	0028	0004	0018	.0001	0043	0050
-	(.0005)	(.0011)	(.0005)	(.0016)	(.0005)	(.0006)	(.0005)	(.0011
R2 adj	.1727	.1697	.1750	.1697	.2264	.3096	.2291	.317
N	25491	12458	25491	12458	21603	10887	21603	1088

Table 7: Dynamic wage equation, OLS

Note: NLSY79 statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. NLSY97 statistics are weighted using weights constructed to match age distributions. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Education measures completed years of schooling. Other included controls: black, unemployment, metro status. For full results, see Table A.15 in the online appendix A. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

experience. For each cohort,  $T \in \{NLSY79, NLSY97\}$ , we estimate

$$\ln wage_{it} = \eta_1^T EDUC_i + \eta_2^T ABILITY_i + \eta_3^T EXP_{it} \times EDUC_i +$$

$$\eta_4^T EXP_{it} \times ABILITY_i + \eta_5^T EXP_{it} + \eta_6^T EXP_{it}^2 + X_{it}\eta_7^T + \omega_{it},$$
(2)

assuming that the term  $\omega_{it}$  has similar properties as  $\varepsilon_{it}$  in equation (1).

In the estimations of equation (2) the NLSY79 sample is weighted using the BLS sampling weights; and the NLSY97 sample is weighted using constructed weights to match the age distribution of the NLSY79. Table 7 reports the key results. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) report results obtained using equation (1) where schooling is defined as a continuous variable. These results are quite similar to those reported in Table 2, and show significant declines in the returns to cognitive skills over the 20 years and higher returns to education in the 2000s.

Columns (3) and (4) report estimation results of equation (2) for men. The coefficients  $\eta_3^T$  and  $\eta_4^T$  are lower (in absolute value) and not significantly different from zero in the NLSY97. Incorporating dynamics into the model reduces the coefficient on AFQT for NLSY79,  $\eta_2^{79}$ , and results in no significant difference between the returns to ability at entry wages in the 1980s and 2000s. Columns (7) and (8) report the results for women. Introducing wage dynamics into the model yields very similar returns to AFQT at entry wages across cohorts. The coefficient  $\eta_4^T$  is lower in the NLSY97 while the decline in returns to education with experience, measured by  $\eta_3^T$ , is more substantial in the 2000s. The results suggest that changing wage dynamics explain most of the decline in the returns to cognitive skills for men and women.

We interpret these findings within two alternative frameworks which use similar empirical specifications, human capital accumulation theory and employer-learning theory. The human capital hypothesis, as in Ben-Porath (1967), suggests that ability may affect post-schooling investments in human capital and that formal education may become obsolete over time. Within this theory, the coefficients in equation (2) are affected by changing technology and by structural changes in the labor market. The employer-learning theory posits that wages are determined by the expected value of the worker's productivity conditional on observable characteristics and past performance. In this framework, employee's education is an important initial signal to the employer about his or her potential unobserved productivity. As the worker accumulates experience in the labor market, the employer obtains more information on actual productivity and returns to schooling decrease while the returns to unobserved ability increase. Within this framework, changing estimates of equation (2) reflect changes in signaling and learning mechanisms.

In a conventional model of human capital accumulation, potential earnings increase with acquired skills, and individuals allocate their time between work and on-the-job training. We rely on empirical findings by Veum (1993) and assume that cognitive ability makes workers more trainable and more able workers receive more training.<sup>19</sup> We also assume that technological change

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Rubinstein and Tsiddon (2004) also show that in times of rapid technological change, individuals invest more on the job. They also show that during such transitions innate ability contributes more to the wage growth within each education group than during times of a low rate of technological progress.

may affect investments in training. For example, Bartel and Sicherman (1998) use the NLSY79 data from 1987 through 1992 and find that production workers in manufacturing industries with higher rates of technological change are more likely to receive formal company training. Gashi, Pugh and Adnett (2008) reach a similar conclusion using an administrative German dataset.

To add formality to the discussion, assume in any period t the stock of human capital,  $H_t$ , is given by:  $H_t = Q_t + (1 - \delta)H_{t-1}$ , where  $Q_t$  denotes human capital produced in the current period t (investment) and  $\delta$  is the depreciation rate. Formal schooling is denoted by  $H_0$ , which is the level of human capital upon entry to the labor market. A higher depreciation rate implies a faster depletion of formal and acquired on-the-job human capital. Human capital produced in the current period,  $Q_t$ , is assumed to positively depend on personal ability level, the current stock of human capital and technology.

Using this human capital framework, the coefficient on the interaction between education and experience in equation (2),  $\eta_3^T$ , picks up the depreciation of schooling and may also capture the complementarity between schooling and experience. Human capital investment and on-thejob training are reflected in coefficients on experience,  $\eta_5^T$  and  $\eta_6^T$ , and the interaction between ability and experience,  $\eta_4^T$ . The results in Table 7 show a weaker relationship between the returns to cognitive skills and experience in the 2000s relative to the 1980s for men and women. This suggests that the role of on-the-job training declined over time. The 2000s results for men do not show a statistically significant decline in returns to education with experience, the interaction coefficient,  $\eta_3^T$ , is not different from zero, compared to -0.005 in 1980s. This suggests that the depreciation rate of formal schooling is lower in the 2000s or that the complementarity between schooling and experience increased over time. The increase in the coefficient on  $EXP^2$  is also consistent with a declining depreciation rate in the 2000s. The results for women also show a weaker relationship between returns to ability and work experience in the 2000s but do not show an overall decline in the role of on-the-job training. On the other hand, female labor market and labor force participation went through many changes not captured by the simple specification of equation (2). We attribute the differences between male and female outcomes to developments in

the labor market.<sup>20</sup>

We also examine the empirical findings in Table 7 within the employer-learning theory. This theory argues that upon the labor market entry worker's education conveys an important signal to the employer about his or her potential productivity. With labor market experience, as the employer gradually obtains more accurate information on the productivity of an employee the return to schooling decreases and the return to unobserved ability increases.<sup>21</sup> Equation (2) is similar to the empirical strategy developed in Altonji and Pierret (2001) and our findings for the 1980s are comparable: the returns to ability increase with experience and the returns to education decrease with experience. We find weaker evidence of employer learning in the 2000s: the returns to ability do not increase with experience for men and women. Within the employer-learning theory, these outcomes suggest that between the 1980s and 2000s there were advances in signaling about ability: in the 2000s employers obtain more information about employees' productivity from observing their formal education.

