# The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes and the Experience of Chile

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# **Pros and Cons of Alternative Monetary / Exchange Regimes**

<b>More Flexible Regimes (Float)</b>	<b>Marks for Chile</b>
•Independent monetary/exchange rate policy for stabilization policy	high
•Relative price (RER) adjustment more quickly and less costly achieved through nominal devaluation	d high
<ul> <li>Collection of seignorage</li> </ul>	moderate

#### More Inflexible Regime (Dollarization)

•Low credibility of monetary policy and Central Bank

•Mundell's conditions for common currency area

•Large de facto dollarization in domestic markets

•High nominal (and real) exchange rate volatility

•High international financial transaction costs

Marks for Chile

not a problem

not satisfied


not satisfied

moderate


moderate

"Economists of various political and economic views agree on adopting a flexible exchange rate system for Chile" (F. Rosende, 07/20/99)


## **World Trend toward more Flexible Regimes**



### **Toward more Exchange Rate Flexibility: Chile, 1980-99**



### **Toward lower Inflation since Adoption of Inflation Targeting: Chile, 1989-99**



# From Asia 1997 to Brazil 1999: Effects of International Turmoil on Chile

#### **Current Account Effects:**

- •1997-1999 loss of terms of trade by 6.3%, equivalent to 3.5% income loss
- decline in export volume to East Asian market (initially 35% of Chilean exports)

#### **Capital Accounts Effects:**

- lower capital inflows (37.4% lower than 1995-97 average)
- higher cost of foreign borrowing
- significant but temporary increase in country risk spreads

#### **Speculative Attacks:**

- Three speculative attacks on the Peso during 1998
- In an initially overheated economy
- With growing current-account deficits

### **Policy Diagnose**

• Potentially unsustainable current account deficits and stubborn inflation require fiscal and monetary correction

• Speculative attacks on the peso jeopardize meeting the inflation target and maintaining domestic financial stability, if depreciation is too sudden and excessive

• In a highly indexed and overheated economy, curreny overdepreciation leads to higher inflation and a possible loss of the nominal anchor • Overdepreciation leads to major capital losses of foreigncurrency debtors and excessive relative price changes, causing excessive financial stress and output loss


• The terms-of-trade loss and the correction in domestic spending require a more depreciated real exchange rate, achieved by a combination of nominal depreciation and lower inflation

• To rule out an overdepreciation, the nominal exchange rate component of RER correction should be gradual, avoiding nominal (and real) overdepreciation

## **Central Bank Policy Response**

- Adoption of a more restrictive monetary policy stance
- Substantial liberalization of capital inflows: unremunerated reserve requirement set to zero
- Liberalization of domestic financial transactions
- Defense of the Peso:
  - Temporary but strong
  - In three stages: non-sterilized interventions, liquidity restriction (allowing spreads between market and policy rates), increase in policy rate (convergence of both rates)

# **Overnight Interbank Interest Rate and Monetary Policy Rate: Chile, 1997-99**




# Macroeconomic and Financial Performance: Chile, 1998-2000

	1998	1999	<b>2000</b> <sup>(*)</sup>
GDP growth	3.4	0.5	4.5 - 5.5
Actual (Target) inflation	4.7	4.3	
Unemployment rate	7.2	10.8 (1)	
<b>Current Account Deficit/GDP</b>	6.2	3.6	4.0 - 4.5
Real exchange rate depreciation	3.0 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.0 <sup>(3)</sup>	
Bad Bank Loans	1.5	1.8	
90-day nominal interest rate	11.4 <sup>(4)</sup>	7.7 (5)	

(\*) Projected

(1) June 1999; (2) December to December; (3) Dec 98 - May 1999; (4) Average Nov-Dec 99 ; (5) July 99

# **Reaction of International Financial Markets: Spreads on L.A. and Chilean Sovereign Bonds**



### **Chile: Future Policy Challenges**

- For the Central Bank:
  - More exchange rate flexibility
  - Full integration into world financial markets
  - At convergence to OECD inflation levels: adoption of long-term inflation target range
  - More flexible use of monetary policy rate
  - Shift from CPI-indexed to nominal interest rate as monetary policy rate
  - Increase in Central Bank policy transparency (publication of models, regular inflation report)

#### ♦ For Fiscal Policy:

• Return to structural government surpluses

♦ For Economic Policies at large:

• Continuation and deepening of growth-enhancing structural reforms