

# INTERNATIONAL RESERVE MANAGEMENT AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT

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Several factors, apart from the exchange rate regime, influence the comfort level in regard to reserves. Illustratively, they would include vulnerability to the real sector shocks, strength of the fiscal and financial sectors, current account balance, the changing composition of capital flows, a medium-term view of growth prospects encompassing business cycles, etc. In a sense, official reserves have to reflect the balancing and comforting factors relative to external assets and liabilities in the context of a rational balance sheet approach.

—Y. V. Reddy, *Reserve Bank of India*

Following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s it was likely that countries might choose to build up large foreign exchange reserves in order to be able to act as a “do it yourself” lender of last resort in U.S. dollars.

—Mervyn King, *Bank of England*

This paper assesses the costs and benefits of active international reserve management. The first part outlines and appraises various channels through which international reserve management may enhance economic performance, focusing on two important channels: it lowers the real exchange rate volatility induced by terms-of-trade shocks; and it provides self-insurance against sudden stops and fiscal shocks, thereby reducing the downside risk associated with adverse shocks. Two additional channels, for which the evidence is weaker, are as follows: international reserve management is alleged

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to lead to higher growth by fostering exports (that is, it operates through a mercantilist motive); and it has a greater capacity to smooth adjustment to shocks over time, thereby reducing the speed of adjustment of the current account.

My analysis of international reserve management supplements the insights of earlier literature, which focus on using international reserves as a buffer stock, in the context of managing an adjustable-peg or managed-floating exchange rate regime.<sup>1</sup> While valid, the buffer stock approach best fits a world with limited financial integration, where trade openness determines countries' vulnerabilities to external shocks. In the absence of reserves, balance-of-payments deficits would have to be corrected via a reduction in aggregate expenditures, imposing adjustment costs. As greater trade openness increases the exposure to trade shocks, minimizing adjustment costs requires higher reserve holdings. The rapid financial integration of developing countries and the financial crises of the 1990s have led analysts to focus on the growing exposure to sudden stops and on capital flow reversals.<sup>2</sup> In such a world, financial markets may force an adjustment well before commercial trade flows would adjust on their own, which raises the importance of exposure to financial shocks and the costs associated with disintermediation triggered by adverse liquidity shocks.

Section 1 empirically evaluates the impact of international reserves on real exchange rate volatility in the presence of terms-of-trade shocks. The evidence suggests that international reserves play a role in the mitigation of terms-of-trade shocks in developing countries, but not among member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Economic structure matters greatly: exports of natural resources double both the impact of terms-of-trade shocks on the real exchange rate and the impact of the mitigation associated with international reserve management on the real exchange rate. These results are consistent with the notion that the limited development of capital markets in developing

1. Optimal reserves balance the macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in the absence of reserves with the opportunity cost of holding reserves (see Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981). The buffer stock model predicts that average reserves depend negatively on adjustment costs, on the opportunity cost of reserves, and on exchange rate flexibility; and positively on GDP and on reserve volatility, which is frequently driven by the underlying volatility of international trade. Overall, the literature of the 1980s supported these predictions; see Frenkel (1983), Edwards (1983), and Flood and Marion (2002).

2. See Calvo (1998), Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2003), and Edwards (2004a, 2004b) for an assessment of sudden stops in developing countries.

countries hampers the authorities ability to mitigate the volatility associated with shocks. Section 2 models such a mechanism, explaining possible effects of international reserve management in the presence of costly financial intermediation of long-term investment. Section 3 summarizes the debate about international reserve management and mercantilist motives, outlining the empirical and theoretical limitations of the mercantilist approach. Section 4 evaluates the impact of international reserves on current account persistence. The results support the notion that a higher buildup of reserves improves countries buffer against shocks, thereby reducing the speed of adjustment of the current account. This outcome is consistent with the importance of current account adjustments in allowing for smoother consumption, in the presence of limited financial integration and sudden stops. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the limitations of international reserve management.

## **1. REAL EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY, TERMS OF TRADE, AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES**

This section focuses on some of the challenges facing a developing country with limited development of its internal capital market, a growing integration with the global financial system, and a large exposure of the current account to terms-of-trade effects. This description applies especially to commodity-exporting countries, which are subject to large terms-of-trade shocks. While favorable terms-of-trade shocks tend to induce real appreciation and capital inflows, the downturns associated with adverse shocks impose daunting challenges. The literature of the 1990s identified large adverse effects of exogenous volatility on gross domestic product (GDP) and economic growth in developing countries.<sup>3</sup> Fundamentally, this issue hinges on the nature of nonlinearities affecting the economy, in that strong concavity may generate first-order adverse effects of volatility on GDP and growth. An important channel that may explain such negative level and growth effects of volatility are imperfect capital markets.

3. See Ramey and Ramey (1995), Aizenman and Marion (1993), and the references in Aizenman and Pinto (2005) for the association between macroeconomic volatility and growth. See IDB (1995) and Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) for the impact of terms-of-trade shocks and other foreign shocks on growth in Latin America and in developing countries.

Aghion and others (2006) illustrate these considerations: they find that real exchange rate volatility reduces growth for countries with relatively low levels of financial development. This and other studies suggest that factors mitigating real exchange rate volatility may be associated with superior economic performance. The large hoarding of international reserves by developing countries in recent years raises the question of the extent to which these reserves have affected the volatility of the real effective exchange rate. For most countries, terms-of-trade shocks are the most important source of exogenous volatility, frequently leading to real exchange rate volatility and potentially magnifying business cycle volatility. This issue is pertinent for developing countries, as they are exposed to terms-of-trade volatility, the standard deviation of which is three times the volatility of industrial countries. Relatively small, shallow domestic financial systems and the lack of sectoral diversification in most developing countries limit the authorities' ability to mitigate terms-of-trade shocks by internal adjustment. Sovereign risk and the lack of proper financial instruments inhibit their ability to hedge against these shocks by relying on the global financial system (see Caballero, 2003; Caballero and Panageas, 2003). Developing countries may be left with self-insurance as a last resort for dealing with terms-of-trade shocks.

In Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2006), we confirm this possibility. We start by applying a rudimentary panel regression methodology and show that the main result is robust to adding controls and to a more sophisticated estimation method. Specifically, the benchmark regression is

$$\ln(\text{REER})_{i,t} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_1 [\text{TO} * \ln(\text{TOT})]_{i,t} + \alpha_2 [\text{TO} * \ln(\text{TOT}) * \text{RES}]_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where the independent variable is the log of the real effective exchange rate (REER), defined so that a higher REER indicates real appreciation. The term  $\alpha_1$  represents country fixed effects, TOT is the terms of trade,  $\text{TO} = \ln\{1 + [(\text{IM} + \text{EXP}) / 2\text{GDP}]\}$  is the trade openness measure, and  $\text{RES} = \ln[1 + (\text{International Reserves} / \text{GDP})]$  is a proxy for the ratio of international reserves to GDP.

The specification of regression (1) follows the observation that  $\text{TO} * \text{TOT}$  is a first-order approximation of the income effect

associated with a terms-of-trade improvement rate of  $\widehat{\text{TOT}}$ , where the income effect is defined as the GDP rate of change induced by a terms-of-trade shock. I henceforth refer to  $\text{TO} * \widehat{\text{TOT}}$  as the effective terms-of-trade shock. By design, equation (1) implies that the elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect to the effective terms-of-trade change is<sup>4</sup>

$$\frac{\partial \ln(\text{REER})}{\text{TO} * \partial \ln(\text{TOT})} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 * \text{RES}. \quad (2)$$

Regression (1) thus provides information about the degree to which hoarding international reserves may affect REER dynamics induced by terms-of-trade shocks. Table 1 reports the regression results for 1970–2004. Column 1 presents the baseline regression pooling all countries, subject to data availability.<sup>5</sup> The elasticity of the real effective exchange rate with respect to the effective terms-of-trade shock is well above one: a one percent improvement of the effective terms of trade induces a real effective exchange rate appreciation of about 1.8 percent. Hoarding international reserves lessens the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate with respect to the terms of trade by more than twice the ratio of international reserves to GDP—that is, column 1 implies that  $\partial \ln(\text{REER}) / [\text{TO} * \partial \ln(\text{TOT})] \cong 1.8(1 - 2 * \text{RES})$ .