Within the human capital accumulation framework, the estimates are consistent with Nelson and Phelps (1966) hypothesis, which posits that skills are most valuable when workers are adapting to a changing environment but as the rate of technological change slows down, the relative productivity of formal education increases. A rapidly changing technological environment also implies a higher depreciation rate of human capital.<sup>22</sup> Within the employer-learning framework, the results are consistent with changing signaling and screening mechanisms associated with reforms in the education system following technological innovations.

Was technological change more rapid in the 1980s than in the 2000s? To obtain a measure of technological change, we follow the methodology that was proposed in Cummins and Violante

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Among many others, Blundell, Bozio and Laroque (2011) document the changes over time in the labor market participation of men and women. For example, labor force participation of 27 year-old men in the US was around 87% in 1977 and in 2007. For women these rates are around 55% and 70%, respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>This theory was empirically tested by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) using the NLSY79 data. Both studies argue that employer learning about workers' ability plays an important role in wage dynamics.

 $<sup>^{22}</sup>$ This interpretation is also consistent with findings reported in Panel B of Table 3. Those with a bachelor degree have around 7% higher return to AFQT than high school graduates in the 1980s but there is no difference in the 2000s. Given that college graduates are more likely to receive training, see Veum (1993), the drop in the difference in the return to AFQT can be explained by the decline in training required to adapt to the changing work environment.




Figure 2: Aggregate Measures of Investment-Specific Technical Change

Note: Annual percentage change of price index of equipment and softwares and computers based (on the right hand side) quality adjusted, source: NIPA; Cummins and Violante (2002), www.econ.nyu.edu/user/violante/Journals/CUMMINS-VIOLANTE-DATA.xls

(2002) and implemented in many other studies. Cummins and Violante (2002) measure the speed of technical change for each capital good in equipment and software category (E&S) as the difference between the growth rate of constant-quality consumption and the growth rate of the good's quality-adjusted price. We use two measures of real equipment prices, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) official price index of E&S and the price of computers and peripheral (C&P) equipment.<sup>23</sup> Figure 2 shows a substantial decline in technical change in the 2000s. Average annual growth rates in the overall E&S indexes are 5-7% in the 1980s and 1990s and drop to 1% in the 2000s. The C&P index grows by 19-21% on average in the 1980s and 1990s and by 10% in the 2000s.

Prices reflect both consumption- and investment-specific shocks as well as changing competitive conditions and therefore only partially measure technological innovations. For example,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>The former is not fully quality adjusted although a significant effort has been made by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to reduce the quality bias. The latter is a reliable constant-quality price index. We retrieve data from Table 5.3.4. of the NIPA series. For further discussion on NIPA and BEA indexes, see BEA (2003) and Cummins and Violante (2002).

Aizcorbe, Oliner, and Sichel (2008) decompose detailed semiconductor price indexes and show that swings in price-cost markups account for a considerable part of the price dynamics over the past fifteen years.<sup>24</sup> However, their findings are weaker when using aggregate semiconductor prices and they do not examine relative aggregate equipment and software prices or relative aggregate computer prices. We infer that relative aggregate price indexes are less susceptible to shocks associated with changing markups.

Existing literature offers more evidence on the changing pace of technological progress. For example, Goldin and Katz (2007) show that relative demand growth for college workers was more rapid in the 1980s, but it has slowed down since the 1990s. The authors conclude that technology has been racing ahead of education, especially in the 1980s.<sup>25</sup> Katz (2000) suggests that the maturing of the computer revolution led to the slowdown in growth of the relative demand for skill since the late 1980s. Greenwood and Yorokoglu (1997) argue that technological changes were more pronounced at the beginning of the 1980s. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2002) show that at times of technological acceleration the average age of capital declines: firms scrap their machines earlier in response to a faster obsolescence rate. Following their methodology and using data from the BEA, Table 2.10, we find that the average age of capital has increased from 8.5 years in the 1980s to more than 10 years in 2000s, consistent with a slowdown in the rate of technological growth.

A changing technological environment leads not only to changes in training policies but also affects productivity signaling, screening and monitoring mechanisms. Technological change was followed by reforms in the education system in terms of fields of study, implementation and development of new teaching approaches, and access to education. For example, McPherson and Schapiro (1998) document a positive trend in merit-oriented student aid policies which provided higher skilled individuals with opportunities to achieve more and higher quality education. Kinsler and Pavan (2011) show that for higher ability students the effect of family income on the proba-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>In contrast, Pillai (2012) uses growth of microprocessor performance (instead of semiconductor prices) and shows that it increased during the 1990-2000 period and decreased subsequently.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Using National Science Foundation (NSF) data we document a similar trend in the proportion of R&D scientists and engineers in manufacturing companies. This proportion increased by 72% during the 1981-1991 period and by 22% during 1997-2007.

bility of attending a top quartile school decreased significantly across the two waves of the NLSY. Castex (2010) and Lovenheim and Reynolds (2011) show that college non-attendance decreased substantially over time, particularly for high ability students. Goldin and Katz (2007) argue that the increasing relevance of educational institutions to market needs starting in the late 1990s could have provided young workers with better skills for the jobs. Such adjustments in the education system should improve the screening process; i.e. schooling degrees and grades immediately provide more accurate information on the true productivity of an individual in the 2000s than in the 1980s.

