A CRITICAL VIEW OF INFLATION TARGETING: CRISES, IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY, AND AGGREGATE SHOCKS

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Abstract

This paper presents a critical appraisal of inflation targeting as a monetary policy for emerging markets. It is shown that this policy, if understood as a strict commitment to a CPI inflation target, shares many features with exchange rate targeting and is quite different from money growth rules, which are traditionally associated with the label 'flexible exchange rates'. Inflation targets are vulnerable to speculative attacks, although less so than exchange rate targets. They perform worse than exchange rate targets when credibility is imperfect. And their relative performance under exogenous shocks, not surprisingly, depends on the nature and direction of those shocks. Given this lack of an obvious advantage over exchange rate targets, the real attraction of inflation targets may be that they give the policymaker discretion. This, in the context of many emerging markets, has to be a cause for concern.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Inflation targeting has in recent years been adopted by the central banks of several advanced economies including Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. The policy is widely perceived as having been successful, see the discussions in Leiderman and Svensson (1995), McCallum (1996) and Bernanke et al. (1999). It is now increasingly being implemented by emerging economies. Following recent currency crises several of them have had to let their currencies float. In designing a new permanent monetary policy framework, a view has emerged that for emerging economies the option of simply fixing the exchange rate is no longer viable[1], and that the choice is between a fixed exchange rate with an extremely strong form of commitment (such as a currency board or full dollarization) and flexible exchange rates. Several important emerging economies such as Brazil and Mexico have chosen the latter. Given the well-known problems associated with choosing a monetary aggregate as the nominal anchor, they have opted for an inflation target.

This transplants inflation targeting to a new and quite different economic environment. It also assigns it a new task, the attainment and maintenance of low inflation rates in a historically highly inflationary environment, often starting from double digit inflation rates. The suitability of inflation targeting for such environments was first discussed in Masson, Savastano and Sharma (1997). They find that the policy is unsuitable for most emerging markets, based on two objections. The main one is that for emerging markets the (real) exchange rate remains an important additional objective of monetary policy, which is bound to lead to conflicts with the inflation target. Strong empirical support for this view can be found in Calvo and Reinhart (2000a,b) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999), who find that the actual behavior of many emerging economies' exchange rate regimes, while

[1] There is no unanimity on this by any means. See e.g. Frankel (1999).

officially classified as floating, in fact resembles that of noncredible pegs. The second objection to inflation targeting, which may no longer be applicable to all emerging markets but certainly to a majority among them, is fiscal dominance. In most emerging markets the government budget remains a source of instability while seigniorage may still be an important source of government financing. The reasons include a weak fiscal revenue base, a rudimentary tax collection system, the contingent bailout liabilities attached to weak banking systems, and simple overspending at the federal or regional level. There is often no political consensus that low inflation should be the overriding objective of monetary policy. As an example, the Brazilian crisis of 1999 was by most accounts caused by unsustainable fiscal policies. Whether the problem of fiscal dominance has really been consigned to history may become clearer if and when the world economic environment, which is currently benign with fairly low interest rates and a US economic boom, becomes more testing to emerging markets.

As I will show in Section 2 of this paper, under conditions of fiscal inconsistencies inflation targets are vulnerable to speculative attacks. This is one reason, among many others, why credibility of emerging markets inflation targets cannot be taken for granted in the same way as in the industrialized economies which have used this policy. The next part of the paper, Section 3, explores the consequences of lack of credibility in a full-fledged sticky price small open economy model. Defining imperfect credibility as policy temporariness, and using the benchmark of equal credibility of an inflation target and an exchange rate target, it concludes that the defense of an inflation target against the inflationary bias resulting from lack of credibility requires a more volatile and distortionary monetary policy, and results in lower welfare. These results, in the author's view, should be first and foremost in the mind of many an emerging markets policymaker when deciding on the suitability of different monetary regimes. This is also stressed in a recent paper by Mendoza (2000). On the other hand however there is the result well known to every student of open economy macroeconomics that when an economy is subject to real shocks flexible exchange rates allow for a more effective countercyclical monetary policy. This is the basis of a number of recent papers including Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) and Chang, Cespedes and Velasco (2000) who argue that inflation targeting is superior to exchange rate targeting.[2] This question is addressed in the next part of this paper, Section 4. Using the analytical apparatus developed for the previous exercise, it analyzes the dynamic response of the economy to a number of shocks including real and money demand shocks. It is found that the superiority of one or the other regime in the welfare sense depends on a number of factors including not only the nature of shocks but also their direction. It is found that the logic which is often implied in the policy debate, namely that given the “flexibility” of exchange rates under inflation targeting the nominal exchange rate can quickly bring the real exchange rate to a new equilibrium, is mostly false. This is one of the fallacies of the ”popular” debate on this subject, which bases conclusions for the ”flexible rates” of inflation targeting on the results of an earlier literature on flexible rates under money targeting. In fact the attainment of a new equilibrium real exchange rates happens at a very similar speed under exchange rate targeting as long as the domestic inflation rate (as opposed to the price level) is flexible. The conclusion from this exercise is that the performance of inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting under perfect credibility and exogenous shocks is not vastly different, and depends very sensitively on the exact nature of the shocks. It seems premature to draw final conclusions at this point.

But then this may miss the real point behind the attractiveness of inflation targeting entirely. The theoretical results derived in this paper are based on the assumption that when a central bank targets the inflation rate its commitment to that target is just as serious as the commitment to an equivalent exchange rate target. As documented in more detail in Kumhof, Li and Yan (2000), there is reason for believing that many emerging markets central bankers pursuing inflation targets do not consider themselves to be vulnerable to crises, and that they

[2] It should however be stressed that the former paper, which quantifies the welfare effects of different regimes, quantitatively only finds quite a small advantage for inflation targeting.

are willing to see very much larger short-run nominal exchange rate movements than what is consistent with their inflation target. There is talk of "constrained discretion", and of "letting bygones be bygones". If one is willing to simply assume credibility despite discretion, it is really no wonder that inflation targeting would outperform exchange rate targeting. But then the comparison with a rigidly fixed exchange rate is really not fair, and it should more properly be compared with a "dirty peg". That however is a regime which long ago ceased to be respectable, precisely because of its lack of commitment to a nominal anchor was found many times to give rise to credibility / time inconsistency problems. It seems to me that, at least as far as emerging markets with their long history of monetary mismanagement are concerned, rules at one point won the debate versus discretion. It now looks as though discretion has made a comeback, albeit under a more respectable and fashionable name, inflation targeting. Fashion aside, this is a mystery, except perhaps for the strongest of the emerging markets such as Chile.

The following three sections contain a set of theoretical models of a monetary small open economy, starting with a simple continuous time flexible price two good model to analyze the question of currency crises, and then building more complex discrete time sticky price models to analyze credibility problems and exogenous shocks. The emphasis for this paper is on the economic intuition, which is discussed with the help of computations of dynamic time paths. Rigorous definitions of equilibrium, as well as some actually quite important computational and mathematical aspects, are omitted except where they are relevant to the intuition. At the appropriate places the reader is referred to the original papers, Kumhof, Li and Yan (2000) and Kumhof (2000), for the technical detail.