Equation (2) is the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate with respect to the effective terms of trade. This implies that the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate with respect to the terms of trade is  $\partial \ln(\text{REER}) / \partial \ln(\text{TOT}) = \text{TO} * (\alpha_1 - \alpha_2 * \text{RES}) \cong \text{TO} * 1.8(1 - 2 * \text{RES})$ . For a country with a trade openness of 0.2, and a ratio of international reserves to GDP of 0.1, the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate relative to the terms of trade is  $0.25 * 1.8(1 - 2 * 0.1) = 0.36$ . This is in line with De Gregorio and Wolf (1994), who find that the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate with respect to the terms of trade, unconditional of the reserve position, is about 0.4.

4. Throughout the discussion, I presume that trade openness and the ratio of international reserves to GDP are characterized by low volatility relative to terms-of-trade volatility.

5. See table 2 for regressions of the real effective exchange rate on the effective terms of trade and international reserves in the absence of interaction terms. For developing countries, the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate with respect to the effective terms of trade is well above one, whereas the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate with respect to the ratio of the stock of international reserves to GDP is well below minus one. In other words, a higher reserves-to-GDP ratio is associated, on average, with a depreciated real effective exchange rate.

Table 1. The Real Effective Exchange Rate versus Terms-of-Trade Shocks and Mitigation through Reserve Accumulation<sup>a</sup>

<i>Explanatory variable</i>	<i>All countries</i>	<i>Developing countries</i>	<i>Commodity exporters</i>	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>Asia</i>
Log effective TOT	1.802*** (0.244)	1.836*** (0.255)	4.376*** (0.779)	1.642** (0.802)	2.269** (1.104)
Log effective TOT *Reserves / GDP	-3.873*** (0.746)	-3.937*** (0.766)	-10.676 (7.013)	-0.537 (9.164)	-4.672** (2.280)
<i>Sample statistic</i>					
No. observations	1,863	1,260	253	343	202
$R^2$	0.4549	0.4367	0.6162	0.3903	0.2161
Period	1970–2004	1970–2004	1970–2004	1980–2004	1970–2004

Source: Author's estimations.

\* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. \*\* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. \*\*\* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. The dependent variable is the log of the real effective exchange rate. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports only the significant coefficients, suppressing the coefficients dealing with industrial countries and manufacturing exporters (for the full results, see Alizenman, 2006, available online at [papers.nber.org/papers/w12734.pdf](http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12734.pdf)).

Table 2. The Effect of the Log of the Effective Terms of Trade and Stock of Reserves on the Log of the Real Effective Exchange Rate<sup>a</sup>

<i>Explanatory variable</i>	<i>All countries</i>	<i>Developing countries</i>	<i>Industrial countries</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>Commodity exporters</i>	<i>Manufacturing exporters</i>
Log effective TOT	1.384*** (0.181)	1.358*** (0.195)	1.137*** (0.355)	-0.415 (0.406)	1.644*** (0.482)	3.220*** (0.434)	0.581 (1.006)
Reserves / GDP	-1.084*** (0.126)	-1.254*** (0.137)	0.520** (0.217)	-2.727*** (0.301)	0.179 (0.602)	-2.315*** (0.470)	-1.990*** (0.641)
<i>Summary statistic</i>							
No. observations	1863	1217	646	202	343	253	271
R <sup>2</sup>	0.4689	0.4461	0.6021	0.3212	0.3905	0.6603	0.4307

Source: Author's estimations.

\* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. \*\* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. \*\*\* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

a. The dependent variable is the log of the real effective exchange rate. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

Aggregation matters. Columns 2 and 3 show that this result applies to developing, but not to industrial countries. This is consistent with the notion that limited development of the capital market in developing countries hampers their ability to mitigate the volatility associated with shocks. Economic structure matters greatly: exports of natural resources magnify the impact of the effective terms-of-trade shocks and the mitigation associated with international reserves by a factor exceeding two. The international reserve effect is insignificant for that group, yet it is significant for the lagged terms-of-trade shock, as I show below. In contrast, these interactions are insignificant for manufacturing-intensive countries. The last two columns focus specifically on Latin America and Asia. Terms-of-trade shocks induce large effects in both regions, whereas international reserves induce a powerful mitigation of the terms-of-trade shock in Asian countries, but not in Latin America.

Table 3 verifies the robustness of prior results, redoing the base regression of the case for evaluating the adjustment to the one-year lagged terms-of-trade shock on the contemporaneous real effective exchange rate:

$$\ln(\text{REER})_{i,t} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_1 [\text{TO} * \ln(\text{TOT})]_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 [\text{TO} * \ln(\text{TOT}) * \text{RES}]_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (1')$$

The signs are identical to table 1. The main difference is that shocks are apparently absorbed faster in Latin America and Asia than in other regions; most of the coefficients on the lagged shocks are insignificant for these blocks.

Table 4 reports country-specific results for several Latin American countries. The last two columns represent the total effect of changes in the terms of trade (amplified by trade openness) on the real exchange rate, taking into account the mitigation offered by international reserves:

$$\text{Total effect, 1990–99} = \frac{\partial \ln(\text{REER})}{\partial [\text{TO} * \ln(\text{TOT})]} = [\alpha_1 + (\alpha_2 * \text{RES}_{1990-99})];$$

$$\text{Total effect, 2000–04} = \frac{\partial \ln(\text{REER})}{\partial [\text{TO} * \ln(\text{TOT})]} = [\alpha_1 + (\alpha_2 * \text{RES}_{2000-04})].$$



Table 3. The Real Effective Exchange Rate versus the Lagged Effective Terms of Trade and Mitigation through Reserve Accumulation<sup>a</sup>

<i>Explanatory variable</i>	<i>All countries</i>	<i>Developing countries</i>	<i>Commodity exporters</i>	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>Asia</i>
Lagged log effective TOT	1.773*** (0.278)	1.806*** (0.289)	4.362*** (0.759)	1.205 (0.827)	1.762 (1.103)
Lagged log effective TOT*Rerserves / GDP	-3.557*** (0.887)	-3.633*** (0.910)	-11.528* (6.473)	4.654 (10.059)	-4.024* (2.388)
<i>Summary statistic</i>					
No. observations	1852	1263	252	343	201
R <sup>2</sup>	0.4465	0.4302	0.6165	0.3898	0.2047
Period	1970–2004	1970–2004	1970–2004	1980–2004	1970–2004

Source: Author's estimations.

\* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. \*\* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. \*\*\* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

a. The dependent variable is the log of the real effective exchange rate. Robust standard errors in brackets. The table reports only the significant coefficients, suppressing the coefficients dealing with industrial countries and manufacturing exporters (for the full results, see Aizenman, 2006, available online at [papers.nber.org/papers/w12734.pdf](http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12734.pdf)).

Overall, the results suggest that reserves play a role in the mitigation of terms-of-trade shocks only in developing countries. While this role differs widely across countries, the mitigation role of international reserves is important, especially in countries with abundant natural resources, like Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico.

**Table 4. The Log of the Real Effective Exchange Rate versus the Terms of Trade: Selected Individual Countries<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Explanatory variable</i>	<i>Argentina</i>	<i>Chile</i>	<i>Ecuador</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Terms of trade	44.994 (6.597)***	8.436 (1.561)***	7.158 (1.322)***	3.841 (2.048)*
TOT*Reserves	-793.738 (113.969)***	-50.188 (13.080)***	-46.25 (21.816)**	-177.211 (71.729)**
No. observations	25	23	23	23
R <sup>2</sup>	0.5594	0.6338	0.6600	0.1901
Total effect, 1990–99	-0.764380	-1.465110	3.386239	-5.692390
Total effect, 2000–04	-27.473900	-0.973320	5.400608	-9.719750
Volatility of TOT	0.0099	0.0517	0.0573	0.0360

Source: Author's estimations.  
\* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. \*\* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. \*\*\* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. The dependent variable is the log of the real effective exchange rate.