### 5 Conclusion

Returns to cognitive skills have declined by 30% - 60% for men and women between the 1980s and the 2000s while returns to formal education have increased. The changes in the returns are persistent across education groups, hold for different ability measures and are robust in various specifications. Changing distributions of various observed characteristics (age and family back-ground) and changing labor market structure cannot explain the decrease in the returns to cognitive ability between the 1980s and 2000s. Additionally, we examine potential biases associated with measurement errors in test scores and conclude that they do not explain the declining coefficients.

We examine the changes in skill prices over the 20 years in a dynamic wage model. We show that wage growth in the 1980s was positively associated with cognitive ability but we do not find such relationship in the 2000s. We analyze these outcomes within human capital accumulation and employer-learning frameworks. We show that the changes in wage dynamics, and therefore the overall decline in the returns to ability can be attributed to the changing work environment and adoption of new technologies. We argue that more rapid technological growth in the 1980s raised the importance of on-the-job training and therefore raised returns to cognitive skills. In the 2000s, technological change has slowed down leading to a more stable work environment. Within the employer-learning theory, we argue that advances in signaling and learning about workers' productivity between the 1980s and 2000s can explain the changing wage dynamics. In particular, we conclude that employers obtain more information about employees' productivity from observing their formal education in the 2000s than in the 1980s.

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Appendix A

			AFC	QT80	M	ath	Vei	rbal
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
test score			.096	.033	.111	.046	.067	.019
			(.009)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
hs	.201	.190	.124	.168	.114	.162	.149	.177
	(.016)	(.019)	(.018)	(.020)	(.017)	(.020)	(.018)	(.020)
aa	.384	.441	.273	.414	.264	.407	.306	.425
	(.034)	(.044)	(.036)	(.045)	(.035)	(.045)	(.035)	(.045)
ba	.525	.597	.384	.548	.374	.527	.432	.571
	(.023)	(.028)	(.026)	(.030)	(.025)	(.030)	(.026)	(.030)
ma	.831	.911	.652	.855	.628	.833	.719	.881
	(.051)	(.082)	(.053)	(.082)	(.053)	(.082)	(.053)	(.082)
experience	.069	.064	.069	.065	.070	.066	.069	.065
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
experience2	003	003	003	003	003	003	003	003
	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
black	192	153	100	133	080	131	129	141
	(.013)	(.014)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)
unempl rate	-2.236	360	-2.107	243	-2.201	215	-2.109	284
	(.372)	(.848)	(.364)	(.849)	(.360)	(.847)	(.368)	(.849)
metro status	.042	013	.033	016	.035	016	.037	014
	(.015)	(.014)	(.015)	(.014)	(.015)	(.014)	(.015)	(.014)
const	2.247	2.142	2.304	2.157	2.314	2.163	2.283	2.151
	(.042)	(.052)	(.042)	(.052)	(.041)	(.052)	(.042)	(.052)
R2 adj	.140	.150	.166	.154	.176	.157	.154	.151
N	25491	12458	25491	12458	25491	12458	25491	12458

Table A.1: Returns to schooling and cognitive skills, standard weights OLS, men

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and one standard deviation. Education variables: hs=1 for high school graduates and 0 otherwise, aa=1 for individuals with an associate degree, ba=1 for a bachelor's degree holders and ma=1 for individuals with a master's degree or higher. The unemployment rate is measured by a 3-year moving average and is calculated using Current Population Surveys. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

		AFC	QT80		Μ	ath	Ver	rbal
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
test score			.108	.062	.106	.065	.082	.051
			(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.007)	(.007)
hs	.217	.198	.133	.156	.147	.159	.152	.164
	(.016)	(.017)	(.016)	(.018)	(.016)	(.018)	(.017)	(.018)
aa	.477	.472	.350	.404	.365	.403	.385	.420
	(.029)	(.038)	(.030)	(.039)	(.029)	(.038)	(.030)	(.039)
ba	.619	.669	.458	.581	.474	.577	.504	.603
	(.024)	(.025)	(.026)	(.027)	(.025)	(.027)	(.026)	(.026)
ma	.792	1.003	.617	.904	.633	.902	.670	.927
	(.076)	(.056)	(.075)	(.056)	(.073)	(.055)	(.076)	(.056)
experience	.061	.040	.064	.043	.065	.042	.062	.042
	(.006)	(.005)	(.006)	(.005)	(.006)	(.005)	(.006)	(.005)
experience2	004	003	003	003	003	003	003	003
	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
black	108	047	003	004	011	016	029	010
	(.012)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.013)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)
unempl rate	-2.629	-3.507	-2.300	-3.340	-2.188	-3.467	-2.442	-3.300
	(.383)	(.876)	(.372)	(.867)	(.373)	(.866)	(.375)	(.870)
metro status	.054	.044	.056	.037	.059	.037	.054	.039
	(.013)	(.014)	(.013)	(.014)	(.013)	(.014)	(.013)	(.014)
const	2.073	2.153	2.098	2.187	2.072	2.196	2.101	2.175
	(.042)	(.053)	(.041)	(.052)	(.041)	(.053)	(.042)	(.052)
R2 adj	.1910	.2579	.2257	.2713	.2270	.2729	.2130	.2673
N	21603	10887	21603	10887	21603	10887	21603	10887

Table A.2: Returns to schooling and cognitive skills, standard weights OLS, women