2 CURRENCY CRISES

In the policy debate about inflation targeting it is often claimed that a major advantage of this monetary regime is that it does not leave an economy vulnerable to a speculative attack. The logic is that a run on reserves can be averted because the central bank can simply “let the exchange rate go”. However, if the policymaker is committed to the inflation target this is not at all obvious. The reason is that in a small open economy the exchange rate is a very important component of the price index, and exchange rate management becomes necessary to achieve the inflation target. This commitment to intervene in the foreign exchange market makes a speculative attack possible. In addition to making that point, this section investigates whether quantitatively there is much difference in the behavior of economic variables between inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting under conditions which must ultimately lead to a speculative attack.

The key ideas can be presented with a simple microfounded balance of payments crises model along the lines of Calvo (1987). The additional element needed is non-tradable goods, which allows a natural specification of the consumer price index, the variable targeted in all current inflation targeting regimes. It is shown that once reserves are sufficiently low exchange rate depreciation starts to exceed the inflation target in anticipation of the crisis. In order to continue to meet the inflation target the central bank has to permit a contraction of the money supply. This generates domestic deflation and sharply accelerating reserve losses in the final phase of the program. In calibrated experiments this final phase is very short but, unlike a collapsing exchange rate target, not instantaneous. Nothing in this logic depends on the inevitability of the crisis displayed by our model, and the principle can therefore easily be extended to second generation balance of payments crisis models, see the arguments in Krugman (1996). In fact, as described by Carstens and Werner (1999) and Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999), contagion-driven speculative pressure on inflation targets did occur in Mexico, Chile and Israel (among others) in the second half of 1998.

This theory has important consequences for monetary policy in small open economies. The only way to completely rule out speculative attacks is to choose a target which does not involve any commitment to central bank intervention in the foreign exchange markets. One possibility is a target growth rate for the quantity of nominal money balances, the traditional definition of a floating exchange rate regime. More generally, it will be shown that the greater the weight of the exchange rate in the nominal target variable, the greater is the vulnerability to a speculative attack. For an open economy which targets the inflation rate this weight is far greater than zero.

The rest of this section is organized as follows. Subsection 2.1 develops the model. Subsection 2.2 calibrates it and discusses computed solution paths. Subsection 2.3 concludes. Computational aspects of the model solution can be found in the original paper, Kumhof, Li and Yan (2000).

2.1 The Model

Consider a small open economy which consists of a government and representative, price-taking, infinitely-lived consumers. Lower/upper case letters represent real/nominal quantities. For tradable goods, purchasing power parity holds and their international price is constant and normalized to one. Non-tradable goods prices are flexible. Time is continuous.

2.1.1 Consumers

Consumers maximize lifetime utility derived from the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods c_t^* and c_t. Their personal discount rate equals the constant real international interest rate r to ensure the existence of a steady state. The objective function is

$$Max \quad \int_0^\infty \left(\gamma \ln c_t^* + (1-\gamma) \ln c_t\right) e^{-rt} dt \ . \qquad [2.1]$$

Consumers receive fixed endowments of tradable and non-tradable goods y^* and y, and government lump-sum transfers g_t. The nominal exchange rate and the price level of non-tradable goods are denoted by E_t and P_{N_t} respectively, and the real exchange rate by

$e_t = E_t/P_{N_t}$. Consumers hold two types of assets, real international bonds b_t and real money balances $m_t = M_t/E_t$, with total asset holdings $a_t = b_t + m_t$. Real money balances in terms of non-tradable goods are $n_t = M_t/P_{N_t}$. The rate of currency depreciation is denoted by $\varepsilon_t = \dot{E}_t/E_t$, and uncovered interest parity is assumed to hold:[3]

$$i_t = r + \varepsilon_t \ . \tag{2.2}$$

Consumers face a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption $m_t \geq \alpha \left(c_t^* + \frac{c_t}{e_t} \right)$, which will be shown to hold with equality in equilibrium. Their lifetime budget is

$$a_0 + \int_0^\infty \left(y^* + \frac{y}{e_t} + g_t \right) e^{-rt} dt = \int_0^\infty \left(c_t^* + \frac{c_t}{e_t} + i_t m_t \right) e^{-rt} dt \ . \tag{2.3}$$

First-order conditions are

$$\frac{c_t}{c_t^*} = e_t \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} \ , \tag{2.4}$$

$$\frac{\gamma}{c_t^*} = \lambda(1 + \alpha i_t) \ . \tag{2.5}$$

This implies real money demands

$$m_t = \alpha c_t^* \gamma^{-1} \ , \tag{2.6}$$

$$n_t = \alpha c_t (1-\gamma)^{-1} \ . \tag{2.7}$$

Defining $\mu_t = \dot{M}_t/M_t$, equation (2.6) implies $\dot{m}_t/m_t = (\mu_t - \varepsilon_t) = \dot{c}_t^*/c_t$.

2.2 Definition of the Inflation Rate

At the heart of a paper on open economy inflation targeting has to be a definition of what we mean by "the inflation rate". For if all goods were tradable and purchasing power parity prevailed, there would be no difference between inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting. That clearly misses the point. All countries which have implemented inflation targeting have chosen as their target a version of the consumer price index (CPI), which is based on a goods basket of both tradable goods with price level $E_t P_t^*$ and non-tradable goods

[3] See Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) on evidence supporting uncovered interest parity in emerging markets.

with price level P_{N_t}. With our normalization $P_t^* = 1$ a natural definition of the CPI P_t is therefore the consumption based price index:

$$P_t = (E_t)^{\gamma} (P_{N_t})^{1-\gamma} \gamma^{-\gamma} (1-\gamma)^{-(1-\gamma)} . \qquad [2.8]$$

In rate of change form this is:

$$p_t = \gamma \varepsilon_t + (1-\gamma)\pi_t . \qquad [2.9]$$

where $p_t = \dot{P}_t / P_t$ and $\pi_t = \dot{P}_{N_t} / P_{N_t}$.

2.3 Government and the Aggregate Budget Constraint

The government's policy consists of a specification of the path of lump-sum transfers $\{g_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, of an initial condition P_0 for the CPI, and of the initial (unsustainable) target rate of CPI inflation $\bar{p}$, the post-crisis steady state rate of CPI inflation being determined by a balanced budget requirement. We assume full central bank monetary accommodation at time 0, which implies a constant E and jumps in P_N and P on impact.[4]

The case of P_t as the only target variable in a perfect foresight environment corresponds to what King and Wolman (1996) call "perfect inflation targeting". They show, in a closed economy setting, that it can be achieved either by manipulation of the money supply (as in our model) or by an interest rate feedback rule with a very strong interest rate response to deviations of P_t from its target path. There is an equivalent interest rate policy in our economy, too, but given (3) interest rate policy is of course indistinguishable from exchange rate policy.