The results reported above focus on the association between the level of ln(TOT) and RES on ln(REER). Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2006) also verify that a higher ratio of international reserves to GDP is associated with a lower REER volatility. This result is consistent with Hviding, Nowak, and Ricci (2004), who focus on the association of the ratio of international reserves to GDP with REER volatility, controlling for exchange rate regimes. Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2006) also confirm that the mitigation effects identified in equation (2) continue to hold when the regressions control for exchange rate regimes and for the composition of capital flows.<sup>6</sup>

6. See Broda and Tille (2003) for the role of exchange rate flexibility in accommodating the adjustment to terms-of-trade shocks.

## 2. THE MODEL: FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, SELF-INSURANCE, AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE

A growing literature identifies financial intermediation, in the presence of collateral constraints, as a mechanism for explaining the hazard associated with credit cycles induced by shocks. The prominent role of bank financing in developing countries suggests that capital flights, triggered by adverse terms-of-trade shocks or contagion, impose adverse liquidity shocks. This section outlines a model describing the conditions under which the ex ante hoarding of international reserves may provide a self-insurance mechanism that would mitigate the real effects of liquidity shocks, ultimately reducing the adverse effects of terms-of-trade volatility on GDP. For simplicity, I focus on an ex ante/ex post model dealing with the determination of the GDP level and the real exchange rate in one investment cycle. By applying the logic of endogenous growth, one may extend the model to address the impact of terms-of-trade shocks on growth.

As my focus is on developing countries, I assume that all financial intermediation is done by banks, which rely on debt contracts. Specifically, I consider the case in which investment in a long-term project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks. Shocks may thus force costly liquidation of earlier investments, thereby reducing output. I solve the optimal demand for deposits and international reserves via a bank that finances investment in long-term projects. The bank's financing uses callable deposits, which expose the bank to liquidity risk. Macroeconomic liquidity shocks, stemming from sudden stops and capital flights, cannot be diversified away. In these circumstances, hoarding reserves saves liquidation costs and potentially leads to large welfare gains—gains that hold even if all agents are risk neutral. In this framework, deposits and reserves tend to be complements: more volatile liquidity shocks will increase both the demand for reserves and deposits. This is another example of hoarding international reserves as self-insurance against nondiversifiable liquidity shocks.<sup>7</sup>

I model financial intermediation and the real exchange rate by combining Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) insight with Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee's (2004) modeling of market imperfections

7. See Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Rodrik and Velasco (2000), García and Soto (2004) Aizenman and Lee (2007), Jeanne and Ranciere (2005), and Rodrik (2006) for studies addressing various aspects of self-insurance and international reserves.

in a collateral-dependent small open economy.<sup>8</sup> I construct a minimal model to explain the self-insurance offered by international reserves, in the form of mitigating the output effects of liquidity shocks with endogenous real exchange rate determination. Investment in a long-term project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks, so the liquidity shock may force costly liquidation of the earlier investment, reducing second-period output. I simplify further by assuming that there is no separation between the bank and the entrepreneur: the entrepreneur is the bank owner and uses the bank to finance investment.

I consider a small open economy in which a traded good is produced with capital and a country-specific nontraded factor. The traded sector includes commodity exports, which generate revenue determined by the realization of terms-of-trade shocks (equal to the relative price of the exported commodities vis-à-vis other traded goods). The traded good is the numeraire. The relative price of the nontraded factor is denoted by  $p$ , and it is referred to as the real exchange rate. There is a continuum of lenders and borrowers, and their number is normalized to 1.

I focus now on the evolution of the economy throughout one investment cycle, where gestation lags imply that capital should be installed well before a specific nontraded input is hired. To simplify, the supply of the specific factor is inelastic, at a level  $Z$ . The lenders in the economy cannot invest directly, but lend their saving at the international interest rate. Depositors are entitled to a real return of  $r_f$  on the loan that remains deposited for the duration of investment. The safe return reflects a risk-free investment opportunity, either in the form of a foreign bond or as storage technology. The borrowers are entrepreneurs who have investment opportunity, but are credit constrained. The actual investment should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks. The production function is a Cobb-Douglas constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) technology:

$$y_2 = \frac{1}{\alpha} \bar{K}_1^\beta z^{1-\beta}, \quad (5)$$

where  $\bar{K}_1$  is the nonliquidated capital invested at period 1 and  $z$  is the level of the country-specific input, hired at a relative price of  $p_1$ . Premature liquidation of capital is costly and is associated with a


8. The model extends the one-sector framework outlined in Aizenman and Lee (2007).

proportionate adjustment cost of  $\theta$ . Specifically, reducing the capital stock by one dollar yields a net liquidity of  $1/(1 + \theta)$ .

The time line associated with financial intermediation is summarized in figure 1. At the beginning of period 1, the entrepreneur with initial wealth of  $H_1$  borrows  $\mu H_1$ .<sup>9</sup> The combined liquidity of  $(1 + \mu)H_1$  finances planned investment,  $K_1$ . Setting aside liquid reserves  $R$ :

$$(1 + \mu)H_1 = K_1 + R_1. \quad (6)$$

Figure 1. The Time Line



9. Collateral constraints can be shown to arise as a result of capital market imperfections in the presence of moral hazard and costly monitoring; see Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999).

Next, a liquidity shock,  $\delta$ , is realized. A positive shock is inconsequential, because banks can accommodate positive liquidity shocks by purchasing a risk-free bond or investing in the risk-free low-yield storage technology. I therefore concentrate on adverse liquidity shocks, which reduce desirable deposits from  $\mu H_1$  to  $\mu H_1(1 + l\delta)$ , where  $\delta < 0$ ,  $l > 0$ . The model focuses on the impact of adverse liquidity shocks on optimal investment and liquidity: I do not model the reasons for the shock. Such a shock may reflect external developments, such as a higher foreign interest rate, contagion, or a reaction to a signal revealing the future terms of trade. For example, suppose that the public learns of a signal,  $\delta$ , that determines the second-period foreign currency earnings from commodity exports. A negative terms-of-trade shock may induce anticipation of an economic slowdown, triggering capital flights and reducing deposits from  $\mu H_1$  to  $\mu H_1(1 + l\delta)$ . Independently of the exact source of the adverse liquidity shock, gestation lags associated with tangible investment and costly liquidation expose the bank to the downside risk associated with abrupt adjustment.

The bank uses reserves to meet the liquidity shock and to purchase the nontraded input. The liquidity shock may be met by costly liquidation of capital if needed. Consequently, the ultimate capital is

$$\bar{K}_1 = \begin{cases} K_1 - (1 + \theta) \max[(-\delta)l\mu H_1 + p_1 z - R_1, 0] & \text{if } \delta < 0 \\ K_1 & \text{if } \delta \geq 0 \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

I assume that the liquidity constraint is binding and that the marginal productivity of the nontraded input exceeds the return on liquid reserves. The producer's surplus is

$$\Pi = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{a} K_1^\beta \left[ \frac{(1 + \mu)H_1 - K_1}{p_1} \right]^{1-\beta} - (1 + r_f)\mu H_1 & \text{if } \delta \geq 0 \\ \frac{1}{a} \bar{K}_1^\beta \left[ \frac{[1 + \mu(1 + l\delta)]H_1 - K_1 + (K_1 - \bar{K}_1)/(1 + \theta)}{p_1} \right]^{1-\beta} - (1 + r_f)\mu H_1(1 + l\delta) & \text{if } \delta < 0 \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

where  $p_1$  may depend on  $\delta$ .