		AF	QT		Math					Verbal			
	moo	del 1	model 2		moo	iel 1	moo	iel 2	mod	lel 1	model 2		
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	
test score	.068	.025	.061	.022	.091	.039	.080	.033	.047	.008	.042	.010	
	(.012)	(.010)	(.011)	(.009)	(.012)	(.010)	(.011)	(.009)	(.012)	(.010)	(.011)	(.009)	
hs	.098	.137	.094	.098	.087	.131	.085	.094	.112	.147	.106	.105	
	(.026)	(.026)	(.023)	(.022)	(.026)	(.026)	(.024)	(.022)	(.026)	(.026)	(.023)	(.022)	
aa	.269	.395	.277	.295	.253	.387	.263	.290	.291	.405	.295	.302	
	(.050)	(.052)	(.051)	(.043)	(.051)	(.052)	(.052)	(.044)	(.050)	(.052)	(.051)	(.043)	
ba	.445	.481	.369	.332	.427	.461	.355	.319	.475	.501	.393	.346	
	(.042)	(.037)	(.040)	(.035)	(.042)	(.038)	(.040)	(.035)	(.041)	(.037)	(.039)	(.035)	
ma	.527	.839	.449	.656	.494	.818	.422	.642	.565	.861	.480	.672	
	(.098)	(.098)	(.101)	(.094)	(.098)	(.098)	(.102)	(.094)	(.098)	(.098)	(.101)	(.095)	
experience	.051	.061	.049	.046	.052	.062	.050	.046	.050	.061	.049	.046	
-	(.009)	(.007)	(.008)	(.006)	(.009)	(.007)	(.008)	(.006)	(.009)	(.007)	(.008)	(.006)	
experience2	002	003	002	002	002	003	002	002	002	003	002	002	

(.001)

-.104

(.021)

.751

(1.032)

.005

(.017)

+

1.666

(.124)

.162

8432

(.001)

.004

(.022)

-3.418

(.727)

.013

(.021)

+

+

1.604

(.193)

.318

9387

(.001)

-.087

(.018)

-.211

(.955)

.018

(.015)

+

+

1.721

(.147)

.307

8408

(.001)

-.037

(.024)

-3.835

(.813)

.010

(.023)

+

1.675

(.204)

.234

9396

(.001)

-.003

(.024)

-3.733

(.802)

.009

(.023)

+

1.754

(.205)

.249

9396

(.001)

-.022

(.024)

-3.743

(.810)

.008

(.023)

+

1.711

(.205)

.240

9396

black

unempl rate

metro status

inds, occs

const

R2 adj

Ν

family background

(.001)

-.107

(.021)

.694

(1.032)

.006

(.017)

+

1.647

(.124)

.159

8432

(.001)

-.011

(.023)

-3.428

(.733)

.013

(.021)

+

+

1.565

(.192)

.311

9387

(.001)

-.089

(.018)

-.237

(.954)

.018

(.015)

+

+

1.715

(.146)

.305

8408

(.001)

-.024

(.023)

-3.484

(.735)

.014

(.021)

+

+

1.535

(.192)

.307

9387

(.001)

-.116

(.022)

.638

(1.033)

.007

(.018)

+

1.620

(.124)

.158

8432

(.001)

-.095

(.018)

-.277

(.954)

.019

(.015)

+

+

1.700

(.145)

.304

8408

Table A.3: Returns to schooling and cognitive skills, standard weights, with additional controls, OLS, men

Ta	ble A	.4:	Return	s to	schooling	and	cognitive	skills,	standard	weights,	with	additional	controls,
OI	LS, wo	ome	en										

		AF	QT			Ma	ath			Ver	bal	
	mod	iel 1	mod	lel 2	moc	lel 1	moc	le 12	moc	lel 1	moc	lel 2
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
test score	.095	.068	.074	.048	.099	.072	.078	.052	.064	.053	.049	.036
	(.013)	(.011)	(.012)	(.009)	(.013)	(.010)	(.012)	(.009)	(.013)	(.010)	(.012)	(.009)
hs	.105	.141	.070	.066	.113	.143	.074	.067	.125	.150	.084	.072
	(.031)	(.024)	(.029)	(.021)	(.030)	(.024)	(.028)	(.021)	(.031)	(.024)	(.029)	(.021)
aa	.308	.380	.223	.260	.309	.377	.222	.257	.335	.397	.242	.272
	(.047)	(.050)	(.044)	(.043)	(.047)	(.048)	(.044)	(.042)	(.048)	(.050)	(.044)	(.044)
ba	.468	.547	.327	.365	.464	.538	.322	.358	.512	.569	.357	.380
	(.049)	(.033)	(.046)	(.031)	(.048)	(.033)	(.045)	(.031)	(.050)	(.033)	(.046)	(.031)
ma	.612	.937	.400	.704	.599	.934	.388	.703	.660	.959	.432	.719
	(.098)	(.061)	(.094)	(.063)	(.096)	(.059)	(.093)	(.061)	(.099)	(.063)	(.095)	(.064)
experience	.057	.040	.053	.033	.058	.040	.053	.033	.056	.040	.052	.033
	(.010)	(.007)	(.009)	(.006)	(.009)	(.007)	(.009)	(.006)	(.010)	(.007)	(.009)	(.006)
experience2	003	002	003	002	003	002	003	002	003	002	003	002
•	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
black	.004	.029	018	.010	.013	.016	011	.002	026	.022	041	.005
	(.027)	(.018)	(.023)	(.017)	(.026)	(.018)	(.023)	(.016)	(.026)	(.019)	(.023)	(.017)
unempl rate	-3.804	-3.329	-3.227	-2.526	-3.791	-3.480	-3.222	-2.637	-4.057	-3.257	-3.412	-2.471
1	(.873)	(1.029)	(.784)	(.904)	(.866)	(1.028)	(.785)	(.902)	(.894)	(1.032)	(.796)	(.907)
metro status	.050	.026	.052	.033	.051	.025	.052	.032	.049	.028	.052	.034
	(.023)	(.017)	(.020)	(.014)	(.023)	(.017)	(.020)	(.014)	(.023)	(.017)	(.020)	(.014)
family background	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
inds, occs			+	+			+	+			+	+
const	1.406	1.887	1.517	1.977	1.363	1.892	1.493	1.983	1.384	1.847	1.513	1.947
	(.211)	(.105)	(.196)	(.164)	(.210)	(.105)	(.194)	(.166)	(.212)	(.106)	(.197)	(.162)
R2 adj	.278	.286	.366	.414	.283	.289	.369	.416	.267	.281	.359	.411
N	7788	7480	7775	7467	7788	7480	7775	7467	7788	7480	7775	7467