Let h_t be the government's foreign exchange reserves. Then the government's lifetime budget constraint is

$$h_0 + \int_0^{\infty} (\dot{m}_t + \varepsilon_t m_t - g_t) \, e^{-rt} dt = 0 . \qquad [2.10]$$

4 This appears to us to be the most reasonable assumption. Calvo and Reinhart (2000a) and Reinhart (2000) show that central banks in emerging economies continue to resist large swings in nominal exchange rates. And the prevailing view of inflation targeting is that it should target future inflation and ignore jumps in the current price level caused by one-off shocks. See Tombini and Bogdanski (2000), who describe the Brazilian policy.

There is a minimum level of net foreign assets, which for simplicity will be assumed to be equal to zero:[5]

$$h_t \geq 0 \quad \forall t \; . \tag{2.11}$$

In equilibrium the nontradable goods market must clear:

$$c_t = y \quad \forall t,$$

which, importantly, implies $\mu_t = \pi_t \; \forall t$. The economy's overall resource constraint can now be derived as

$$f_0 + \frac{y^*}{r} = \int_0^\infty c_t^* e^{-rt} dt \; , \tag{2.12}$$

with current account $\dot{f}_t = r f_t + y^* - c_t^*$.

2.4 Crisis Dynamics

Assume that the economy is in an initial (subscript I) steady state with (for simplicity) zero net foreign assets $f_I = 0$ and zero inflation, with a constant level of foreign exchange reserves h_I, and a balanced budget. In this steady state $p_I = \varepsilon_I = \pi_I = 0$ and $rh_I = g_I$. Now assume that the government starts to pursue an inconsistent fiscal policy at $t = 0$, with the inflation target kept at $\bar{p} = 0$ and g permanently increased to $\bar{g}$ = 10% of output. The time T at which the final (subscript T) steady state is reached is endogenous. The same is true for final steady state inflation $p_T = \varepsilon_T = \pi_T$, which is a function of $c_T^* = y^* + r f_T$ by $p_T = \gamma \bar{g} / \alpha (y^* + r f_T) > p_I$. The government's rule for the growth rate of the nominal money supply and therefore for non-tradables inflation $\pi_t = \mu_t$ is, given the inflation target, a function of ε_t. The system can therefore be written in terms of ε_t given an exogenous p_t. We get

$$\frac{\dot{c}_t^*}{c_t^*} = \frac{1}{1-\gamma}(p_t - \varepsilon_t) \; , \tag{2.13}$$

$$\dot{\varepsilon}_t = \frac{1 + \alpha i_t}{\alpha(1-\gamma)}(\varepsilon_t - p_t) \; . \tag{2.14}$$

[5] See Obstfeld (1986) for a discussion of (2.10) and (2.11). The latter is highly relevant for emerging economies, which as documented by Calvo and Reinhart (2000b) lose access to international capital markets during balance of payments crises.

Perfect foresight requires that the path of ε_t and therefore of c_t^* be continuous at T. This system has one zero and one positive eigenvalue. The mathematical and computational aspects are discussed in Kumhof, Li and Yan (2000), where it is shown that a unique solution exists and can be computed without relying on linearization.

To compute dynamic equilibrium paths we assign parameter values according to Table 2.1. The time unit for calibration of stock-flow ratios is a quarter. Some parameters will be calibrated using Brazilian data, Brazil being one of the first emerging economies to adopt inflation targeting. For an emerging market the real marginal cost of borrowing in international capital markets r is assumed to be given by the real Brady bond yield. In Brazil this has mostly fluctuated between 10% and 15%, which after adjusting for US inflation suggests using $r = 10\%$. The inverse velocity α is set equal to the ratio of real monetary base to quarterly absorption in Brazil in 1996.[6] A 50% share of tradables in consumption is empirically reasonable, see De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994). The nontradables and tradables endowments are normalized to 1 for simplicity. This yields a normalized initial level of quarterly real GNP of 2. The parameters α and γ imply $m_I = 0.6$. Central bank foreign exchange reserves h_I are set at 0.8, based on the h/m-ratio in Brazil in 1996. The logarithmic specification of the utility index is somewhat restrictive, as it implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one. Empirical estimates of this elasticity are typically below one, as in Reinhart and Vegh (1995). However, see Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) and Eckstein and Leiderman (1992) for examples of estimates closer to one.

Solution paths are presented as the solid lines in Figure 2.1 below and compared to balance of payments crises under exchange rate targeting $\bar{\varepsilon} = 0$ (broken lines).[7]

[6] Brazilian absorption data are only available with a long lag.
[7] The latter are trivial to compute. We therefore omit the detail.

Parameter	Value	Description
p_I	0% p.a.	Initial inflation target
$\bar{p}$	0% p.a.	New inflation target
————	————	————————————
g_I	0.02	Initial primary deficit
$\bar{g}$	0.20	New, permanent primary deficit
————	————	————————————
r	10% p.a.	Real international interest rate
β	10% p.a.	Subjective discount rate
α	0.3	Inverse velocity
γ	0.5	Share of tradable goods
y	1	Nontradables endowment
y^*	1	Tradables endowment
f_I	0	Initial net foreign assets
h_I	0.8	Initial reserves

Table 2.1

2.5 Dynamics of the Speculative Attack

Figure 2.1 shows that the dynamics generated by collapsing exchange rates and inflation targets are quite similar. The collapse of the exchange rate target in a continuous time model happens instantaneously while under inflation targeting reserve losses occur as flows. However for practical purposes this is not very different because almost all reserve losses are concentrated in about one month before the end of the program. During that period the beginning exchange rate depreciation tends to drive the CPI inflation rate up. The central bank, if it is fully committed to defending the inflation target, is then forced to allow a monetary contraction which generates an offsetting domestic deflation. The key to understanding the associated flow reserve losses is the seigniorage term in the government's budget constraint, which is shown as the final panel of Figure 2.1:

$$\dot{m}_t + \varepsilon_t m_t = \mu_t m_t = \pi_t m_t \ . \qquad [2.15]$$



Currency Depreciation, % p.a.



Tradables Consumption



Real Money Balances



Non-Tradables Inflation, % p.a.



Real Exchange Rate



Seigniorage

Figure 2.1

Although there may be an increase in the inflation tax component of seigniorage $\varepsilon_t m_t$ in the final stages of the program, money demand falls so fast that overall seigniorage declines steeply, thereby accelerating reserve losses above those caused by the primary deficit $\bar{g}$. This rapid reserve loss due to a steep drop in private sector asset demands is the speculative attack.