To gain further insight, it is useful to focus on the simplest discrete example, in which an adverse liquidity shock of  $\delta = -\varepsilon$  (where  $0 \leq \varepsilon < 1$ ) has a 50 percent probability of taking place and the incidence of no liquidity interruption similarly has a 50 percent probability of occurring. The value of  $\varepsilon$  corresponds to the volatility of the liquidity shock,  $\delta$ . The asymmetric nature of tangible investment implies that only negative liquidity shocks may require real adjustment. In these circumstances, the expected profits are as follows:

$$E(\Pi) = 0.5 \left\{ \frac{1}{a} K_1^\beta \left[ \frac{(1+\mu)H_1 - K_1}{p_1} \right]^{1-\beta} - (1+r_f)\mu H_1 \right\} \\ + 0.5 \left\langle \frac{1}{a} \bar{K}_1^\beta \left[ \frac{[1+\mu(1-l\varepsilon)]H_1 - K_1 + (K_1 - \bar{K}_1)/(1+\theta)}{p_1} \right]^{1-\beta} \right. \\ \left. - (1+r_f)\mu H_1 (1-l\varepsilon) \right\rangle, \quad (9)$$

where  $K_1 \geq \bar{K}_1$ .

The equilibrium is then characterized by the following three propositions:

—First, if no liquidation would take place in the bad state ( $K_1 = \bar{K}_1$ ), then optimal planned capital ( $K_1$ ) is the solution to

$$\frac{\beta}{K_1} - \frac{1-\beta}{(1+\mu)H_1 - K_1} + \left\{ \frac{\beta}{K_1} - \frac{1-\beta}{[1+\mu(1-\varepsilon l)]H_1 - K_1} \right\} = 0. \quad (10a)$$

If liquidation would occur in the bad state ( $K_1 > \bar{K}_1$ ), then the optimal planned capital ( $K_1$ ) is determined by

$$\left( \frac{K_1}{\bar{K}_1} \right)^\beta \left[ \frac{\beta}{K_1} - \frac{1-\beta}{(1+\mu)H_1 - K_1} \right] \\ - \theta \left\{ \frac{\beta^2}{\bar{K}_1} + \frac{(1-\beta)^2}{[1+\mu(1-\varepsilon l)]H_1 (1+\theta) - \theta K_1 - \bar{K}_1} \right\} = 0, \quad (10b)$$

where

$$\bar{K}_1 = \beta \left\{ [1+\mu(1-\varepsilon l)]H_1 (1+\theta) - \theta K_1 \right\}. \quad (11)$$

—Second, the threshold volatility associated with partial liquidation in bad times, denoted by  $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ , is

$$\tilde{\varepsilon} = \left(1 + \frac{1}{\mu}\right) \frac{2\theta}{1 + \theta} \frac{1 - \beta}{l(1 - \theta\beta)}. \quad (12)$$

Hence, a small enough leverage and a large enough adjustment cost implies  $\tilde{\varepsilon} > 1$ , such that the liquidation option would not be exercised. In these circumstances, the optimal investment and the ex ante hoarding of international reserves are

$$K_1 = \beta(1 + \mu)H_1 - 0.5\beta l\varepsilon\mu H_1; \quad (13)$$

$$R_1 = (1 - \beta)(1 + \mu)H_1 + 0.5\beta l\varepsilon\mu H_1.$$

The adjustment to the adverse liquidity shock is facilitated by real exchange rate depreciation:

$$p_{1|\bar{k}=-\varepsilon} = \frac{(1 - \beta)(1 + \mu)H_1 - \varepsilon(1 - 0.5)\beta l\mu H_1}{Z}; \quad (14)$$

$$p_{1|\bar{k}=0} = \frac{(1 - \beta)(1 + \mu)H_1 + 0.5\varepsilon\beta l\mu H_1}{Z}.$$

—Third, if  $\tilde{\varepsilon} < 1$ , the partial liquidation option would be exercised in bad times only if the volatility exceeds the threshold,  $\varepsilon < \tilde{\varepsilon} < 1$ . For volatility below the threshold,  $\varepsilon < \tilde{\varepsilon} < 1$ , no liquidation would take place, and the equilibrium is characterized by equations (13) and (14).

The proof of this proposition is as follows:

—The characterization of the planned investment and the ex ante hoarding of reserves (equation 13) follows by solving  $K_1$  from equation (10a).

—The optimal stock of capital following partial liquidation (equation 11) is obtained by maximizing the profits in bad times relative to  $\bar{K}_1$  (the second line of equation 8). Note that  $K_1$  was preset at the beginning of the planning horizon.

—The volatility threshold inducing liquidation in bad times,  $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ , is obtained by noting that at  $\varepsilon = \tilde{\varepsilon}$ ,  $K_1 = \bar{K}_1$ . —In other words, the liquidation is zero at the lowest volatility associated with liquidation in bad times. After solving equation (11) for the case where  $K_1 = \bar{K}_1$ , I infer that



$$\bar{K}_{1|\varepsilon=\tilde{\varepsilon}} = \frac{\beta(1+\theta)}{1+\beta\theta} [1 + \mu(1 - \tilde{\varepsilon}l)] H_1.$$

The actual level of  $\tilde{\varepsilon}$  is solved from equation (10b), after substituting both  $K_1$  and  $\bar{K}_1$  with

$$\frac{\beta(1+\theta)}{1+\beta\theta} [1 + \mu(1 - \tilde{\varepsilon}l)] H_1.$$


Smaller leverage and larger adjustment costs imply a higher threshold of volatility associated with liquidation (see equation 12). In the no-liquidation range ( $\varepsilon > \tilde{\varepsilon}$ ), equation (13) implies that investment drops by half of the anticipated liquidity shock. This drop is financing an equal increase in the ex ante hoarding of international reserves, which will mitigate the effects of adverse liquidity shocks in bad times. The adverse liquidity shock would induce a real depreciation of  $(\varepsilon\beta\mu H_1)/Z$  (see equation 14). The extra liquidity induced by hoarding reserves and the real depreciation in bad times allow the economy to adjust fully without the need to liquidate tangible capital. This comes, however, at the cost of a drop in planned investment and output.

If  $\tilde{\varepsilon} < 1$ , the regime is mixed: for volatility far enough above the threshold, the regime is characterized by a partial liquidation of capital in bad times; for volatility below the threshold, the liquidation option would not be exercised. Hence, high enough volatility induces a regime switch from no liquidation to the partial liquidation of capital.

Figure 2 provides an example of the two regimes, tracing the optimal planned investment,  $K_1$ , as a function of volatility. Given that  $R_1 = (1 + \mu)H_1 - K_1$ , the patterns of reserves as a function of volatility are the mirror image of the patterns of the planned investment:  $dR_1/d\varepsilon = -dK_1/d\varepsilon$ . Panel A (B) corresponds to a relatively high (low) adjustment cost,  $\theta = 0.20$  ( $\theta = 0.02$ ). Under relatively low volatility, liquidation would not be exercised, whereas higher volatility would reduce the planned investment and increase the level of reserves. These reserves would be used to meet adverse liquidity shocks, eliminating the need to engage in a costly ex post liquidation of productive investment. High enough volatility implies that the liquidation option would supplement the defensive hoarding of reserves. Note that liquidation mitigates the adverse impact of higher volatility on the planned investment, as can be seen by

comparing the slopes of the two lines below and above the volatility threshold,  $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ . This mitigation involves a deadweight loss associated with adjustment costs.

Figure 2. Volatility and Planned Investment<sup>a</sup>



Source: Author's construction.  
a. The simulation corresponds to the case n which  $\beta = 0.5$ ;  $l = 1.0$ ;  $H = 1.0$ ; and  $\mu = 1.0$ .

The regime switch to the partial liquidation regime triggers a discrete drop of the planned investment, and a matching discrete jump in the ex ante hoarding of reserves. This follows from the observation that the switch to the partial liquidation regime increases the marginal valuation of liquid reserves. The intuition for this is straightforward: in the partial liquidation regime, an extra unit of


liquid reserves eliminates the need to liquidate  $1 + \theta$  capital, saving the deadweight loss of  $\theta$ . This marginal benefit of liquidity is absent in the no-liquidation regime. Consequently, at the regime switch, there is discontinuity where the ex ante demand for liquidity jumps, inducing a drop in planned investment. This drop increases with the adjustment costs, as is vividly illustrated by the contrast between the two panels of figure 1. This point can be confirmed by comparing equations (11) and (13a) at the threshold volatility associated with regime change. If the no-liquidation and liquidation regimes are denoted NL and LQ, respectively, then at  $\varepsilon = \tilde{\varepsilon}$ ,

$$K_{1|NL} - \bar{K}_{1|LQ} = \theta^2 \frac{\beta(1-\beta)}{(1+\theta)(1-\beta\theta)} (1+\mu)H_1. \quad (15)$$

A key variable is the adjustment cost parameter,  $\theta$ , which measures the flexibility of capital market adjustment. Greater flexibility of the adjustment reduces the role of international reserves, as well as the overall impact of volatility on investment and the real exchange rate.