	high schoo	ol dropouts	high	school	b	a
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
			М	en		
AFQT score	.113	.020	.084	.032	.159	.040
	(.020)	(.017)	(.011)	(.009)	(.025)	(.039)
experience	.065	.029	.066	.072	.061	.074
	(.014)	(.020)	(.009)	(.008)	(.019)	(.037)
experience2	003	001	002	004	004	.001
	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.006)
black	102	125	111	144	.031	062
	(.026)	(.031)	(.019)	(.018)	(.043)	(.058)
unempl rate	-3.560	3.711	791	-1.566	-5.055	7.196
	(.712)	(2.293)	(.451)	(1.054)	(1.178)	(4.765)
metro status	001	065	.041	022	004	.059
	(.031)	(.034)	(.019)	(.017)	(.043)	(.045)
const	2.473	2.061	2.315	2.389	2.949	2.222
	(.077)	(.115)	(.045)	(.055)	(.120)	(.269)
R2 adj	.094	.047	.082	.066	.104	.040
Ν	5875	1846	16297	8496	2346	1066
			Wo	men		
AFQT score	.070	.048	.097	.068	.138	.067
	(.024)	(.020)	(.009)	(.009)	(.026)	(.028)
experience	.019	003	.078	.046	.111	.068
enperience	(.020)	(.020)	(.008)	(.008)	(.026)	(.040)
experience2	.000	.001	004	003	007	006
enperiencez	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.003)	(.008)
black	040	014	.020	008	008	.002
	(.037)	(.029)	(.017)	(.017)	(.041)	(.043)
unempl rate	-1.586	-1.198	-1.672	-3.755	-5.160	-1.273
••••••••••••	(1.105)	(2.145)	(.477)	(1.028)	(1.148)	(4.868)
metro status	.038	.017	.070	.046	.041	.034
	(.034)	(.031)	(.016)	(.017)	(.040)	(.036)
const	6.799	6.793	6.739	6.961	7.253	7.726
	(.113)	(.117)	(.045)	(.056)	(.113)	(.281)
	( )	( )	( )		( )	( )
R2 adj	.043	.026	.080	.049	.113	.035
N	1529	1290	12013	6847	2275	1371

Table A.5: Returns to ability, standard weigths, OLS, by education

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and one standard deviation. The unemployment rate is measured by a 3-year moving average and is calculated using Current Population Surveys. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

		М	en			Wo	men	
	wł	nite	bla	nck	wh	ite	bla	ack
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
AFQT score	.090	.028	.121	.070	.104	.057	.140	.099
	(.011)	(.010)	(.014)	(.014)	(.009)	(.011)	(.014)	(.012)
hs	.128	.189	.109	.110	.143	.163	.120	.118
	(.022)	(.028)	(.024)	(.027)	(.020)	(.025)	(.031)	(.027)
aa	.284	.440	.185	.320	.361	.423	.326	.366
	(.043)	(.054)	(.051)	(.064)	(.035)	(.051)	(.050)	(.061)
ba	.394	.567	.369	.523	.478	.603	.341	.525
	(.032)	(.038)	(.043)	(.051)	(.030)	(.034)	(.050)	(.049)
ma	.674	.900	.715	1.043	.635	.920	.476	.995
	(.058)	(.089)	(.063)	(.051)	(.082)	(.063)	(.126)	(.150)
experience	.073	.068	.038	.048	.065	.044	.061	.037
	(.007)	(.007)	(.010)	(.011)	(.007)	(.007)	(.009)	(.008)
experience2	003	003	002	002	003	003	003	002
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
unempl rate	-2.150	.435	-2.628	-1.382	-2.441	-3.163	-1.181	-3.293
	(.429)	(1.102)	(.587)	(1.542)	(.440)	(1.141)	(.616)	(1.338)
metro status	.033	023	.011	.005	.059	.040	.010	.006
	(.017)	(.018)	(.023)	(.023)	(.015)	(.018)	(.021)	(.022)
const	2.289	2.097	2.441	2.199	2.089	2.156	2.113	2.278
	(.049)	(.070)	(.068)	(.085)	(.047)	(.069)	(.076)	(.082)
R2 adj	.146	.138	.136	.136	.224	.275	.178	.290
N	15956	6762	6439	3137	13815	5507	5250	3146

Table A.6: Returns to ability, standard weights, OLS, by race

		m	en		women				
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	
AFQT score			.089	.032			.130	.045	
			(.020)	(.019)			(.024)	(.017)	
hs	.139	.192	.083	.171	.254	.233	.160	.197	
	(.043)	(.044)	(.045)	(.046)	(.046)	(.028)	(.047)	(.030)	
aa	.408	.566	.324	.537	.510	.473	.385	.413	
	(.089)	(.087)	(.085)	(.088)	(.077)	(.061)	(.080)	(.067)	
ba	.534	.699	.412	.651	.748	.698	.573	.631	
	(.065)	(.058)	(.070)	(.063)	(.070)	(.045)	(.074)	(.052)	
ma	.684	1.050	.523	1.001	.588	.968	.413	.896	
	(.147)	(.173)	(.152)	(.171)	(.237)	(.102)	(.241)	(.103)	
experience	.001	.084	.010	.085	.039	.043	.052	.045	
	(.020)	(.011)	(.020)	(.011)	(.019)	(.011)	(.020)	(.011)	
experience2	.001	005	.001	005	001	003	002	003	
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	
black	178	138	098	116	136	054	024	025	
	(.035)	(.032)	(.037)	(.037)	(.039)	(.027)	(.044)	(.027)	
unempl rate	-6.506	-4.395	-5.747	-4.457	-4.281	-2.153	-2.940	-2.178	
	(1.383)	(1.642)	(1.353)	(1.637)	(1.489)	(1.619)	(1.441)	(1.613)	
metro status	.023	.004	.009	.002	.047	.053	.065	.044	
	(.040)	(.033)	(.037)	(.033)	(.043)	(.029)	(.041)	(.030)	
const	2.742	2.277	2.732	2.300	2.185	2.030	2.098	2.069	
	(.172)	(.091)	(.169)	(.092)	(.182)	(.085)	(.175)	(.087)	
R2 adj	.210	.214	.236	.217	.270	.250	.308	.257	
N	3086	2906	3086	2906	2572	2679	2572	2679	