Figure 2.1 also allows us to infer a more general result regarding the vulnerability of different monetary regimes to speculative attacks. The figures show that the inflation target $\bar{p} = 0$ collapses later than the exchange rate target $\bar{\varepsilon} = 0$. Given that government deficit related reserve losses per period are equal, this must be due to smaller reserve losses attributable to the speculative attack. Under a money targeting rule[8] $\bar{\mu} = 0$ an attack would become completely impossible, meaning reserve losses attributable to a speculative attack would be zero. The crisis would therefore happen even later. The conclusion is that, among the class of monetary policy rules which target the growth rate of a single nominal variable, vulnerability to a speculative attack increases with the weight of the exchange rate in the target. Under inflation targeting that weight is lower than under exchange rate targeting, but it is far greater than zero. To explore this further we computed the cumulative time T stock equivalent of flow reserve losses under inflation targeting, which equals $\int_0^T \pi_t m_t e^{r(T-t)} dt$, and expressed it as a fraction of the instantaneous reserve losses under exchange rate targeting for different weights γ of the exchange rate in the price index. This fraction is increasing in γ, and for our policy experiment it is almost exactly equal to γ at 49%.

2.6 Conclusion

Inflation targeting is best described as a commitment to achieve a certain path of the consumer price index. Given that in a small open economy this index is strongly influenced by the exchange rate, foreign exchange market intervention becomes a necessary part of monetary policy. This makes balance of payments crises possible. This paper has shown that such crises have quite similar dynamics to the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime,

[8] This is equivalent to targeting the non-tradable goods price in the present model.

with two important exceptions. One is that the attack takes place over a short time period as opposed to instantaneously. The other is that reserve losses attributable to the attack are smaller, and increasing in the share of tradable goods in total consumption.

The possibility of speculative attacks under inflation targeting is acknowledged by policymakers in some, but by no means all, emerging economies currently implementing this policy. Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) explicitly acknowledge the necessity of potentially heavy foreign exchange intervention to defend the inflation target. Carstens and Werner (1999) state that Mexico's transition to full inflation targeting is slow precisely because policymakers find that they must allow frequent large shocks to the exchange rate to lead to deviations from the inflation target. On the other hand, this problem is not explicitly acknowledged by Tombini and Bogdanski (2000), for Brazil, and by Uribe, Gomez and Vargas (2000), for Colombia. But unless the Chilean hard line is pursued it is difficult to see how credibility of the target can be established given that the commitment to it is contingent on the absence of speculative pressure. This should be a point of concern, because credibility of the nominal anchor continues to be a much more critical issue for monetary policy in emerging economies than it is in advanced economies.

3 IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY

This section assesses the theoretical implications of using an imperfectly credible inflation target to maintain a low rate of inflation in a small open economy with open capital account and sticky nontradable goods prices.[9] Results can be compared with those of the well established literature on exchange rate targeting, e.g. Calvo and Vegh (1993, 1999).

The model builds on that of the last section, the main difference being that nontradables prices are now assumed to be sticky. A discrete time set-up is used in order to apply a convenient new computable general equilibrium method with wide applicability to small open economy models, which are typically characterized by a personal discount rate equal to an exogenous world real interest rate and consequently a non-hyperbolic steady state. See Kumhof (2000) for details.

It is shown that forward looking inflation targeting alone results in indeterminacy of equilibrium paths (non-uniqueness). This problem does not arise if inflation targeting is defined as fixing the path of the price level. The main results of the section are driven by the fact that the consumer price index, which is the target variable in all extant inflation targeting regimes, is an average of relatively sticky domestic nontradable goods prices and more flexible, exchange rate driven tradable goods prices. Imperfect credibility of a low inflation target is represented such that the duration of the low inflation period is perceived to be, and in fact turns out to be, limited. As a result nontradable goods inflation stays above the target at all times. In order to meet the target nevertheless, the monetary authority is forced to reduce the rate of currency depreciation through a tight monetary policy. Especially towards the end of the program this leads to very large current account deficits, real appreciations and

[9] The literature so far contains only very few thorough microfounded treatments of inflation targeting in open economies. Svensson (2000) makes far stronger assumptions than this paper, and does not use a fully specified dynamic general equilibrium model. Parrado (1999) uses a set-up related to Svensson (2000) to study the performance of monetary policy rules under exogenous shocks but full credibility. Calvo (1999), who describes inflation targeting as a “badly defined monetary system”, assumes that the target is the price level of nontradable goods alone. Bencivenga, Huybens and Smith (1997) work with a very different set-up, an OLG model with one tradable good.

domestic recessions, in excess of those observed under exchange rate targeting. In addition, after the collapse there is a temporary contraction in tradables consumption. The welfare losses of non-credible inflation targeting exceed those of exchange rate targeting, the more so the higher is the degree of price stickiness.

These conclusions are closely related to the arguments of Masson, Savastano and Sharma (1997). The seigniorage driven negative fiscal effect of a lower inflation target is even worse than under exchange rate targeting due to the need for an especially tight monetary policy. And the need to use the exchange rate in this way leads to an exacerbated real appreciation clashing with the secondary (if that is what it is) exchange rate or competitiveness objective.

The rest of the section is organized as follows. Subsection 3.1 develops the model. Subsection 3.2 calibrates the model and evaluates the effects of non-credible exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting programs. Subsection 3.3 concludes.

3.1 The Model

Consider a small open economy which consists of a government, a representative price-taking infinitely-lived household, and a continuum, indexed by $j \in [0,1]$, of monopolistically competitive infinitely-lived nontradable goods producing firms.

3.1.1 Consumers

Consumers maximize lifetime utility, which depends on their consumption of homogenous tradable goods c_t^*, heterogeneous nontradable goods $c_t(j)$, $j \in [0,1]$, and utility from leisure aggregated over heterogeneous occupations $1 - l_t(j)$, where 1 is the fixed endowment of time per occupation and $l_t(j)$, $j \in [0,1]$ is heterogeneous labor. Their personal discount rate equals the constant real international interest rate $r > 0$ as in Section 2. Aggregate nontradables consumption is given by

$$c_t = \left(\int_0^1 c_t(j)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}, \qquad [3.1]$$

with elasticity of substitution $\theta > 1$. Let $P_{N_t}(j)$ be the price of individual good $c_t(j)$.

Then cost minimization implies

$$c_t(j) = c_t \left(\frac{P_{N_t}(j)}{P_{N_t}} \right)^{-\theta} , \qquad [3.2]$$

where the price index of nontradables P_{N_t} is

$$P_{N_t} = \left(\int_0^1 P_{N_t}(j)^{1-\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} . \qquad [3.3]$$

Consumers' objective function is

$$Max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t \left[\gamma \ln(c_t^*) + (1-\gamma) \ln(c_t) + \kappa \int_0^1 \ln(1 - l_t(j)) dj \right] . \qquad [3.4]$$