Hoarding reserves mitigates the volatility of the real exchange rate and of the adverse effects of liquidity shocks on GDP. To fully appreciate this observation, it is useful to evaluate the expected output in the absence of the precautionary adjustment of international reserves. Using the parameters specified in panel A of figure 2, I set planned capital at  $K_1 = 1$ . The actual capital in the presence of a liquidity shock and the absence of the precautionary adjustment in international reserves would have been  $\bar{K}_1 = 1 - \mu\varepsilon lH_1(1 + \theta)$ . The solid line in figure 3 plots the expected output in this regime as a fraction of the output that would have obtained if the liquidity shock had been zero. The bold line is the expected normalized output for the case in which reserves are adjusted to prevent the need to liquidate capital, as in equation 1). The figure vividly illustrates the first-order gain associated with the precautionary adjustment of international reserves. The precautionary adjustment of reserves also reduces volatility and the real effective exchange rate.

The present model is not detailed enough to identify who would hold the international reserves—private banks or the central bank. In the presence of capital controls, as in China, the international reserves would be held by the central bank. With full integration of capital

**Figure 3. Volatility and Relative Expected Output<sup>a</sup>**

Source: Author's construction.

a. The simulation corresponds to the case in which  $\theta = 0.2$ ;  $\beta = 0.5$ ;  $l = 1.0$ ;  $H = 1.0$ ; and  $\mu = 1.0$ . The bold curve corresponds to no liquidation and optimal precautionary demand for reserves; the solid curve corresponds to zero precautionary demand, with all the adjustment made through liquidation.

markets and convertibility and with an efficient market for excess reserves that allows diversifying idiosyncratic shocks, the bulk of the international reserves may be held by private banks. However, given moral hazard considerations (as in Levy Yeyati, 2008) or the absence of an efficient market for excess reserves, the bulk of the international reserves would be held by the central bank.

The model described above is stylistic, in that I do not derive the collateral constraint endogenously and I do not claim that the debt contract or the resolution of the liquidity shock is the most efficient solution. If the debt contract is taken as exogenously given, the resulting role of international reserves can be characterized.<sup>10</sup> The model suggests that adverse liquidity shocks triggered by a deterioration in the terms of trade are accommodated by lower reserves and real depreciation, adjustments that limit the necessary liquidation of capital. While the above framework dealt with one investment cycle, it can be extended into a dynamic set up, in which

10. See Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2003) for further discussion of the mutual benefits of transfers from an unconstrained traded sector to a constrained nontraded sector in the presence of liquidity pressure. I also do not model the mechanism inducing capital flight in the presence of adverse terms-of-trade shocks. This may reflect both contagion and the possibility of multiple equilibrium, or fundamental forces (such as the search for a higher return on savings). For further discussion of fundamentals-based crises, see Allen and Gale (1998) and Goldfajn and Valdés (1997); for panic-based crises, see Chang and Velasco (2000).

the next cycle resembles a similar sequence, subject to updating the entrepreneurs' initial wealth by the profits of the previous investment cycle and by any outside income. In the extended setup, improvements (deterioration) in the terms of trade would tend to lead to a further real exchange rate appreciation (depredation). This would be the case when the entrepreneurs' outside income includes proceeds from the exported commodity, implying that higher wealth would increase the future demand for the nontraded input. This would also be the case if the nontraded input has other uses, which cause the demand for the input to rise with the wealth of the economy.

The above discussion provides only one possible mechanism to account for the buffering role of international reserves. Although I focus on the adjustment to terms-of-trade shocks, the buffering role of international reserves also applies when the shocks stem from the financial sector, in the form of a sudden stop or reversal of the current account. For example, Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003) study a model in which a sudden stop of capital inflows results in an abrupt current account reversal, inducing a sizable real exchange rate depreciation. In their model, the required real depreciation and the growth costs of the sudden stop depend negatively on the country's degree of openness. This observation is consistent with the Mundell-Fleming tradition, whereby the expenditure-reducing effort, for any given level of expenditure switching, is inversely related to the marginal propensity to import. The tests reported in Edwards (2004b) confirm these perditions. Hence, the buffering role of international reserves reported in this paper may be especially relevant for countries that are exposed to sudden stops and current account reversals and more closed to international trade.<sup>11</sup>

The greater financial and commercial integration of developing countries implies that sudden stops and current account reversals may be associated with complex feedbacks between financial and real shocks, which affect other markets through financial and trade linkages (for example, through bilateral trade, competition in third markets, and financial contagion; see Glick and Rose, 1999; Calvo, 1999; Forbes, 2004). When push comes to shove, having deep international reserves allows the central bank to be of lender of last resort independently of the sources of capital flight, which improves the

11. This suggests that countries specializing in the export of commodities, with limited diversification of their exports, tend to be more vulnerable. They may be relatively closed to trade both as a result of low trade openness and because their export supply is relatively inelastic with respect to the real exchange rate.

bank's capacity to address sudden stops and reversals of capital inflows (see Calvo, 2006). In principle, what matters is a country's ability to come up with hard currency when a crisis occurs. The optimal reserves and optimal debt should therefore be decided jointly. A country that has borrowed externally to its limit may need more reserves than one that has room for more borrowing.<sup>12</sup>

### **3. INTERNATIONAL RESERVE MANAGEMENT AND MERCANTILIST MOTIVES**

The discussion in the previous section viewed international reserve management in the context of reducing the costs of economic volatility, reflecting the desire for self-insurance against exposure to future sudden stops. This view faces a well-known contender in a modern incarnation of mercantilism: the accumulation of international reserves is triggered by concerns about export competitiveness. This explanation has been advanced by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003), especially in the context of China. The issue is of more than academic importance: the precautionary approach links reserve accumulation directly to exposure to sudden stops, capital flight, and volatility, whereas the mercantilist approach views reserve accumulation as a residual of an industrial policy that may impose negative externalities on other trade partners. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber interpret reserve accumulation as a by-product of promoting exports, which are needed to create better jobs to absorb abundant labor in traditional sectors, mostly agriculture. Under this strategy, reserve accumulation may facilitate export growth by preventing or slowing appreciation:

We argued that a sensible development policy might involve creating a distortion in the real exchange rate in order to bias domestic investment toward export industries. Sensible here means that the resulting capital stock will be superior to that generated by a badly distorted domestic financial system and other relative price distortions typical of emerging market countries. (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2005.)

The mercantilist explanation for hoarding international reserves presumes that a monetary policy that affects the level of

12. See Zhou (2005) for conformation of this observation.

the exchange rate has permanent real effects. While the view that monetary instability has adverse long-run real consequences is well supported by empirical studies, there is no comparable body of evidence that validates the long-run real impact of setting the level of the nominal exchange rate. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that the neoclassical adjustment mechanism works even in China—economic growth leads to real appreciation independently of the exchange rate regime.

The growing importance of foreign direct investment, and the observation that countries experiencing a large foreign direct investment inflow do occasionally hoard international reserves, underscored an extended version of the revived Bretton Woods system, in which international reserves are viewed as collateral reducing the risk associated with FDI:

Delivering goods and services up front is a crude form of collateral. But there is no credible alternative. Market participants individually could pledge financial assets in the center country, but the only way that the aggregate of the periphery can acquire assets in the U.S. is to run a current account surplus. In an important sense, the goods and services already delivered to the U.S. support the stock of U.S. claims on the periphery; it is the collateral that powers the entire development strategy.

