Banco Central de ChileRevista Economía Chilena
Published Issues
Volume 3 Nº 2 August 2000
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| Articles |
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| Financial Structure in Chile: Macroeconomic Developments and Microeconomic Effects Francisco Gallego Y.; Norman Loayza The objectives of this paper are, first, to describe the developments in Chilean financial markets at the macroeconomic level and, then, to examine their effects at the level of firms. First, the paper describes the remarkable changes in the size, activity, and efficiency of the banking sector and other capital markets (bond, stock, pension and insurance markets) during 1980s and 1990s. Then, the paper analyzes econometrically the access to financial markets, the financing (balance-sheet) structure, and the revenue growth performance in a sample of 79 Chilean firms during the period 1985-1995. |
| The Structure of Real Interest Rates in Chile. Fernando Lefort G.; Eduardo Walker H. This paper describes the structure of real interest rates (the real yield curve) in Chile and shows its evolution through time. It provides a practical tool for the systematic study of the determinants of Chilean yield curves. Empirical estimations are based on transaction and auction data for Central Bank bonds and pension recognition bonds issued by the government, applying the Nelson and Siegel method. Estimation results are used to measure the liquidity premium in the market maker’s bond yield, simulate the evolution of the very short and long-term rates, and analyze issues of Central Bank zero-coupon bonds and the response of domestic interest rates to local and international economic events. |
| Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities have Different Objectives. Herman Bennett C.; Norman Loayza O. The question that this paper examines is what policy bias there may be when monetary and fiscal authorities have different preferences regarding the importance of closing the output and inflation gaps created by adverse economic shocks. For this purpose, the paper follows a game-theoretic approach to model the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities, each having different preferences and controlling their respective policy instrument. Modeled as a Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium, the absence of policy coordination implies that an increase in the preference divergence between both authorities leads to, ceteris paribus, larger public deficits (the fiscal authority’s policy instrument) and higher interest rates (the central bank’s instrument). The empirical section of the paper provides evidence in favor of this conclusion in a pooled sample of 19 industrial countries with annual information for the period 1970-94. The policy implication of the paper is that, without prejudice to the gains from central bank independence, institutional arrangements that allow for monetary-fiscal coordination may alleviate the biases that move the economy to sub-optimally higher fiscal deficits and real interest rates. |
| Research Notes |
| The Economics of Adjustment and Growth por Pierre-Richard Agénor Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel D. Macroeconomía en un mundo interdependiente por Carlos Massad y Guillermo Pattillo Andrés Sanfuentes V. Teoría Macroeconómica: Ciclos Económicos, Crecimiento e Inflación por Francisco Rosende R. Raphael Bergoeing V. |
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