Log consumption utility is a standard assumption in this literature, see Bergin and Feenstra (2000) or King and Wolman (1996). The nominal and real exchange rate are denoted by E_t and $e_t = E_t / P_{N_t}$. The rate of currency depreciation is $\varepsilon_t = (E_t - E_{t-1})/E_{t-1}$, and nontradables inflation is $\pi_t = (P_{N_t} - P_{N_{t-1}})/P_{N_{t-1}}$. The real exchange rate evolution is governed by:

$$\frac{e_t}{e_{t-1}} = \frac{1+\varepsilon_t}{1+\pi_t} . \qquad [3.5]$$

Consumers receive a constant endowment of tradable goods y^* and government lump-sum transfers in terms of tradables g_t. From firms they receive nominal wages $\int_0^1 W_t(j) l_t(j) dj$ and nominal lump-sum profit distributions $\int_0^1 \Pi(j) dj$. They hold two kinds of assets, real international bonds b_t and real money balances $m_t = M_t / E_t$, with total assets $a_t = b_t + m_t$. Uncovered interest parity is assumed to hold:

$$(1 + i_t) = (1 + r)(1 + \varepsilon_{t+1}) . \qquad [3.6]$$

Consumers face a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption which will be shown to hold with equality in equilibrium. When this is incorporated into their lifetime budget constraint one obtains

$$(1+r)b_{-1}+\frac{m_{-1}}{1+\varepsilon_0}+\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^t\left(g_t+y^*+\frac{\int_0^1 W_t(j)l_t(j)dj}{E_t}+\frac{\int_0^1 \Pi_t(j)dj}{E_t}\right) \quad [3.7]$$
$$=\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^t\left(\left(c_t^*+\frac{\int_0^1 P_{N_t}(j)c_t(j)dj}{E_t}\right)\left(1+\alpha\frac{i_t}{1+i_t}\right)\right) .$$

The household's problem is to maximize (3.4) subject to (3.7). The first-order conditions, apart from (3.7), are

$$\frac{\gamma}{c_t^*}=\lambda(1+\alpha\frac{i_t}{1+i_t}) , \quad [3.8]$$

$$\frac{c_t}{c_t^*}=e_t\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} , \quad [3.9]$$

$$w_t(j)=\frac{\kappa c_t(1+\alpha\frac{i_t}{1+i_t})}{(1-\gamma)(1-l_t(j))} , \quad [3.10]$$

where λ is the constant multiplier of the lifetime budget constraint (3.7), equal to the shadow value of lifetime wealth, and $w_t(j) = W_t(j)/P_{N_t}$ is the real wage in terms of nontradables in occupation j. Equation (3.8) shows that the current account is driven by intertemporal substitution due to variations in the effective price of consumption, via either changes in nominal interest rates or in inverse velocity α. Equation (3.9) equates the marginal rate of substitution between tradables and nontradables to their relative price, the real exchange rate. Equation (3.10) equates the marginal consumption utility of extra nontradables earnings to the marginal disutility of additional labor supply, adjusted for the monetary distortion to the consumption-leisure choice.

3.1.2 Definition of the Inflation Rate

The consumption based price index is defined as in Section 2. Foreign inflation will still be set equal to zero in this section, but in Section 4 we will allow for nonzero foreign inflation. Allowing for that, the general formula for the index is

$$P_t=(E_tP_t^*)^\gamma (P_{N_t})^{1-\gamma}\gamma^{-\gamma}(1-\gamma)^{-(1-\gamma)} . \quad [3.11]$$

In rate of change form this is:

$$(1+p_t)=(1+\varepsilon_t)^{\gamma}(1+\pi_t^*)^{\gamma}(1+\pi_t)^{1-\gamma}\ , \qquad [3.12]$$

where $p_t=(P_t-P_{t-1})/P_{t-1}$and $\pi_t^*=(P_t^*-P_{t-1}^*)/P_{t-1}^*$.

3.1.3 Technology and Pricing

Purchasing power parity is assumed to hold for tradable goods, and their international price level is normalized to one. The preliminary judgement is that this seems justified on the basis of the empirical evidence on tradables pass-through for emerging markets. In Kumhof, Li and Yan (2000) we survey this so far very sparse evidence, which finds far higher pass-through coefficients than in industrialized countries.

Nontradable goods producing firms have linear production functions

$$y_t(j)=l_t(j), \quad j\in[0,1]\ . \qquad [3.13]$$

They are price takers in the labor market and monopolistically competitive in the goods market, taking into account goods demand (3.2).[10] Firms distribute all nominal profits $\Pi_t(j)$ to consumers in a lump-sum fashion:

$$\Pi_t(j)=P_{N_t}(j)c_t(j)-W_t(j)l_t(j)\ . \qquad [3.14]$$

Following Calvo (1983), it is assumed that firms only get infrequent opportunities to change their prices, and that these opportunities arrive as exogenous processes, are independent across firms, and for each firm are independent of of their last occurrence. Specifically, it is assumed that each period there is a probability $(1-\delta)$ that any firm will be able to change its price. The interval between price changes for an individual firm is therefore a random variable. However, with a continuum of firms $(1-\delta)$ also represents the fraction of firms that can change prices in any period. Together with the assumption of lump-sum profit distributions to consumers this implies that firm-specific uncertainty does

[10] This set-up is chosen for ease of exposition. It is formally equivalent to one where firms reside in heterogenous households.

not translate into aggregate income uncertainty for consumers. The model can therefore be solved under perfect foresight.

When the model is calibrated for a typical emerging market it will display non-zero steady state inflation. While this possibility does not affect the original Calvo (1983) specification, the fully microfounded version needs to be modified. We allow today's price setters to both choose today's price level, and to change their price by the steady state inflation rate π_{ss} every period thereafter. Without this assumption steady state nontradables output would be increasing in steady state inflation despite the presence of the monetary distortion to the consumption-leisure choice.

Following Rotemberg (1987) and Walsh (1998), it is further assumed that each firm j which does get an opportunity to change its price sets it to minimize a quadratic loss function that depends on the discounted sum of expected percentage differences between that price $P_{N_t}(j)$ and its optimal price in period t, $P^+_{N_t}$:

$$\frac{1}{2}E(t)\left(\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^i\left(\ln P_{N_{t+i}}(j)-\ln P^+_{N_{t+i}}\right)\right) . \qquad [3.15]$$

Here $E(t)$ denotes the expectations operator, conditional on information available at time t. The optimal price $P^+_{N_t}$ is the period t profit maximizing price taking as given the current aggregate price level P_{N_t}. The monopolistic competitor's period t profit maximization problem is

$$\underset{P_{N_t}(j)}{Max}\ P_{N_t}\left(c_t\left(\frac{P_{N_t}(j)}{P_{N_t}}\right)^{1-\theta}-c_t\left(\frac{P_{N_t}(j)}{P_{N_t}}\right)^{-\theta}w_t(j)\right) . \qquad [3.16]$$

We define the markup $\mu=\theta/(\theta-1)$ and let $Q_t\equiv P_{N_t}(j)/P_{N_t}$, dropping firm specific subscripts because all firms changing their price at t will choose an identical price. In equilibrium, which is defined more rigorously in Kumhof (2000), firms' determination of the period t optimal price is assumed to be consistent with labor demand (3.10). Then the solution to this problem becomes

$$Q_t=\left(\frac{\mu\kappa}{1-\gamma}\right)\frac{c_t\left(1+\alpha\frac{i_t}{1+i_t}\right)}{1-c_tQ_t^{-\theta}} . \qquad [3.17]$$