Table A.7: Returns to schooling and AFQT, standard weights, 16yo at time of test

		m	en		women					
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97		
AFQT score			.078	.017			.127	.007		
			(.023)	(.031)			(.031)	(.024)		
hs	.170	.281	.124	.273	.243	.221	.157	.215		
	(.057)	(.082)	(.059)	(.084)	(.067)	(.040)	(.068)	(.041)		
aa	.460	.465	.381	.456	.487	.409	.362	.401		
	(.104)	(.157)	(.096)	(.157)	(.097)	(.081)	(.098)	(.091)		
ba	.548	.792	.454	.769	.745	.674	.582	.664		
	(.071)	(.099)	(.077)	(.104)	(.084)	(.057)	(.092)	(.070)		
ma	.714	1.245	.575	1.219	.826	.742	.672	.729		
	(.148)	(.335)	(.154)	(.334)	(.167)	(.099)	(.167)	(.110)		
experience	.028	.095	.027	.096	.041	.037	.053	.037		
	(.027)	(.018)	(.027)	(.017)	(.023)	(.019)	(.022)	(.019)		
experience2	001	005	001	005	001	001	002	001		
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)		
black	174	089	092	079	154	073	035	070		
	(.048)	(.053)	(.050)	(.059)	(.045)	(.041)	(.056)	(.041)		
unempl rate	-6.234	-3.658	-6.050	-3.823	-3.725	.945	-2.727	.936		
	(1.608)	(2.639)	(1.611)	(2.632)	(1.531)	(2.306)	(1.552)	(2.304)		
metro status	.006	034	001	035	.062	.085	.070	.084		
	(.047)	(.049)	(.045)	(.050)	(.050)	(.040)	(.048)	(.041)		
const	2.666	2.159	2.693	2.174	2.147	1.861	2.082	1.868		
	(.201)	(.147)	(.200)	(.148)	(.200)	(.120)	(.193)	(.123)		
R2 adj	.225	.197	.243	.197	.275	.220	.306	.219		
N	1756	1369	1756	1369	1909	1206	1909	1206		

Table A.8: Returns to schooling and AFQT, standard weights, 16yo and 9th grade at time of test

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. There are 372 males and 423 females who were in 9th grade and 16 years old in 1980 in NLSY79. In NLSY97, in 1997, the corresponding numbers are 282 and 276. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and one standard deviation. Education variables: hs=1 for high school graduates and 0 otherwise, aa=1 for individuals with an associate degree, ba=1 for a bachelor's degree holders and ma=1 for individuals with a master's degree or higher. The unemployment rate is measured by a 3-year moving average and is calculated using Current Population Surveys. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
	0	LS	TS	LS	O	LS	TS	LS
		m	en			WO	men	
AFQT score	.159	.061	.216	.099	.076	.044	.193	.055
	(.045)	(.029)	(.056)	(.043)	(.031)	(.028)	(.044)	(.045)
aa	.150	.313	.157	.316	.322	.131	.296	.128
	(.114)	(.077)	(.121)	(.077)	(.072)	(.098)	(.073)	(.099)
ba	.274	.395	.256	.380	.408	.417	.359	.412
	(.051)	(.048)	(.053)	(.051)	(.049)	(.036)	(.049)	(.039)
ma	.544	.637	.511	.616	.613	.682	.563	.674
	(.104)	(.081)	(.105)	(.082)	(.119)	(.077)	(.110)	(.081)
experience	.060	.091	.064	.092	.100	.065	.108	.065
	(.027)	(.019)	(.027)	(.019)	(.025)	(.016)	(.025)	(.016)
experience2	001	004	001	004	007	004	008	004
	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)
black	.020	084	.062	057	073	.020	.058	.025
	(.068)	(.039)	(.071)	(.042)	(.053)	(.038)	(.069)	(.041)
unempl rate	-3.629	.650	-3.590	.460	-4.829	-6.761	-4.805	-6.802
	(1.434)	(2.811)	(1.452)	(2.828)	(1.376)	(3.059)	(1.391)	(3.067)
metro status	.027	015	.032	023	.080	.064	.070	.064
	(.054)	(.042)	(.054)	(.042)	(.052)	(.036)	(.055)	(.036)
const	2.532	2.225	2.473	2.217	2.366	2.524	2.279	2.522
	(.157)	(.163)	(.167)	(.163)	(.146)	(.178)	(.153)	(.178)
R2 adj	.219	.204	.215	.202	.314	.237	.292	.237
N	1221	1456	1221	1456	1729	1606	1729	1606

Table A.9: TSLS using SAT scores, workers with 12 or more years of schooling

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. SAT scores are obtained high school transcript questionnaire. SAT scores are available for 950 and 1407 respondents, in NLSY79 and NLSY97, respectively. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and one standard deviation. Education variables: hs=1 for high school graduates and 0 otherwise, aa=1 for individuals with an associate degree, ba=1 for a bachelor's degree holders and ma=1 for individuals with a master's degree or higher. The unemployment rate is measured by a 3-year moving average and is calculated using Current Population Surveys. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported. First stage results are reported in Table A.1.