The nature of the social collateral is so obvious it is hard to see. If the center cannot seize goods or assets after a default, it has to import the goods and services before the default and create a net liability. If the periphery then defaults on its half of the implicit contract, the center can simply default on its gross liability and keep the collateral. The periphery's current account surplus provides the collateral to support the financial intermediation that is at the heart of Asian development strategies. The interest paid on the net position is nothing more than the usual risk free interest paid on collateral. (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2005.)

The wide-reaching implications of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2005) have propagated a spirited debate that goes well beyond the scope of this paper.<sup>13</sup> Some view the modern mercantilist approach as a valid interpretation for most East Asian countries, arguing that they follow similar development strategies. This interpretation is intellectually intriguing, yet it remains debatable. Observers point

13. See Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006); Eichengreen (2006a); Glick and Spiegel (2005).

out that high export growth is not the new kid on the block—it is the story of East Asia over the last fifty years. Yet, the large increase in hoarding reserves has occurred mostly after 1997. Indeed, in the cases of Japan and Korea, the policy tool of choice during their rapid growth phase was selective favorable financing of targeted sectors, not hoarding international reserves.<sup>14</sup> Both countries began hoarding international reserves after the end of the high growth phase.

Aizenman and Lee (2007) test the importance of precautionary and mercantilist motives in accounting for the hoarding of international reserves by developing countries. While variables associated with the mercantilist motive (like lagged export growth and deviation from purchasing power parity) are statistically significant, their economic importance in accounting for reserve hoarding is close to zero and is dwarfed by other variables. Overall, the empirical results in Aizenman and Lee (2007) are in line with the precautionary demand. The effects of financial crises have been localized, in that reserve hoarding has increased in the aftermath of crises mostly in countries located in the affected region, but not in other regions. A more liberal capital account regime is found to increase the amount of international reserves, in line with the precautionary view. These results, however, do not imply that the hoarding of reserves by countries is optimal or efficient. Making inferences regarding efficiency would require a detailed model and much more information, including an assessment of the probability and output costs of sudden stops and the opportunity cost of reserves.

Aizenman and Lee (2006) propose a new interpretation of the association between mercantilism, economic growth, and the hoarding of reserves based on the development strategies of East Asian countries in the second half of the twentieth Century. The history of the region suggests that export promotion was largely achieved through preferential financing, which effectively subsidized investment in targeted sectors. This was achieved in several ways, including direct subsidies funded by state banks; financial repression, to the extent that favored sectors enjoyed preferential access to cheaper external borrowing; and moral suasion, whereby private banks were encouraged to provide favorable financing. Aizenman and Lee refer to this policy as financial mercantilism and contrast

14. Both Japan and Korea were closed to foreign direct investment in their rapid growth periods. The view that foreign direct investment is the key for successful development in East Asia thus remains debatable.



it with monetary mercantilism, a policy that hinges on hoarding international reserves.

The history of Japan and Korea features the near absence of monetary mercantilism during the fast growth phase, although financial mercantilism was vigorously applied. In both countries, the switch to large hoarding of international reserves occurred at times of collapsing growth. Thus, if monetary mercantilism played any significant role in these countries, it was in periods of disappointing growth. The legacy of financial mercantilism was a deterioration of the balance sheets of affected banks. The circumstances under which floundering growth leads to the switch from financial mercantilism to a large hoarding of reserves are associated with a growing fragility of the banking system—and while financial fragility is relatively sustainable in times of rapid growth, it may induce a banking crisis when growth flounders.<sup>15</sup> Precautionary motives may then lead countries to hoard international reserves to mitigate the possible transmission of a banking crisis to a currency crisis. Given limited data, such a response may be observationally equivalent to the predictions of monetary mercantilism. It is hard to disentangle precautionary hoarding from monetary mercantilism using good data on international reserves but spotty data on nonperforming loans. Moreover, monetary mercantilism and precautionary hoarding may be mutually reinforcing: the benefit of competitiveness may reduce the effective cost of hoarding reserves and induce governments to prefer reserve hoarding over alternative precautionary means.

China's hoarding of reserves picked up sharply after the Asian crisis. Unlike Japan and Korea, China is accumulating reserves without having gone through a sharp slowdown in economic growth. The recent history of Japan and Korea probably encouraged China to adopt a dual strategy of financial mercantilism and rapid hoarding of international reserves. As much as China is growing even faster than Japan and Korea in their early years and is going through its takeoff process in the era of a highly integrated global financial market, China arguably faces a much greater downside risk of social

15. The research triggered by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) points out that greater financial fragility increases the odds of a currency crisis. Hutchison and Noy (2005) report that "the onsets of 31 percent of banking crises were accompanied by currency turmoil. Furthermore, there is a statistically significant correlation between lagged banking crises and contemporaneous currency crises, but not vice versa." This observation is consistent with the insight of models of financial fragility, exemplified by Chang and Velasco (2000).

and political instability associated with a crisis than did Japan or Korea. This greater downside risk of recession and financial crisis may explain the Chinese eagerness both to push financial mercantilism and to aggressively hoard reserves to buffer the downside risk of the economy's growing financial fragility.<sup>16</sup> Given the sheer size of China and its reserve hoarding, however, other countries in the region may be tempted to engage in competitive hoarding to mitigate their loss of competitiveness in third markets.

Monetary mercantilism is also associated with negative externalities akin to competitive devaluation. When one country hoards international reserves in response to short-run competitiveness concerns, other countries may adopt a similar policy to preempt any competitive advantage gained by the first country. These circumstances may lead to competitive hoarding of reserves, which, in turn would dissipate any competitiveness gains. Aizenman and Lee (2007) provide a simple framework illustrating the welfare losses associated with competitive hoarding. These losses may provide a novel argument in favor of regional funds, viewed as a mechanism for coping with regional negative externalities. The greater importance of manufacturing in East Asia relative to Latin America, combined with the deeper financial repression in some East Asian countries, suggests that the case for an Asian fund is stronger than that for a similar regional fund among Latin American countries.<sup>17</sup>

Recent empirical research, while still preliminary, provides evidence consistent with this discussion. The mercantilist motive predicts that countries exporting to the same third market and competing for market shares there may engage in competitive hoarding. This implies a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses pattern of hoarding international reserves, in line with Cheung and Qian (2006). They find evidence of an interdependence of holdings of international reserves in East Asia; this finding is robust to the

16. In the case of China, the ratio of banks' nonperforming loans to international reserves is estimated to range somewhere between 20 percent (according to the Bank of China) and more than 90 percent (see Jim Peterson, "Balance Sheet: China Offers Fertile Soil for Investor Unhappiness," *International Herald Tribune*, 11 September 2006). These numbers highlight the uncertainty of estimating the economywide burden of financial weakness, which itself would add to the demand for precautionary hoarding.

17. The presumption is that the real exchange rate has greater consequences on the competitiveness of manufacturing exporters than on countries specializing in commodities and raw materials; for further discussion of regional funds, see Eichengreen (2006b).

presence of standard macroeconomic determinants, a few controls, and a few alternative specifications of the so-called Joneses variable. For ten East Asian countries, they find that a dollar increase in international reserves by one country is associated with an increase of about 0.6 dollar by the other nine peer countries. The evidence about the undervaluation of China, however, is inclusive.<sup>18</sup> This may reflect the low explanatory power of tests dealing with the real exchange rate, as well as the possibility that the neoclassical adjustment mechanism operates even for countries engaging in competitive hoarding of international reserves.