Returning to the firm's intertemporal problem (3.15), we now have $P^{+}_{N_t} = Q_t P_{N_t}$. Using this and the exogenous arrival rate of price changing opportunities $(1-\delta)$, the firm's objective function becomes

$$\underset{P_{N_t}(j)}{Min}\ \frac{1}{2}\left(\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{\delta}{1+r}\right)^{i}\left(\ln P_{N_t}(j)(1+\pi_{ss})^{i}-\ln Q_t P_{N_t}\right)\right). \qquad [3.18]$$

Let X_t be the optimal choice of $P_{N_t}(j)$, again identical for all firms, and let $Z_t \equiv X_t/P_{N_t}$. This can be shown, after some algebra, to satisfy

$$Z_t = \left((Z_{t+1})\frac{(1+\pi_{t+1})}{(1+\pi_{ss})}\right)^{\left(\frac{\delta}{1+r}\right)}(Q_t)^{1-\frac{\delta}{1+r}}\ . \qquad [3.19]$$

On the other hand, the price index satisfies $P^{1-\theta}_{N_t} = \delta P^{1-\theta}_{N_{t-1}} + (1-\delta)X_t^{1-\theta}$, and therefore

$$1 = \delta\left(\frac{1+\pi_{ss}}{1+\pi_t}\right)^{1-\theta} + (1-\delta)\left(Z_t\right)^{1-\theta}\ . \qquad [3.20]$$

It is immediate that the last two equations imply $Q_{ss} = 1$, which means that steady state nontradables output and consumption are given by

$$c_{ss} = \frac{1}{1+\frac{\kappa\mu}{1-\gamma}(1+\alpha\frac{i_{ss}}{1+i_{ss}})}\ . \qquad [3.21]$$

This depends negatively on the steady state nominal interest rate due to the distortion in the consumption-leisure choice introduced by the presence of money. Because realistic calibrations of emerging economies must take this rate to be far above zero, this implies that steady state nontradables output is far below the Friedman rule optimum. When equations (3.19) and (3.20) are log-linearized one obtains the familiar New-Keynesian Phillips curve. Let log-deviations be denoted by a hat above the relevant variable. For rates of price change x, $\hat{x}_t = \ln(1+x_t) - \ln(1+x_{ss})$, while for all other variables y, $\hat{y}_t = \ln(y_t) - \ln(y_{ss})$. We have, again after some algebra:

$$\beta_1\hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \hat{\pi}_t = -3\beta_2\hat{c}_t - 2A\beta_2\hat{\varepsilon}_{t+1}\ , \qquad [3.22]$$

where $\beta_1 = 1/(1+r)$, $\beta_2 = \frac{1-\delta}{\delta(2+\theta)}(1-\frac{\delta}{1+r})$, $A = \alpha/(1+i_{ss}+\alpha i_{ss})$. In levels form:

$$\frac{(1+\pi_{t+1})^{\beta_1}}{(\pi_t)}(1+\pi_{ss})^{1-\beta_1} = \left(\frac{e_t c_t^{*\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}}}{c_{ss}}\right)^{-3\beta_2}\left(\frac{1+\varepsilon_{t+1}}{1+\varepsilon_{ss}}\right)^{-2A\beta_2}\ . \qquad [3.23]$$

Equations (3.5), (3.8), and (3.23), plus an equation determining λ through first order condition (3.8) and the aggregate budget constraint (see below), constitute the system of equations which governs the dynamic behavior of this economy. Starting from an initial steady state, this system will be subjected to a shock in the form of a change in the exogenous policy target. Under exchange rate targeting this target is ε_t while the inflation rate p_t is endogenous. Under inflation targeting ε_t becomes endogenous and must be replaced in all equations, according to (3.12), by $(1+\varepsilon_t) = (1+p_t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}/(1+\pi_t)^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}}$, with p_t as the new target.

3.1.4 Government and Aggregate Budget Constraint

It is assumed that the government redistributes to consumers, over their lifetime, the proceeds from money creation and its initial net wealth:

$$(1+r)h_{-1} - \frac{m_{-1}}{1+\varepsilon_0} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^t m_t \frac{i_t}{1+i_t} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^t g_t \; . \qquad [3.24]$$

This implies that monetary policy has no wealth effects. The economy's overall budget constraint is then obtained as

$$(1+r)f_{-1} + y^*\left(\frac{1+r}{r}\right) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^t c_t^* \; , \qquad [3.25]$$

with current account $f_t - f_{t-1} = rf_{t-1} + y^* - c_t^*$.

3.2 Uniqueness of Equilibrium Paths

The question of unique convergent equilibrium paths is discussed at this point because it is of more than academic interest. What is at stake is that a monetary policy rule or "nominal anchor" is only useful if makes (rational) expectations converge on a unique equilibrium path, given the sequence of shocks to which the economy is subjected. This is a nontrivial exercise for the present case, as our small open economy contains one unit root and is therefore situated at a non-hyperbolic steady state. The reader is referred to Kumhof (2000) for the technical details. It is shown there that the dynamic system can be represented by the laws of motion for three variables, c_t^*, e_t, and π_t, characterized by one unit root, one root inside, and one outside the unit circle. For both inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting π_t is a free variable, c_t^* must satisfy the lifetime budget constraint, and therefore the requirement for saddle path convergence is that the real exchange rate be a predetermined variable. Remember that

$$e_t = e_{t-1}\left(\frac{1+\varepsilon_t}{1+\pi_t}\right) = e_{t-1}\left(\frac{1+p_t}{1+\pi_t}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} . \qquad [3.26]$$

For e_t to be predetermined ε_t must be determined by monetary policy at all times under exchange rate targeting, while p_t must be determined at all times under inflation targeting. Because in general exchange rate rules **do** specify a path for **levels** of the exchange rate $\{E_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, such targets are consistent with a unique convergent equilibrium path. However, the same is not evident from the policy debate surrounding inflation targeting, where policy rules are often implied to be pure forward looking rules for the rate of change of the price level $\{p_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$, and where price level surprises are dealt with by the rule of "letting bygones be bygones". This implies indifference about today's p_t, meaning **any** real exchange rate is possible today, and of course at any future time. This is **not** consistent with a unique convergent equilibrium path. What is required is a target path for price levels $\{P_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, and this is how this paper will define inflation targeting from here on.

3.3 Policy Experiments and Calibration

Under the assumptions of the model, particularly full lump-sum redistribution of seigniorage, it follows immediately that a permanent, credible reduction in an exchange rate target or inflation target results in an instantaneous downward jump in nontradable goods inflation at an unchanged real exchange rate. Without credibility problems the choice of nominal anchor is immaterial for the outcome.

The focus in what follows is therefore on programs which lack credibility. The public may simply not believe, and cannot be forced to believe, that the government will permanently maintain the lower level of public spending required by lower seigniorage revenue. Following the literature on exchange rate targeting, imperfect credibility is modeled as policy temporariness and the public's expectations are taken to be exogenous. It is not conceptually difficult to endogenize expectations for the case of fiscal problems, along the lines of Section 2. However, in the present sticky price case this would greatly complicate the model and computations without adding much additional insight.