	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
	m	en	WOI	men
SAT score	.459	.510	.518	.510
	(.016)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)
aa	.024	103	.040	.120
	(.075)	(.081)	(.042)	(.041)
ba	.109	.055	.118	.017
	(.026)	(.026)	(.029)	(.028)
ma	056	005	033	.174
	(.056)	(.061)	(.068)	(.047)
experience	024	.006	.005	.000
	(.024)	(.014)	(.024)	(.014)
experience2	.001	001	.000	.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
black	294	233	577	137
	(.040)	(.042)	(.037)	(.028)
unempl rate	689	3.573	2.840	3.442
	(.975)	(2.504)	(.986)	(2.656)
metro status	053	.109	.020	072
	(.028)	(.024)	(.028)	(.023)
const	1.038	.439	.490	.489
	(.114)	(.144)	(.105)	(.152)
R2 adj	.669	.654	.695	.626
N	1221	1456	1729	1606

Table A.10: First stage: using SAT scores to instrument for AFQT scores, workers with 12 or more years of schooling

Note: All statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. SAT scores are obtained high school transcript questionnaire. SAT scores are available for 950 and 1407 respondents, in NLSY79 and NLSY97, respectively. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and one standard deviation. Education variables: hs=1 for high school graduates and 0 otherwise, aa=1 for individuals with an associate degree, ba=1 for a bachelor's degree holders and ma=1 for individuals with a master's degree or higher. The unemployment rate is measured by a 3-year moving average and is calculated using Current Population Surveys. Coefficients and standard errors presented.

			men				women	
	NLSY79		NLSY	97	NLSY79		NLSY	97
	all	all	motivated	non-motivated	all	all	motivated	non-motivated
AFQT score	.096	.033	.046	.016	.108	.062	.065	.057
	(.009)	(.008)	(.010)	(.013)	(.008)	(.008)	(.009)	(.014)
hs	.124	.168	.148	.193	.133	.156	.163	.136
	(.018)	(.020)	(.026)	(.031)	(.016)	(.018)	(.020)	(.036)
aa	.273	.414	.418	.417	.350	.404	.435	.360
	(.036)	(.045)	(.072)	(.059)	(.030)	(.039)	(.047)	(.066)
ba	.384	.548	.543	.559	.458	.581	.599	.551
	(.026)	(.030)	(.042)	(.044)	(.026)	(.027)	(.034)	(.046)
ma	.652	.855	.868	.831	.617	.904	.894	.925
	(.053)	(.082)	(.106)	(.122)	(.075)	(.056)	(.072)	(.085)
experience	.069	.065	.055	.073	.064	.043	.049	.035
	(.006)	(.006)	(.008)	(.008)	(.006)	(.005)	(.007)	(.009)
experience2	003	003	002	004	003	003	003	002
	(.000)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
black	100	133	097	167	003	004	017	.021
	(.015)	(.015)	(.020)	(.023)	(.014)	(.014)	(.017)	(.025)
unempl rate	-2.107	243	.189	475	-2.300	-3.340	-2.903	-3.766
	(.364)	(.849)	(1.166)	(1.265)	(.372)	(.867)	(1.131)	(1.380)
metro status	.033	016	009	027	.056	.037	.034	.048
	(.015)	(.014)	(.019)	(.021)	(.013)	(.014)	(.017)	(.022)
const	2.304	2.157	2.139	2.165	2.098	2.187	2.159	2.224
	(.042)	(.052)	(.071)	(.078)	(.041)	(.052)	(.068)	(.085)
R2 adj	.166	.154	.175	.135	.226	.271	.287	.249
N	25491	12458	6445	5743	21603	10887	6506	4202

## Table A.11: Returns to AFQT, standard weights, OLS, by reason to take the test

		m	en			WOI	men	
test score		.033		.033		.062		.062
		(.008)		(.008)		(.008)		(.008)
"motivated"			037	034			.008	.017
			(.014)	(.014)			(.014)	(.014)
hs	.190	.168	.191	.170	.198	.156	.196	.155
	(.019)	(.020)	(.020)	(.020)	(.017)	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)
aa	.441	.414	.442	.416	.472	.404	.470	.404
	(.044)	(.045)	(.046)	(.046)	(.038)	(.039)	(.038)	(.039)
ba	.597	.548	.598	.550	.669	.581	.667	.581
	(.028)	(.030)	(.028)	(.030)	(.025)	(.027)	(.025)	(.027
ma	.911	.855	.924	.868	1.003	.904	1.017	.920
	(.082)	(.082)	(.084)	(.083)	(.056)	(.056)	(.056)	(.057
experience	.064	.065	.063	.064	.040	.043	.041	.043
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005
experience2	003	003	003	003	003	003	003	003
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001
black	153	133	148	129	047	004	046	004
	(.014)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)
unempl rate	360	243	241	121	-3.507	-3.340	-3.385	-3.22
-	(.848)	(.849)	(.860)	(.861)	(.876)	(.867)	(.885)	(.876
metro status	013	016	015	019	.044	.037	.046	.039
	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014
const	2.142	2.157	2.155	2.168	2.153	2.187	2.142	2.170
	(.052)	(.052)	(.053)	(.053)	(.053)	(.052)	(.055)	(.055
R2 adj	.150	.154	.151	.155	.258	.271	.257	.270
N	12458	12458	12188	12188	10887	10887	10708	10703

