
"Aggregate Information Dynamics" by Kyriakos Chousakos, Gary Gorton and Guillerme Ordoñez

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Some results:

More information is produced before and during recessions with crises than otherwise

This leads reallocation of capital, narrowing dispersion of firms' q-ratios, spillovers across borders

Information measure and median volatility have predictive power over recession with crisis (but not without)

Empirical measure of information – **standard deviation of volatilities of individual stocks**

Theories of information: 1

- Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) "Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets"
 - Sophisticated investors collect information and trade on it
 - but prices incorporate information only partially (otherwise no incentives to collect information)

• Xiong (2001)

- o This process depends on arbitrageurs' capital
- When capital is depleted (after losses, in crises), less information gets into prices
- Moreover, trades can be destabilizing (creating volatility linked not to fundamentals but to depleted capital)

... suggests high volatility, but less information in crises

Theory 2: Bubbles and Crashes

• Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) "Bubbles and Crashes"

- Boom becomes a bubble at some point, sophisticated traders become sequentially aware of the bubble
- Decide when to attack: bubble crashes when critical mass attacks
- Result: traders do not attack right away, but ride bubble for some time
- Eventually bubble crashes (high volatility, information is revealed and becomes common knowledge)
- Consistent with Gorton and Ordoñes (2016), "good booms" and "bad booms"
- Chuck Prince "Dance as long as the music is playing"

Minsky moment – Wile E. Coyote Effect



Theory 3: Crisis Mechanism

- Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)
 - Financial institutions choose leverage endogenously => resilience to normal shocks, but large shocks (losses) leading to firesales and crisis episodes

Equilibrium characterized by

- o rise in leverage prior to crisis
- o rise in volatility prior to and in crisis, capital reallocation
- volatility is due to financial frictions
- all these phenomena occur without information production

A closer look at analysis

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• Can we distinguish among these and other theories?

A closer look at analysis

- Measure of **fragility**: median Vol_i, Atkeson et al (2013)
 Really median 1/Vol_i = 1 / median Vol_i
- Measure of information: St Dev (Vol_i)
 - Turns out to have 96% correlation with standard deviation of returns
- Basically, moments of the distribution of firms' volatilities
 both go up before and in recession with crisis, predict these events

Is this about information?

- Measure of **fragility**: median Vol_i, Atkeson et al (2013)
- Measure of **information**: St Dev (Vol_i)
- Basically, moments of the distribution of firms' volatilities
 o both go up before and in recession with crisis, predict these events
- Alternative forces:
- (1) Leverage yes, both measures would rise in leverage
- (2) Endogenous volatility (due to financial frictions and changing risk premia) yes again

Can one disentangle these effects?

- Some thoughts
 - I am sure authors have much better ideas then these naïve theorist's suggestions
- Leverage could estimate asset volatility rather than stock volatility, perhaps control for leverage more carefully
- Even controlling for leverage, endogenous risk would amplify volatility (& raise standard deviation of volatilities)
- Endogenous risk could isolate idiosyncratic component of asset volatility, i.e. subtract portion of return predictable by common risk factors

Conclusions

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- Thought-provoking paper
- Important empirical results distribution of volatilities in crises, asset reallocation, global spillovers
- Suggests important implications on information, but may be consistent with other theories
- It would be nice to disentangle those effects