It is assumed that the economy starts with and is expected by the public to eventually revert to a high exchange rate target ε^H or inflation target p^H. The public expects a new lower target $\varepsilon^L < \varepsilon^H$ or $p^L < p^H$ to be temporary, where $\varepsilon^H = p^H$ and $\varepsilon^L = p^L$.[11] In the experiments discussed below ε^L or p^L is, without loss of generality, maintained for a fixed period $t \in [0, T_\varepsilon)$ or $t \in [0, T_p)$, where $T_\varepsilon = T_p = T$ equals 4 or 12 quarters.

For the interpretation of these policy experiments, it is important to understand that monetary policy under CPI inflation targeting is different from money or exchange rate targeting in one very important respect. While a central bank can *directly* control either the growth rate of nominal money balances or the rate of change of the exchange rate, the CPI must be controlled *indirectly*. It is clear from (3.12) that, because the exchange rate has to be consistent with the CPI inflation target given the behavior of nontradables inflation, this precludes an independent exchange rate target. This in turn means that the nominal money supply must be set so as to achieve this exchange rate. There can therefore be no announced target rate for the direct instruments of monetary policy, as both are endogenous to the CPI target.

Table 3.1 summarizes the parameter values chosen for the calibration exercise. The time unit is a quarter. A specification with a credibility horizon of $T = 12$ quarters and firms' probability $\delta = 0.75$ of not being able to change their price, corresponding to an average contract length of one year, is chosen as the benchmark case. In other dimensions the calibration reflects the likely magnitude of an inflation targeting program in today's

[11] Assumptions about the public's expectations are restricted by the requirement that nonnegative nominal interest rate paths must obtain in equilibrium. For the inflation targeting case this rules out certain extreme beliefs.

emerging economies. The steady state inflation rate is 40%, with a target inflation rate of 10% that is very close to the current Brazilian and Mexican targets. We set $r = 10\%$, $\alpha = 0.3$, and $\gamma = 0.5$ as in the last section.The utility function parameter $\kappa = 2.47$ is taken from King and Wolman (1996). The functional form of the utility function is also close to King and Wolman (1996), except that aggregate consumption is here split into tradables and nontradables components, and that labor is heterogeneous. Initial net foreign assets are assumed to be zero.

Parameter	**Value**	**Description**
T	4 / 12 quarters	Duration / credibility of temporary programs
$\varepsilon^H = p^H$	40% p.a.	Steady state exchange rate / inflation targets
$\varepsilon^L = p^L$	10% p.a.	Transitional exchange rate / inflation targets
r	10% p.a.	International real interest rate
θ	4.33	Own price demand elasticity
δ	0.75	Probability of not being able to change price
α	0.3	Monetary base to consumption ratio (Brazil)
γ	0.5	Share of tradables in consumption
κ	2.47	Leisure coefficient in utility function
f_0	0	Initial net foreign assets

Table 3.1

3.4 Discussion of Solutions

In Figure 3.1 the solid line represents the exchange rate targeting program (ET) and the dashed line the inflation targeting program (IT). The unit along the horizontal axis is quarters, with 0 representing the time of announcement of the program. Note also that because this is a forward looking model the value of the exchange rate or inflation target before time 0 is in fact immaterial.

The two policies in general perform very similarly in the initial phase of the program but strong differences emerge around the time of collapse. Lack of credibility in both cases implies that, in anticipation of a future collapse of the program, nontradable goods inflation never drops to the new lower target. However, maintaining CPI inflation at its target requires that the *average* of nontradable goods inflation and currency depreciation equals the lower target. The exchange rate therefore has to compensate for the lack of credibility by depreciating more slowly than the CPI. In some cases this effect may be so extreme that the currency actually has to appreciate for much of the transition. This significantly exacerbates the real effects observed under non-credible exchange rate targeting. The very much lower nominal interest rate drives up tradables consumption and causes a large current account deficit. And the combination of relatively high nontradables inflation and low currency depreciation appreciates the real exchange rate by around 20%. This is accompanied by a very deep nontradables recession - output falls by over 20%.

All of these effects become particularly severe just before the collapse of the program, when nontradables inflation rises more quickly in anticipation of the imminent reversion to a high-inflation regime. However, upon the collapse of the program the higher steady state inflation rate is not immediately attained in that sector, where inflation now approaches the higher target from below. This requires a large upward jump in the rate of currency depreciation and nominal interest rate at that time, after which they approach the new higher target from above. Following the collapse there will therefore also be a temporarily positive current account.

These distortions are the result of the monetary policy required to sustain a low CPI inflation rate in the face of low credibility. When nontradables inflation fails to drop to the lower target, monetary tightening to reduce exchange rate depreciation is the endogenous policy response. This is reflected, during the transition, in a far slower and mostly negative rate of money growth, resulting in a more appreciated path of the nominal exchange rate. Monetary policy under inflation targeting therefore requires much larger swings in money growth and therefore also in seigniorage income, which as mentioned before may be thought of as the reason for the lack of credibility. In both cases there is a severe contraction in this source of government revenue, from around 2.5% of initial real absorption to less than 1%. In the case of inflation targeting the necessary monetary contraction is so severe that seigniorage actually turns negative during the transition.



Figure 3.1: Benchmark (__= ET, - - = IT)



Figure 3.2 : More Flexible Prices (__ = ET, - - = IT)



Figure 3.3 : Less Credibility (__ = ET, - - = IT)

Figures 3.2 and 3.3 analyze different degrees of price stickiness and of credibility. When price adjustment is faster than in the benchmark case ($\delta = 0.5$) but credibility is the same, an inflation target based policy looks very similar to an exchange rate based policy during much of the program, except again for a few months before and after the collapse.

3.5 Welfare

The welfare loss of a non-credible program is defined, following Lucas (1987), as the percentage reduction η in the pre-stabilization steady state streams of tradables and nontradables consumption $\bar{c}^*_{ss}$ and $\bar{c}_{ss}$ which makes consumers indifferent between the reduced constant streams of consumption, with leisure unchanged, and the streams of consumption and leisure obtained as a result of the stabilization program $\{c^*_t, c_t, (1 - l_t(j)), j \in [0,1]\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$. Then η is given by

$$\gamma \ln(\bar{c}^*_{ss}) + (1-\gamma)\ln(\bar{c}_{ss}) + \kappa \ln(1 - l_{ss}) + \ln(1 - \frac{\eta}{100}) = \quad [3.27]$$

$$\frac{r}{1+r}\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^t \left[\gamma \ln c^*_t + (1-\gamma)\ln c_t + \kappa \int_0^1 \ln(1 - l_t(j))dj\right] .$$

For a staggered price economy this is not trivial to compute as at any time there is a large number of cohorts of firms and workers which are characterized by different relative prices and therefore equilibrium labor supply. The solution is therefore approximated by evaluating utility for a total of the 30 most recent cohorts, which accounts for more than 99.99% of the overall distribution of relative prices. Figures 3.4a and 3.4b present the results. Figure 3.4a holds the credibility horizon at its benchmark value of $T = 12$ quarters and varies δ between 0.4 and 0.8. Figure 3.4b holds δ at its benchmark value and varies the credibility horizon between 1 and 20 quarters. The main result is that non-credible inflation targeting programs always involve larger welfare losses than non-credible exchange rate targeting programs. The difference is largest for high price stickiness. Overall losses become very small as δ falls below 0.5. Programs suffering from very low credibility involve smaller losses as distortions are limited to a very short period.