Table A.12: Returns to AFQT, standard weights, OLS, controlling for test motivation, NLSY97

			reweighted by age, family background		reweighted by age, family background		reweighted by age, ind and occs, family	
		ed by age	(no fam inc)		(with fam inc)		background (no fam inc)	
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
AFQT score	.096	.046	.095	.039	.080	.038	.095	.038
	(.009)	(.011)	(.010)	(.013)	(.012)	(.014)	(.010)	(.015)
hs	.124	.154	.139	.166	.117	.138	.138	.162
	(.018)	(.034)	(.020)	(.032)	(.025)	(.036)	(.020)	(.034)
aa	.273	.399	.284	.360	.296	.326	.281	.337
	(.036)	(.053)	(.038)	(.062)	(.050)	(.066)	(.038)	(.068)
ba	.384	.495	.406	.513	.478	.488	.406	.538
	(.026)	(.048)	(.029)	(.056)	(.041)	(.057)	(.029)	(.054)
ma	.652	.774	.668	.716	.563	.718	.667	.770
	(.053)	(.077)	(.056)	(.098)	(.095)	(.111)	(.057)	(.107)
experience	.069	.059	.072	.076	.051	.074	.072	.065
	(.006)	(.012)	(.007)	(.011)	(.009)	(.011)	(.007)	(.012)
experience2	003	003	003	005	002	005	003	004
	(.000)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
black	100	141	090	154	066	137	090	112
	(.015)	(.024)	(.017)	(.026)	(.022)	(.029)	(.017)	(.028)
unempl rate	-2.107	-4.930	-1.936	-4.689	-4.111	-3.133	-1.974	-7.510
	(.364)	(1.345)	(.402)	(1.907)	(.815)	(1.840)	(.402)	(1.979)
metro status	.033	.004	.041	005	.025	009	.042	001
	(.015)	(.021)	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	(.025)	(.016)	(.025)
const	2.304	2.449	2.266	2.415	2.473	2.357	2.270	2.575
	(.042)	(.092)	(.046)	(.119)	(.092)	(.114)	(.047)	(.125)
R2 adj	.166	.153	.163	.142	.227	.135	.163	.146
N	25491	12458	20333	10248	9334	8351	20292	10171

Table A.13: Returns t	o AFOT. NLSY97	reweighted using	constructed weights, men

			reweighted by age,		reweighted by age,		reweighted by age,	
			family background		family background		ind and occs, family	
	•	ed by age	(no fam inc)		(with fam inc)		background (no fam inc)	
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
AFQT score	.108	.079	.111	.078	.106	.073	.111	.051
	(.008)	(.011)	(.008)	(.014)	(.013)	(.014)	(.008)	(.015)
hs	.133	.143	.125	.187	.113	.167	.125	.183
	(.016)	(.023)	(.019)	(.034)	(.031)	(.032)	(.019)	(.042)
aa	.350	.375	.339	.389	.316	.373	.339	.357
	(.030)	(.043)	(.031)	(.057)	(.048)	(.059)	(.031)	(.058)
ba	.458	.526	.452	.556	.484	.549	.452	.596
	(.026)	(.039)	(.028)	(.053)	(.049)	(.050)	(.028)	(.064)
ma	.617	.920	.662	.785	.635	.899	.661	.926
	(.075)	(.073)	(.064)	(.082)	(.100)	(.083)	(.064)	(.120)
experience	.064	.041	.067	.033	.059	.032	.067	.045
	(.006)	(.009)	(.006)	(.011)	(.009)	(.012)	(.006)	(.013)
experience2	003	003	004	002	003	002	004	003
	(.000)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
black	003	020	.012	020	027	022	.013	017
	(.014)	(.021)	(.015)	(.024)	(.024)	(.025)	(.016)	(.028)
unempl rate	-2.300	-7.105	-2.606	-7.183	-3.891	-5.989	-2.600	-2.327
	(.372)	(1.087)	(.406)	(1.962)	(.890)	(1.854)	(.407)	(2.317)
metro status	.056	.031	.056	.024	.062	.024	.056	.018
	(.013)	(.019)	(.014)	(.023)	(.022)	(.024)	(.014)	(.028)
const	2.098	2.458	2.118	2.441	2.235	2.396	2.118	2.125
	(.041)	(.075)	(.044)	(.133)	(.102)	(.123)	(.044)	(.153)
R2 adj	.226	.309	.230	.267	.269	.270	.231	.225
N	21603	10887	17718	8840	7741	7368	17687	8812

Table A.14: Returns to AFQT, NLSY97	' reweighted using construct	ed weights, women
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	men				women			
	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97	NLSY79	NLSY97
AFQT	.077	.030	.025	.025	.091	.070	.072	.060
	(.009)	(.011)	(.015)	(.022)	(.008)	(.011)	(.014)	(.016)
education	.071	.093	.102	.090	.081	.100	.112	.139
	(.004)	(.007)	(.007)	(.013)	(.004)	(.006)	(.008)	(.009)
AFQT x exp			.008	.001			.003	.002
			(.002)	(.004)			(.002)	(.003)
educ x xexp			005	.001			006	009
			(.001)	(.002)			(.001)	(.002)
experience	.052	.060	.139	.047	.050	.027	.153	.196
	(.006)	(.012)	(.019)	(.042)	(.006)	(.008)	(.019)	(.031)
experience2	001	001	003	.000	002	.000	004	005
	(.000)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
black	118	153	116	153	038	046	034	040
	(.015)	(.023)	(.015)	(.023)	(.013)	(.020)	(.014)	(.020)
unempl. rate	-1.461	1.755	-1.611	1.871	-1.891	-1.859	-2.056	-3.369
	(.366)	(1.143)	(.372)	(1.253)	(.375)	(1.005)	(.379)	(1.099)
metro status	.032	.004	.031	.004	.050	.041	.050	.037
	(.015)	(.021)	(.015)	(.021)	(.013)	(.019)	(.013)	(.018)
const	1.540	1.042	1.112	1.081	1.241	1.064	.800	.514
	(.067)	(.132)	(.107)	(.192)	(.062)	(.121)	(.105)	(.139)
R2 adj.	.173	.170	.175	.170	.226	.310	.229	.318
N	25491	12458	25491	12458	21603	10887	21603	10887

Table A.15: Dynamic wage equation, OLS

Note: NLSY79 statistics are weighted by the cross-sectional weights. NLSY97 statistics are weighted using weights constructed to match age distributions. Wages are inflation adjusted to 2007 using the CPI-U. Test scores are normalized to have zero mean and one standard deviation. Education measures years of schooling. Unemployment rate is measured by a 3-year moving average and is calculated using Current Population Surveys. Coefficients and standard errors presented. Respondents are clustered at the primary sampling unit, robust standard errors are reported.

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