#### 4. CURRENT ACCOUNT PERSISTENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES

The purpose of this section is to ascertain the degree to which a higher ratio of international reserves to GDP ratios is associated with greater capacity to smooth adjustment to shocks over time, resulting in more persistent current account patterns. In contrast, a low level of reserves may require a fast, rigid adjustment of the current account to shocks, when deviations from a balanced current account position are hard to sustain. I evaluate this possibility by applying the methodology of Taylor (2002), in which the speed of adjustment of the current account (CU) back toward its equilibrium or steady-state level is captured by the value of  $\beta$  in the following regression:<sup>19</sup>

$$\Delta \left( \frac{\text{CU}}{\text{GDP}} \right)_t = \beta \left( \frac{\text{CU}}{\text{GDP}} \right)_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t. \quad (16)$$

The autoregressive reinterpretation of equation (16),  $(\text{CU}/\text{GDP})_t \cong (1 + \beta) (\text{CU}/\text{GDP})_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$ , clarifies that a value of  $\beta$  close to minus one implies no persistence of the current account pattern, as would be the case if the adjustment to a shock is contemporaneous. In contrast,

18. Aizenman and Lee (2007) find that, as predicted by the mercantilist use of reserves, deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP) are statistically significant in explaining the hoarding of international reserves. Nevertheless, the economic importance of deviations from PPP in accounting for reserve hoarding is close to zero and is dwarfed by other variables. Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2006) report that “once sampling uncertainty and serial correlation are accounted for, there is little statistical evidence that the RMB is undervalued, even though the point estimates usually indicate economically significant misalignment.”

19. See Taylor (2002) for a discussion linking the above estimation to intertemporal long-run budget constraints.

a value of  $|\beta|$  closer to zero implies greater persistence of the current account, allowing for a more protracted adjustment to shocks.

I start by fitting the following regression:

$$\Delta\left(\frac{\text{CU}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{i,t} = \text{Country Effects}_i + \text{Time Effects}_t + \beta_{\text{sample}}\left(\frac{\text{CU}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{i,t-1} + e_{it}, \quad (17)$$

where  $(\text{CU}/\text{GDP}) = \ln[1 + (\text{Current Account} / \text{Domestic GDP})]$ , and both the current account balance and the domestic GDP are measured in current U.S. dollars. Table 5 shows the coefficient of adjustment and thus a measure of persistence for the current account balance for 1970–2004, subject to data availability, and subsets of the data such as developing countries, developed OECD countries, manufacturing exporters, natural resource exporters, and Latin American and Asian emerging economies. The table also reviews subsamples from 1980–92 and 1993–2004, and it also breaks down indebtedness and income as classified by the World Bank. The table reveals that developing countries are characterized by a faster current account adjustment than OECD countries, Latin American economies adjust faster than Asian emerging economies, and exporters of natural resource adjust faster than manufacturing exporters.

I turn now to a cross-country study testing the impact of international reserves on the speed of adjustment. On average, one would expect that a higher buildup of reserves gives countries a better buffer against shocks, thereby reducing the speed of adjustment of the current account and resulting in a positive association between international reserves and  $\beta$ . I apply a two-step derivation of the relationship between reserves (and other government assets) and current account persistence. In the first step, I derive a measure of current account persistence.

I ran a time-series regression for each available country in the following form:

$$\Delta\left(\frac{\text{CU}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_i = \beta\left(\frac{\text{CU}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{i-1} + \varepsilon_i. \quad (18)$$

This yields one  $\beta$  coefficient per country. The countries, the number of observations used in the autoregressive estimation of  $\beta$ , and the fitted values are listed in Aizenman (2006, tables B1–B4). Table 6 provides the estimates for several Latin American countries.

**Table 5. Current Account Persistence across Subgroups<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Period and sample</i>	<i>Lag(CU/ GDP)</i>	<i>Standard error</i>	<i>No. observations</i>	<i>R<sup>2</sup></i>
1970–2004				
All countries	−0.437***	0.026	4,053	0.2548
Developing	−0.441***	0.027	3,346	0.2608
OECD	−0.260***	0.036	707	0.2315
Manufacturing exporters	−0.250***	0.056	273	0.3655
Commodity exporters	−0.362***	0.049	391	0.4182
Latin America	−0.432***	0.088	594	0.3082
Asia	−0.217***	0.063	298	0.3812
1980–1992				
All countries	−0.544***	0.041	1,661	0.3316
Developing	−0.546***	0.042	1,394	0.3336
OECD	−0.433***	0.057	267	0.2228
Latin America	−0.523***	0.091	234	0.3395
Asia	−0.248***	0.067	114	0.1626
1993–2004				
All countries	−0.563***	0.046	1,708	0.3421
Developing	−0.568***	0.047	1,445	0.3443
OECD	−0.347***	0.059	263	0.2224
Latin America	−0.507***	0.059	216	0.3963
Asia	−0.315***	0.087	112	0.166
Indebtedness				
Severely indebted (Debt1)	−0.435***	0.047	1,016	0.2737
Moderately indebted (Debt2)	−0.512***	0.040	930	0.3515
Less indebted (Debt3)	−0.412***	0.057	999	0.2449
Income level				
Low (Income1)	−0.413***	0.044	1,137	0.2679
Lower-middle (Income2)	−0.495***	0.056	1,105	0.3302
Upper-middle (Income3)	−0.496***	0.057	844	0.2809
High (Income4)	−0.315***	0.050	961	0.224

Source: Author's estimations.

\*\*\* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

a. The dependent variable is D(CU/GDP). For a list of the indebtedness ranking of each country and the breakdown by income level, see Aizenman (2006, tables B1–B2, available online at [papers.nber.org/papers/w12734](http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12734)).

Table 6. Estimated  $\beta$  for Selected Countries

Country	$\beta$	Standard error	No. observations	$R^2$
Argentina	-0.396	0.083***	34	0.1896
Brazil	-0.214	0.093**	34	0.0841
Chile	-0.447	0.117***	34	0.2108
Costa Rica	-0.329	0.103***	34	0.1602
Dominican Republic	-0.477	0.232**	34	0.1703
Ecuador	-0.73	0.185***	34	0.3629
El Salvador	-0.917	0.196***	34	0.47
Haiti	-0.282	0.126**	32	0.153
Honduras	-0.586	0.163***	30	0.2968
Mexico	-0.413	0.149***	34	0.2041
Uruguay	-0.494	0.128***	34	0.2462
Venezuela	-0.656	0.129***	34	0.3164

Source: Author's estimations.  
\*\* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. \*\*\* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

The persistence proxy used in the next step is simply the value of the pure autoregressive process of the current account deflated by GDP:

$$\left(\frac{CU}{GDP}\right)_t = \alpha \left(\frac{CU}{GDP}\right)_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t,$$

(19)

where  $\alpha = \beta + 1$ . In the second step, I look at the cross-section relationship between the measure of persistence represented by  $\alpha$  and a series of structural parameters for these economies, on the one hand, and a measure of the stock of reserves deflated by GDP, on the other.<sup>20</sup>

The univariate regressions reveal that higher reserves, higher GDP growth, and a lower share of commodities are associated with a significant increase in the persistency of the current account for non-OECD countries (see table 7). International reserves are insignificant for a sample that includes the OECD countries. The multivariate regressions

20. Out of 134 countries, ten countries have negative alphas that would represent extreme volatility in the current account. These countries are generally small economies with very sensitive external sectors. To reduce noise in future regressions, I have purged these countries from the data. (See the countries in italics in Aizenman, 2006, table B4; available online at [papers.nber.org/papers/w12734](http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12734)).

indicate that for developing countries, higher persistence is positively associated with a higher reserves-GDP ratio, lower inflation, greater exchange rate flexibility (measured as the volatility of the nominal exchange rate), and a higher share of manufacturing (see table 8).

**Table 7. Univariate Regressions<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Explanatory variable</i>	<i>All countries</i>	<i>Non-OECD countries</i>
Reserves	0.068 (0.110)	0.183 (0.100)*
Nominal exchange rate volatility	-0.056 (0.247)	0.058 (0.240)
Financial integration	0.142 (0.110)	-0.042 (0.113)
Terms of trade	0.058 (0.083)	0.116 (0.085)
GDP growth	1.701 (0.635)***	2.119 (0.639)***
Percent share of commodities	-0.415 (0.096)***	-0.311 (0.102)***
Inflation	-0.017 (0.044)	0.009 (0.044)

Source: Author's estimations.

\* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. \*\*\* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

a. The dependent variable is alpha. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

The results reported above are consistent with the consumption-smoothing role of current account adjustments. To illustrate, consider a benchmark neoclassical economy in which consumption is determined by the permanent income hypothesis (that is, linear marginal utility of consumption); output follows a first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), process defined as  $Y_t - \bar{Y} = \rho(Y_{t-1} - \bar{Y}) + \bar{Y}\varepsilon_t$  (where  $|\rho| < 1$ , with output reverting to the long-run mean,  $\bar{Y}$ , at a rate determined by  $1 - \rho$ ); and agents can borrow and lend at the real interest,  $r$ , which also equals their subjective rate of time preference. Then, around the long-run equilibrium,<sup>21</sup>

21. This follows from the observation that in such an economy,  $C_t = rB_t + \bar{Y} + [r/(1 - r - \rho)](Y_t - \bar{Y})$ . Hence,  $CU_t = rB_t + Y_t - C_t = [(1 - \rho)/(1 + r - \rho)](Y_t - \bar{Y})$ . In the vicinity of the long-run equilibrium,  $(CU_t/Y) = [(1 - \rho)/(1 + r - \rho)]\{\rho(Y_{t-1} - \bar{Y}) + \bar{Y}\varepsilon_t\}/Y_t = \rho(CU_{t-1}/Y_{t-1})(Y_{t-1}/Y_t) + (1 - \rho)/(1 + r - \rho)(\bar{Y}/Y_t)\varepsilon_t \approx \rho(CU_{t-1}/Y_{t-1}) + (1 - \rho)/(1 + r - \rho)\varepsilon_t$ .

Table 8. Multivariate Regression<sup>a</sup>

<i>Explanatory variable</i>	<i>All countries</i>	<i>Non-OECD countries</i>
Reserves	0.058 (0.089)	0.192 (0.082)**
Inflation	-0.101 (0.042)**	-0.072 (0.043)*
Nominal exchange rate volatility	0.566 (0.303)*	0.545 (0.294)*
Terms of trade	0.177 (0.088)**	0.195 (0.098)*
Financial integration	0.298 (0.114)**	0.076 (0.127)
Manufacturing exports	0.784 (0.212)***	0.628 (0.225)***
<i>Summary statistic</i>		
No. observations	94	80
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.2084	0.1618

Source: Author's estimations.  
\* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. \*\* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. \*\*\* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
a. The dependent variable is alpha. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

$$\left(\frac{CU}{Y}\right)_t \approx \rho \left(\frac{CU}{Y}\right)_{t-1} + \frac{1-\rho}{1+r-\rho} \varepsilon_t.$$

(20)

Hence,  $\alpha \approx \rho$ . Next I modify the above assumptions to add the possibility of sudden stops. Specifically, assume that the probability of a sudden stop, which terminates the ability to borrow externally, is  $\Phi$ , where  $\Phi = \Phi(IR/Y)$  and  $\Phi' < 0$ . Under these circumstances,

$$\alpha \approx \rho (1 - \Phi).$$

(21)

This suggests that a negative association between sudden stops and hoarding reserves may account for the impact of international reserves on the persistency of current account adjustment.



## 5. ON THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVE MANAGEMENT

I close the paper with a discussion of the limitations of international reserve management. While useful, international reserve management is not a panacea, and it is subject to serious limitations as outlined below.

First, as with any insurance, there is no way to avoid various layers of moral hazard, which can be broken down into macroeconomic and microeconomic hazards. With regard to the former, any deep pot of resources may be the target of opportunistic raiding by policymakers in regimes characterized by political instability and limited monitoring. Central bank independence helps and is desirable, but it is not sufficient to overcome this obstacle.<sup>22</sup> Microeconomic moral hazard, in turn, centers on the likelihood that large stockpiles of reserves may subsidize risk taking, especially if the hoarding is viewed as a signal of a low probability of exchange rate changes.<sup>23</sup>

Second, international reserve management carries fiscal costs, including a direct opportunity cost (that is, the marginal product of investment or the cost of external borrowing) and any marginal costs of sterilization.<sup>24</sup> Hauner (2005) estimates these costs for a hundred countries in 1990–2004; he concludes that while most countries made money on their reserves in 1990–2001, most lost money in 2002–04. One should keep in mind, however, the difficulties in tracing the full benefits of hoarding reserves:

“While assessing the fiscal cost of holding reserves, it would be worthwhile to set off the benefits that the country may have in holding reserves. In any country risk analysis by the rating agencies and other institutions, the level of reserves generally has high weights. Moreover, it is essential to keep in view some hidden benefits which could accrue to a country holding reserves, which may, *inter alia*, include: maintaining confidence in monetary and exchange rate policies; enhancing the capacity to intervene in foreign exchange markets; limiting external vulnerability so as to absorb

22. See Aizenman and Marion (2004) for empirical results on the adverse effects of political instability on hoarding international reserves.

23. See Levy Yeyati (2008), who advocates a combined scheme of, first, decentralized reserves in the form of liquid asset requirements on individual banks to limit moral hazard and, second, an *ex-ante* suspension-of-convertibility clause to reduce the self-insurance costs while limiting bank losses in the event of a run.

24. See Calvo (1991) for an early discussion on the quasi-costs of sterilization.

shocks during times of crisis; providing confidence to the markets that external obligations can always be met; and reducing volatility in foreign exchange markets. It is true that beyond a point, when the credit rating reaches appropriate investment grade, addition to reserves may not lead to further improvement in the credit rating. It is necessary to recognize that, as in the case of costs, there are difficulties in computing the benefits too.” (Reddy, 2006.)

Third, any government in the process of analyzing its international reserve management program faces coordination issues. While this paper has focused on international reserve management as self-insurance, international reserve management may be part of a fiscal scheme to augment social security and future pensions. This is especially relevant for commodity-exporting countries like Chile, Norway, and so on. The management of these funds is best delegated to two different agencies. One, like the central bank, should undertake international reserve management as part of a prudent macroeconomic management throughout the business cycle. The second fund is best managed by the treasury or the social security administration, as it deals with long-term intergenerational transfer.<sup>25</sup>

To conclude, this paper outlined several motives for hoarding international reserves in this era of growing financial integration. The message of the report is mixed, and reserve management is not a panacea. The mercantilist case for hoarding international reserves, as an ingredient of an export-led growth strategy, is dubious. Done properly, however, international reserve management reduces downside risk in turbulent times. These benefits are especially important for commodity-exporting countries and countries with limited financial development.

25. For further discussion, see Davis and others (2001).

## APPENDIX A

### Data Definitions and Sources

This appendix defines the key variables used in the main paper and outlines the data sources. For the indebtedness ranking, country classification by income level, data availability, and estimated  $\beta$  for each country, see Aizenman (2006, tables B1–B4).<sup>26</sup>

—Manufactures: the average of annual observations of the percentage of economic activity dedicated to the production of manufactures (measured as percentage of GDP). Following the definition given by the United Nations, manufactures include the tabulation category D and divisions 15–37 in the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 3. Manufactures are defined as the physical or chemical transformation of materials or components into new products, whether the work is performed by power-driven machines or by hand, whether it is done in a factory or in the worker's home, and whether the products are sold wholesale or retail. The definition includes assembly of component parts of manufactured products and the recycling of waste materials.

—Commodities: the average of annual observations of the percentage of economic activity dedicated to the production of agricultural products, mining, hunting, and utilities.

—Reserves: the average of annual observations of the stock of reserves over GDP taken during the sample period. The sample period depends on data availability.

—Nominal exchange rate volatility: the average annual volatility of the nominal exchange rate. Each annual observation corresponds to the percent standard deviation of the monthly nominal rate of the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar,

$$\sqrt{\sum \left( \frac{x - \bar{x}}{\bar{x}} \right)^2 / (n - 1)}.$$

—Financial integration: the average of annual observations of Edward's (2001) measure of financial integration.

—Inflation: the average of annual CPI inflation observations.

—Terms of trade: the average of annual observations of the terms of trade defined as the ratio of the export price index to the corresponding import price index, measured relative to the base year (2000).

26. Available online at [www.nber.org/papers/w12734](http://www.nber.org/papers/w12734).

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