Figure 3.4a



Figure 3.4b

3.6 Conclusion

The conclusions of this section regarding inflation targeting are negative. Pure forward looking inflation targeting gives rise to indeterminacy of equilibrium paths (non-uniqueness). And inflation targeting compares badly to exchange rate targeting when credibility is imperfect. Nominal and real variables display larger and more persistent deviations from their steady state values under inflation targeting, and welfare is reduced.

The paper suggests that, whatever the case may be for inflation targeting in industrialized economies, it may overlook important characteristics which distinguish emerging economies. In many of the successful case stories in industrialized economies, credibility was either not a big issue to start with, or monetary policy changes were combined with fiscal improvements which alleviated or removed credibility problems. Whether lasting fiscal improvements are likely to be observed in emerging economies must at this point remain open to question. Developed economies also appear to be more resilient to large exchange rate movements, while recent empirical work has demonstrated the continuing concern of policymakers in emerging economies with exchange rate stability.

Caution is therefore called for when applying the lessons learnt from existing inflation targeting programs to a new and very different economic environment.

4 EXOGENOUS SHOCKS

In this section we will assume perfect credibility of monetary policy and evaluate the performance of different monetary regimes under exogenous shocks. The framework used is identical to that of Section 3, except that we now allow for time varying tradables income y_t^*, real international interest rates r_t, international inflation π_t^*, and inverse velocity α_t. The other difference is that a third monetary policy, money growth rate targets, is analyzed. This is an essential contribution to the policy debate given that much of the economic intuition about ”flexible exchange rate” derives from this case and not from inflation targeting. We will in fact see that the behavior of inflation targets is much more similar to exchange rate targets than to money targets.

...Comment: In this first draft the full analysis of the money targets case has not yet been incorporated. This will be completed within a few days. ...

A full stochastic business cycle analysis is beyond the scope of the methodology employed here, and in any event often tends to obscure the precise adjustment mechanism at work. This mechanism can be displayed here with the help of impulse responses to individual shocks. One might also add that emerging economies, much more so than industrialized countries, frequently face the problem of adjusting to very large exogenous shocks, and it is in these situations, rather than over the course of an ordinary business cycle, that the choice of exchange rate regime is deemed especially critical.

In the graphs below the first panel in each figure shows the exogenous shock and the remaining panels show the induced response of the economy.



Figure 4.1 : Tradables Endowment Shock



Figure 4.2 : Real International Interest Rate Shock



Figure 4.3 : International Inflation Shock



Figure 4.4 : Increase in Inverse Velocity

4.1 Discussion of Solutions

Figure 4.3 shows that in terms of neutralizing a foreign inflation shock, which requires no adjustment of the equilibrium real exchange rate and no large impact jumps in consumption, inflation targeting is highly effective (see however the welfare analysis below). What is most striking about the remaining results is just how similarly inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting perform. Other than foreign inflation, the remaining shocks require large initial jumps in tradables consumption, which under fixed exchange rates requires an accompanying jump in nontradables consumption because the real exchange rate is predetermined. More real exchange rate flexibility would ensure that the nontradables sector remains closer to steady state output at all times. However, inflation targeting patently does not give the economy much greater real exchange rate flexibility. The reason is most importantly that exchange rate depreciation is constrained by the requirement of meeting the inflation target. In addition however the flexibility of the nontradables inflation rate is so great that jumps in this rate alone can accomplish most of the required real exchange rate adjustment. This may be one reason why Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe's (2000) results are more skewed in favor of inflation targeting. They impose a convex adjustment cost in the inflation rate, which imparts some stickiness to inflation as opposed to prices alone. On the other hand, the money growth rate targeting case corresponds exactly to our intuition about flexible exchange rates. Here the real exchange rate can instantaneously jump to a new level, leaving the nontradables sector close to steady state at all times. But of course there is no denying that at least inflation targeting is an improvement in terms of real exchange rate flexibility. What may be a little more surprising is that this is not necessarily an advantage in welfare terms.

4.2 Welfare

The figures below summarize the welfare findings, computed by the same method as in Section 3. The benchmark against which welfare is computed is a situation where the economy immediately jumps to its new long-run steady state following a shock, i.e. the flexible price case. The key to understanding the results is that a sticky price monetary economy is subject to pre-exising distortions, namely markups and deviations from the Friedman rule. In an emerging economy with high steady state inflation the latter is very significant. It can be computed that our economy, which features about 14% steady state inflation, has a steady state nontradables output more than 5% below what would be possible at the Friedman rule. This means that exogenous shocks which require an increase in nontradables output in the transition can actually lead to welfare gains. In our example this is the case for the inverse velocity shock and particularly, under exchange rate targeting but not inflation targeting, for the foreign inflation shock. Generally therefore, the necessity for greater jumps in nontradables output under exchange rate targeting can be beneficial in the welfare sense when the jump is upwards.

The picture that emerges from this analysis is very complex, and clearly does not point in one direction as far as the best choice of monetary regime is concerned. As always, what matters is the nature of the shocks to which a particular economy is subject, and according to what we have just seen also the trend of these shocks. This is simply a question of fact, which every country has to answer for itself.



Figure 4.5a : Welfare Losses (__ = ET, - - = IT)



Figure 4.5b : Welfare Differences

5 CONCLUSION

This paper has compared inflation targeting with other monetary regimes, especially exchange rate targeting, along various dimensions. The emphasis is very clearly on the environment facing emerging markets, as for example I do not purport to make statements about credibility with regard to any other group of countries. The conclusions of the analysis are ambiguous, much more so than the current tide of opinion against exchange rate targeting would lead one to believe. It was shown that both exchange rate and inflation targets are vulnerable to speculative attacks. While this vulnerability is somewhat smaller for inflation targeting, on the other hand the monetary policy required to defend a vulnerable inflation target was shown to lead to somewhat greater distortions and welfare losses. And it is very unclear at this point whether inflation targeting is a superior policy in the face of exogenous shocks without precisely identifying the nature of these shocks.

I will restate here the conjecture I made in the Introduction. It may be provocative, but that is the point. An honest debate about the advantages of inflation targeting for emerging markets should probably be the old debate about rules versus discretion. With only a few years of a reasonably successful track record in most of the countries concerned, are we really at a point where we can be comfortable with discretion?

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